










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/92367 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Romeijn, J. 
Title: What’s the issue? : the lobbying and representativeness of political parties on 
specific policy issues 

















Political parties take positions and make decisions on many policies 
that directly influence important parts of the lives of their voters. 
These policies include issues like raising the retirement age, lending 
money to large companies that face bankruptcy, or deploying soldiers 
to Afghanistan.
But do political parties take into account the policy preferences of 
the general public and their own voters when making such decisions? 
And to what extent do interest groups influence political parties’ 
positions and decisions on these policy issues? 
This dissertation studies these important questions across a 
range of wealthy, Northwestern European democracies with strong 
democratic credentials, covering dozens of political parties, policy 
issues and even more interest groups and other policy advocates.
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In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis in the Netherlands, a policy proposal to 
raise the retirement age attracted large amounts of political and media attention. A 
hearing was organized in parliament, and major trade unions, employers’ organizations, 
companies, experts, pension funds and individual pensioners were included in the 
media debate on the issue. The major trade union, the FNV even faced considerable 
internal tension over an initial plan to raise the retirement age from 65 to 66 years. In 
spite of the strong and vocal opposition to the increase from trade unions and senior 
organizations (ANBO), a majority of the advocacy organizations and experts that were 
active on the issue and featured in newspapers, the hearing in parliament or in touch 
with civil servants, actually supported the increase of the retirement age to 67. At the 
same time, a higher retirement age was very unpopular with the general public: ac-
cording to the NKO (Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek) around 66% of Dutch voters disagreed 
with the policy plan.
So what happened on this issue where on the one hand interest groups and experts 
(on average) supported the policy proposal, and voters tended to disagree with it? In this 
case the government, composed of the center-right VVD and CDA parties and with the 
support of several political parties to their left, took the side of most policy advocates 
active on the issue and in July of 2012, the First Chamber of Dutch parliament passed the 
law regulating the increase of the Dutch retirement age.
The story presented here highlights how politics is often fought not just over broad 
ideological conflicts, but over specific policy issues. These policies determine many 
important aspects of citizens’ lives, from the age at which they can retire to where their 
energy comes from. In most Western-European democracies, political parties are given 
the task of deciding on such policies and incorporating public preferences into policy-
making – ensuring the representation of public preferences and interests (Mair, 2010).
However, we know little about how political parties fulfill their representative role 
when it comes to such specific policy issues, or what determines their positions on these 
issues. Considering the example of the Dutch retirement age above, there are multiple 
studies on the effects of public opinion on policy outputs that may help us understand 
how typical it is that a policy is introduced that is not supported by a public majority (e.g. 
Giger & Klüver, 2016; Gilens, 2012; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Rasmussen, Reher, & Toshkov, 
2018). The influence of interest groups and other policy advocates on policy outputs 
has also been studied extensively, even if it remains hard to prove (e.g. Baumgartner, 
Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009; Lowery, 2013; Rasmussen, Mäder, & Reher, 2018). 
However, if we want to understand the policy positions of the government parties VVD 
and CDA on raising the retirement age, we have little evidence from political science to 
help us.
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Most of the literature on how political parties represent public opinion and take 
positions has not studied their positions on specific policy issues. Instead, the focus has 
been on party positions on ideological dimensions (left-right) and whether these over-
lap with or react to the electorate’s ideological preferences or positions. While this has 
contributed tremendously to our understanding of whether and how political parties 
represent the general public, this dissertation contributes to this literature by study-
ing the positions and actions of political parties on specific policy issues instead. Such 
a policy-centered approach (Hacker & Pierson, 2014) allows for studying how political 
parties take into account the preferences of voters on these specific policy issues. Doing 
so is important firstly because these specific policy issues actually directly impact the 
lives of citizens. Moreover, there is evidence that the preferences of the public on these 
issues are not strongly related to their self-positioning on ideological scales (Lesschaeve, 
2017), meaning that representation on ideological dimensions does not necessarily 
imply representation on specific issues (Broockman, 2016).
Secondly, this dissertation helps to extend our knowledge about whether a second 
set of actors may help (or thwart) the translation of public preferences into policy and 
to political parties: interest groups and other policy advocates. Studies in the field of 
interest groups studies have tended to generally take a more policy-centered approach 
(Hacker & Pierson, 2014). We therefore know a lot more about the extent to which they 
(try to) influence specific policy than we do political parties. Due to the GovLis project, 
of which this dissertation is a part, there is also evidence that while imperfectly, interest 
groups may have the potential to help establish links between public preferences and 
policy (Flöthe & Rasmussen, 2019; Rasmussen & Reher, 2019). This dissertation contrib-
utes to these studies by tracing a set of specific policy issues over time, to provide a more 
detailed assessment of the ability of interest groups and other policy advocates to fill 
the representational gaps that may be left by political parties.
Thirdly and finally, a policy-centered approach (Hacker & Pierson, 2014) allows for 
studying these two sets of important interest aggregators, political parties and interest 
groups, in conjunction. There is increasing evidence for the existence of ties and contacts 
between organized interests and political parties and existing studies often assume that 
these ties matter a great deal for policy-making (e.g. Allern, 2010; Rasmussen & Linde-
boom, 2013; Thomas, 2001). However, we do not know whether this is actually the case. 
Focusing on specific policies allows for placing the actions and preferences of political 
parties and policy advocates on a shared metric and studying these actors together. This 
dissertation therefore contributes to existing studies by investigating whether contacts 
and ideological overlap between these two sets of actors matter for policy-making.
This introductory chapter discusses the specific literatures that the different parts 
of this dissertation contribute to. It starts with a discussion of the representative role of 
political parties in Western European democracies, outlining why existing studies may 
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overestimate the ability of political parties to act as representatives of public prefer-
ences. The discussion then continues with a similar discussion of the role of interest 
groups. Subsequently, the literature that has integrated the study of these two sets of 
actors is presented. For each of these parts, the specific contribution of this dissertation 
is highlighted. A discussion of some of the methodological choices is then presented, 
followed by an overview of the chapters of the dissertation.
1.2 PolITICAl PArTIes As rePresenTATIves of 
PublIC PreferenCes
One central assumption in representative democracies is that public preferences ought to 
affect the policies that are introduced by elected politicians. The idea being that in order 
for substantive representation to take place, there should at a minimum be a correlation 
between the policy preferences of the public and the policies it receives (Dahl, 1956). It 
is important to avoid conflating this with the idea that democratic politics should always 
or simply follow the preferences of public majorities. In many cases, political parties and 
politicians have to combine or balance their function as representatives of the public 
with other obligations (Mair, 2010). For example, where the protection of minorities or 
fundamental human rights is concerned, following public opinion may turn decidedly 
undemocratic. Similarly, politicians are expected to behave ‘responsibly’ towards other 
interests like international treaties, the environment or future generations (Mair, 2010). 
Notwithstanding these important reservations it is difficult to conceive of a democratic 
system without any correlation between the preferences of the general public and the 
policy decisions made (Dahl, 1956; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
Over the last century, political parties have been the main actors ensuring the 
strength of this linkage in Western democracies (Mair, 2008). This is especially true in the 
political systems of Western Europe, where multiple and generally well-organized and 
disciplined parties tend to dominate politics. Through elections these parties were and 
are expected to organize and aggregate the preferences of citizens into government 
and public policy in what has been called the ‘representative’ function of political par-
ties, helping to ensure that policy decisions are perceived as legitimate (Keman, 2014; 
Mair, 2010; Mansbridge, 2003). While there are other sources of such legitimacy, making 
policies that reflect public preferences is an important constituent part of the legitimacy 
of representative democracies (Dahl, 1956) and has been shown to affect citizens’ satis-
faction with democracy (Reher, 2015).
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1.3 (lImITATIons To) exIsTIng sTuDIes of The 
rePresenTATIve role AnD CAPACITy of PolITICAl 
PArTIes
Political scientists have studied the extent to which political parties are able to live up 
to this ideal by evaluating whether political parties’ positions reflect the preferences of 
citizens. To measure the congruence, or overlap, between public opinion and the policy 
positions of parties and governments, such studies have generally relied on measures of 
ideological congruence (Golder & Stramski, 2010). Following the pivotal work of Downs 
(1957), these studies assume that most political conflict is organized along a central 
ideological left-right axis. Scholars working in this tradition have developed methods 
to compare the positions and distributions of the policy preferences of (members of ) 
the general public with those of political parties and government (coalitions) (Golder & 
Stramski, 2010).
Regardless of the measure used, these studies of ideological scales typically find 
rather high levels of congruence between public preferences and the policy positions of 
political parties (and government coalitions) in Western Europe (Ferland, 2016; Golder & 
Ferland, 2017). What is more, some scholars have suggested that along this left-right axis, 
congruence has even increased strongly in a country like the Netherlands (Andeweg, 
2011). The general picture painted is therefore one that is rather positive about the 
representative capacity of political parties. Much academic attention has subsequently 
shifted to studying what may explain differences in levels of ideological congruence 
across political systems, focusing predominantly of the role of electoral (and other) 
institutions (Blais & Bodet, 2006; Ferland, 2016; Golder & Ferland, 2017; Powell, 2006, 
2009). Specifically, there is an ongoing debate about whether majoritarian or first-past-
the-post political systems offer more accurate representation than more proportional 
electoral systems (Ferland, 2016; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). Although the jury is still out, 
there is evidence that such differences may depend on the time period studied (Ferland, 
2016), and that institutional configurations may not have direct or only conditional ef-
fects when it comes to congruence between public preferences and policy-making on 
specific issues (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018).
These studies of ideological congruence have contributed much to our understand-
ing of representative democracies. However, their focus on a single left-right ideological 
dimension conceals large parts of the political conflict and decision-making that affects 
both politics and representation. Formulated most clearly by Hacker and Pierson (2014), 
the criticism of existing studies relying heavily on Downsian analytical frameworks boils 
down to the idea that they do not capture that often “the key struggle is not over gaining 
office but over reshaping governance in enduring ways” (p. 644). Focusing on the idea 
that political parties also aim to take ideological positions that increase their vote share 
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(vote-seeking) and entering office (office-seeking), analyses relying on ideological scales 
almost always stop short of analyzing what is another very important driver of politics in 
(modern) Western democracies: influencing policy (ibid.). Or as Schattschneider (1948, 
p. 21) wrote well before Hacker & Pierson when referring to the importance of policy: 
“Public office simply cannot be an end in itself”.
A policy-centered perspective allows for the more direct study of the policy-seeking 
behavior of political parties, and its possible consequences for representation. A large 
share of every day politics, including the formation of government coalitions and legis-
lative processes is driven by politicians in political parties that seek to change or affect 
policy (Hacker & Pierson, 2014). The fact that political parties do indeed spend consid-
erable efforts on policy-related activity is evidenced by a strand in the literature that 
has fruitfully applied a policy-centered approach to the study political parties: studies 
that investigate whether political parties fulfill the pledges they make during election 
campaigns (Costello & Thomson, 2008; Louwerse, 2012; Naurin, 2014; Thomson et al., 
2017). These studies show that across Western democracies, parties that enter govern-
ment (coalitions) manage to implement around 60% of the promises they make in their 
election manifestos (Thomson et al., 2017).
Secondly and crucially, rather than general left-right ideological shifts, it is concrete 
policy decisions like raising the retirement age and setting environmental standards or 
taxation levels that affect the daily lives of citizens. Importantly, there is evidence that 
citizens’ positions on left-right scales are rather weakly correlated to their preferences 
on such specific policy issues (Lesschaeve, 2017). This matters, because it suggests that 
congruence measured on left-right scales only partially captures the public policy pref-
erences that ought to be represented by political parties. The low correlation between 
ideological positions and public preferences for specific policy also means that even 
when finding high levels of congruence on left-right scales, policy-making or party posi-
tions need not actually be congruent with the policy preferences of citizens on specific 
issues (Broockman, 2016). In a study of roll-call voting by American senators, Lax, Phil-
lips, and Zelizer (2019, p. 4) call this the “False Substitutes Problem”:
“It is, in our view, too lenient a test to praise democratic representation for, say, making 
abortion policy more liberal when it is opinion on immigration issues that got more 
liberal, or vice versa—yet indices and ideological scores do just that. To care about 
responsiveness as a matter of normative democratic theory, one must surely think that 
the actual contents of the policy basket matter, and not just the ideological tone of the 
basket.”
Surprisingly, we know little about the policy positions of political parties on specific 
issues, nor do we know whether these positions are related to the preferences of the 
Chapter 1  |  Introduction
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general public, or those of a party’s supporters. There is, however, a separate literature 
that studies the congruence between public opinion and policy outputs (not party posi-
tions), that has made considerable contributions to our understanding of representa-
tion. In a seminal study, Gilens (2012) shows that although there are strong connections 
between the policies that the public wants and gets, this relationship is mainly driven 
by the preferences of wealthy citizens. Studies using a similar approach show that this 
is also the case in the Netherlands and Germany: countries with a different political 
system, lower levels of economic inequality and a much smaller role for campaign 
donations (Elsässer, Hense, & Schäfer, 2017; Schakel, 2019). Other studies have success-
fully applied similar methods to study the effect of institutions on the relation between 
public opinion and policy at the country (Rasmussen, Reher, et al., 2018), or US state 
level (Lax & Phillips, 2012).
In parallel to these developments in the literature, studies of the representativeness 
of political parties have started to move beyond the study of the left-right dimension. 
Although stopping short of studying specific policy-issues, such studies increasingly 
consider salient policy dimensions or scales like Europeanization or immigration. They 
show, for example, that while the positions of political parties (in government) are 
strongly related to the preferences of citizens on the left-right dimension, there are 
much larger gaps between public preferences and policy positions on these other is-
sue dimensions (Dalton, 2017). Similarly, the observation in studies of specific policy 
issues that policy correlates more closely with the preferences of rich citizens is echoed 
in these studies of dimensions (Giger, Rosset, & Bernauer, 2012; Peters & Ensink, 2015): 
the inequality in congruence between the policy positions of the rich and poor is much 
larger on more specific ideological dimensions like Europeanization than on the general 
left-right dimension (Rosset & Stecker, 2019). These studies clearly present a step for-
ward in the study of how political parties represent public preferences. They also show 
that the extent to which the political system represents public preferences may depend 
on the policy area. However, even these studies stop short of considering specific policy 
positions of political parties.
1.4 The benefITs of ADDIng The sTuDy of sPeCIfIC 
PolICy Issues To The sTuDy of PolITICAl PArTIes
As noted above, empirical accounts of the representative capacity of political parties to 
continue to represent citizens are generally rather positive. At the same time, studies 
incorporating more than the central left-right dimension, or focusing on specific policy 
outputs rather than party positions, paint a much bleaker picture of the state of democ-
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racy and highlight problems with inequality or conditional responsiveness (e.g. Dalton, 
2017; Gilens, 2012).
In addition, more theoretically-driven accounts of the representative capacity of 
political parties also underline this skeptical image. One pivotal scholar in this regard 
is Peter Mair, who famously argued that when balancing representative and respon-
sible governing, political parties in Western Europe have increasingly favored the latter 
(Mair, 2010). One important cause for this, according to Mair, is the increasing lock-in 
of political parties in commitments in international treaties and EU-power, as well as 
the tendency to depoliticize much of policy-making in regulatory agencies (Ibid). Act-
ing responsibly also entails that government should be reliable, meaning that when a 
new government is elected it will not overturn policy decisions made by the previous 
administration – further limiting the ability of parties in government to act responsively. 
In addition, he argued that political parties have become increasingly detached from 
civil society. Firstly because, according to Mair, the weakening of traditional cleavages 
and ideological conflicts in Western European countries has simply made it harder for 
political parties to know what public preferences are. This dealignment of voters has 
also meant that when parties make hard decisions that may be unpopular, they are less 
able to appeal to the group identities, loyal voters, or cleavages that allowed them to 
enhance the legitimacy of their policy decisions in the past (Mair, 2010). Finally, Mair ar-
gued (together with Richard Katz) that most political parties have increasingly become 
agents of the state. Not only because political parties in Western Europe are increasingly 
dependent on state subsidies for their survival, but also because elections have increas-
ingly started to revolve around a ‘right to govern’ and around proving which party is the 
most capable administrator (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009).
Much of the skeptical image of the representative role of political parties painted 
above has been nuanced in subsequent studies. For example, van der Meer, Lubbe, van 
Elsas, Elff, and van der Brug (2012) show that ideology still plays an important role in the 
vote choices of Dutch citizens, even if they now choose more actively between ideologi-
cally related sets of possible parties. As mentioned, there is also evidence that political 
parties and systems have remained responsive to the preferences of either their voters 
or the general public (Golder & Ferland, 2017; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). However, the 
findings that levels of congruence between the policy preferences of parties and the 
public vary across policy areas suggest that further research is warranted (Dalton, 2017).
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1.5 InTeresT grouPs As AlTernATIves for 
PolITICAl PArTIes
If we follow the concerns of Mair outlined above, as well as some of the findings from 
Chapter 2, other organizations than political parties alone may have to (help) ensure 
the representation of public preferences in policy. Mair even came to the rather grim 
conclusion that:
Contribution 1: The ability of political parties to represent the 
general public on specific policy issues
So how can we unite these contradictory conclusions of high congruence between 
political parties and the public on the one hand, and more skeptical accounts of the 
representative role of political parties on the other? Chapter 2 of this dissertation 
proposes a way forward by studying the policy positions of political parties on 102 
specific policy proposals in Germany. These are exactly the kind of issues that affect 
the lives of citizens like cutting specific social benefit programs, increasing taxes 
for employees who commute by car, or changes to the health insurance system. 
Combining survey data on the policy preferences of both the general public and 
the supporters of specific political parties with the policy positions of these parties, 
allows for analyzing whether the latter are related to public preferences. To do this, 
the chapter proposes a new application of Multilevel Regression with Poststratifica-
tion (MRP) (Park et al., 2006) that helps to estimate the preferences of the support-
ers of a political party – especially in those instances where survey data contain a 
relatively small number of party supporters. Chapter 2 therefore offers a new way 
of studying the representative role of political parties and reveals a picture of this 
role that is much less positive than is often suggested in studies of the congru-
ence between the policy positions of the public and political parties. Importantly, 
the findings show that the policy preferences of opposition parties are strongly 
correlated with those of the general public. However, this correlation breaks down 
once political parties enter government. To the extent that government parties 
have a stronger influence on government policy, this suggests that this may harm 
the representation of public preferences in policy.
Research question 1: Are the policy positions of political parties related to the prefer-
ences of the general public or their supporters on specific policy issues? And what are 
the covariates of these relationships?
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“Meanwhile, the representation of the citizens, to the extent that it still occurs at all, is 
given over to other, non-governing organizations and practices – to interest groups, so-
cial movements, advocacy coalitions, lobbies, the media, self-representation, etc. – that 
are disconnected from the party system“ (Mair, 2010, p. 6).
Among these alternative organizations, interest groups and other policy advocates 
especially stand out as potential organizations that may help transfer public preferences 
to political elites and ultimately policy. Unlike the literature on political parties, the lit-
erature on interest groups generally does not focus on a single ideological dimension, 
but studies specific policies instead (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009; Hacker & Pierson, 
2014). The main reason for this is that most political activity by interest groups takes 
place at the level of specific policy issues: rather than pushing general public policy in a 
left- or right-wing direction, most lobbying and other interest group (political) activity is 
geared towards achieving more specific political goals (Burstein, 2014).
The literature on interest groups and policy advocacy has almost from its conception 
been interested in the potential of organized interests to work as transmission belts that 
help translate public preferences into policy (Truman, 1951). Simultaneously, there has 
been a persistent worry that such groups represent elite, rather general public prefer-
ences (Schattschneider, 1960). While there is a large number of studies that investigates 
the influence (or lobbying success) of interest groups (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009; Dür, 
Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2015; Lowery, 2013; Mahoney, 2007), there is much less work 
investigating the representative effects of lobbying and interest group politics (but see: 
Burstein, 2014; Gilens & Page, 2014; Gray et al., 2004).
The GovLis project that this dissertation is part of, has empirically studied this 
transmission belt function of public opinion using an approach focusing on specific 
policy issues. In a study that underlines the representative potential of interest groups, 
Flöthe and Rasmussen (2019) studied the positions of interest groups and other policy 
advocates on 50 policy issues in Western Europe for which public opinion surveys were 
available. They show that in around half of all instances, policy advocates take the same 
side as the public opinion majority on issues. When disaggregating the results, they 
also show that public interest groups, like NGOs, are on the same side as the public 
opinion majority around 78% of the time, with business actors aligning with the public 
in just under 45% of cases. In a study including a large number of European countries, 
Rasmussen and Reher (2019) also show that the larger the share of the public that is 
a member of (politically active) voluntary associations in a policy area, the higher the 
likelihood that policy in that policy area is in line with public opinion. Their findings 
also suggest that interest groups, in this case in the shape of voluntary associations, can 
help translate public preferences to policy. These studies are clearly indicative of the 
representative potential of interest groups and policy advocacy.
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1.6 The PolICy ImPACT of TIes beTWeen InTeresT 
grouPs AnD PolITICAl PArTIes
The studies cited above show that interest groups may have some potential for trans-
mitting public preferences into policy, but they do not include political parties in their 
models or theoretical frameworks. However, a related literature has emerged that does 
study the ties between interest groups and parties, and scholars of party politics and 
interest groups alike have called for a closer integration of the empirical study of interest 
groups and political parties (Allern & Bale, 2012; Fraussen & Halpin, 2018; Heaney, 2010).
Usually focusing on Northwestern Europe, empirical studies of party-group ties 
often start with investigating the traditional links between political parties and interest 
groups (Allern et al., 2007; Thomas, 2001). Especially the traditionally close ties between 
Contribution 2: studying the representative potential of policy 
advocacy on specific issues over longer time periods
To further investigate this representative potential of interest groups, Chapter 3 
(co-authored with Anne Rasmussen and Dimiter Toshkov) studies the influence 
of both public opinion and media advocacy on four regulatory policy issues over 
relatively long time periods in Sweden. For policy advocates to have the potential 
to contribute to the representation of the policy preferences of the general public, 
they ought to at least have some influence over policy-making – and not shift it 
away from public preferences. Hence, the dataset used for this study brings to-
gether measures of public support for specific policies with data on the attention 
politicians pay to these issues in the Swedish parliament. In addition, it traces policy 
developments over time and maps the preferences of advocates as expressed and 
reported in two Swedish newspapers. Focusing on a relatively limited number of 
cases allows for adding more detailed qualitative analyses of policy-making on the 
issues to the quantitative analyses. It also allows for tracing the issues over much 
longer time periods than previous studies. While the quantitative models focus on 
the main effects of public opinion and media advocacy on political attention, the 
in-depth discussion of the cases makes clear that their effects on policy are neither 
straightforward nor deterministic. A closer look at the cases also suggests that party 
government and political parties are still very important for policy-making – includ-
ing in instances where it is incongruent with public preferences.
Research question 2: Do public opinion and media advocacy influence (attention to) 
regulatory policy?
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social democratic parties and trade unions have received much attention (Allern et al., 
2007; Allern & Bale, 2017). In part due to their shared origins in labour movements in 
the early 20th century, ties between trade unions and social democratic parties were 
often close and for example evident from the strong organizational integration between 
them. However, the links between these parties and the labour movement have slowly 
weakened during the second half of the 20th century (Allern et al., 2007; Öberg et al., 
2011), even if there is cross-national variation in the extent of this decline (Allern & Bale, 
2017). This development has been ascribed to a decreased utility of these strong rela-
tions for both sets of actors. Importantly, the increased volatility of voters and declining 
membership means that trade unions have lost some of their appeal to social demo-
cratic parties: after all, it has made them less able to reliably deliver voters (Allern et al., 
2007). Similar developments have also been recorded for the links between business 
groups and center-right parties (Christiansen, 2012) and the environmental movement 
and green parties (Blings, 2018).
While such privileged relationships may still persist, there is evidence that most ties 
between interest groups and political parties are now not driven by such ties, but have 
become more strategic (depending on the policy issue at stake). Rasmussen and Linde-
boom (2013) demonstrate the more ad-hoc nature of such contacts between parties 
and groups in a cross-national study. There is also indirect evidence that relationships 
and contacts between groups and parties are driven by more than historical ties alone. 
Importantly, the fact that traditional ties have weakened means that contacts and links 
between groups and parties have become more strategic and resource dependent. 
Allern et al. (2019), for example, show that in Europe monetary donations by trade 
unions are related to the strength of ties between trade unions and political parties, 
even when controlling for the presence (or absence) of historic ties between them.
Drawing on assumptions that both parties and interest groups are relatively 
strategic actors, current studies generally focus on two factors that dominate con-
tacts between parties and groups. Both tend to assume that most of these contacts 
are initiated by groups (DeBruycker, 2016), who need political parties to achieve the 
implementation of their policy preferences. The first factor that increases the appeal 
of political parties to interest groups is the power of a political party. Political parties 
that wield more influence over policy-making are more attractive contacts for interest 
groups than parties that do not (DeBruycker, 2016; Marshall, 2015; Otjes & Rasmussen, 
2017). In these studies, sources of a party’s power tend to be its size in the legislature, 
its participation in government or its control over (the agenda of ) specific legislative 
committees. Secondly, groups generally prefer contacting parties that are ideologically 
close to them (DeBruycker, 2016; Marshall, 2015), reflecting debates in the American 
literature on lobbying that lobbyists generally prefer to lobby their friends over their 
foes (Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). The assumption is that it 
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is easier for groups to convince parties of their policy preferences when the parties are 
already ideologically pre-disposed to agree with their positions. While empirical studies 
generally find support for this assumption (ibid.), there is evidence that in the stages 
where a legislative proposal is about to be voted on, it may become more important to 
contact opponents instead of ‘friends’ (Crombez, 2002). The electoral system, specifically 
government turnover after elections, may also be related to the extent to which political 
parties and interest groups lobby political parties that are ideologically close to them 
(Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). Finally, this combination of power and ideology may explain 
how interest groups deal with radical right-wing populist parties, which tend to be both 
ideologically far-removed from interest groups and less powerful as they generally do 
not enter government – making groups much less likely to contact these parties (Berk-
hout, Hanegraaff, & Statsch, 2019).
While these assumptions about the utility of political parties to groups’ lobbying 
efforts help explain contact patterns between these two sets of actors, we do not know 
whether these contacts actually have consequences for policy-making. This is surprising, 
because both interest groups and political parties are seen as important aggregators of 
public preferences in Western democracies. What is more, both are often considered 
powerful sets of actors in policy-making (even if the influence of interest groups on 
policy is hard to prove empirically (Lowery, 2013)). Current studies of ties between 
groups and parties generally assume that these contacts are very important for policy 
(e.g. Allern & Bale, 2012; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Thomas, 2001), but do not provide 
empirical evidence for this assumption.
To understand the effects of the contacts between these two sets of actors on policy-
making and, ultimately, representation, it is important to study parties and groups si-
multaneously. Again, the framework of policy-centered research provides a useful angle 
for studying these questions (Hacker & Pierson, 2014). The main reason for this is that 
it allows for placing the policy preferences and actions of interest groups and political 
parties on a common metric: as argued above most interest group activity focuses on 
specific policy issues, and while parties may generally pursue broader and more diverse 
goals, they too spend considerable amounts of their time and energy on pursuing spe-
cific policy-goals. To cite Schattschneider (1948, pp. 22-23) in what is arguably the earli-
est call to study political parties and interest groups together: “The relations between 
pressure groups and political parties can be illustrated by an examination of the role of 
the political parties in the formation of policy”.
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Contribution 3: The lobbying of political parties
Chapter 4 (co-authored with Anne Rasmussen) investigates whether interest 
groups and other policy advocates that work with some political parties are more 
likely to attain their preferences than others. Relying on data from the GovLis sur-
vey on the lobbying activities of 478 advocates in 5 countries and 50 policy issues 
(10 per country), the chapter makes a first step towards understanding the policy 
implications of contacts between interest groups and parties. Following existing 
studies, the chapter first considers whether contacting political parties in general is 
associated with higher rates of preference attainment. It then moves on to consider 
two established drivers of contacts between interest groups and political parties: 
the power and position of the party. Here the assumption is that advocates that 
work with powerful parties are more likely to attain their preferences. Similarly, 
we expect that advocates that work with parties that agree with them are more 
likely to get their way. Finally, we expect a multiplicative effect: advocates that 
lobby powerful parties that also agree with them on the issue are most likely to 
attain their preferences. The results show that working with political parties is not 
as clearly correlated with preference attainment as one may expect based on the 
assumptions in previous studies. In fact, we only find evidence for the idea that 
working with parties that are powerful and agree with the advocate is correlated 
with higher levels of preference attainment. 
Research question 3: Is working with (which) political parties related to the preference 
attainment of policy advocates?
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1.7 meThoDologICAl APProACh
This dissertation is part of the GovLis project1, which studies links between interest 
groups, public preferences and policy with an emphasis on Northwestern European de-
mocracies (Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 2018)2. The chapters of this dissertation all draw on 
data from five countries within this region: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden 
1 Funded through Sapere Aude Grant 0602-02642B from the Danish Council for Independent Research and VIDI 
Grant 452-12-008 from the Dutch NWO.
2 Appendix 1.1 outlines the contribution of the author to the data collection and research design of each of the 
chapters.
Contribution 4: how ties to political parties shape the preference 
attainment of policy advocates after elections
Chapter 5 of this dissertation studies the preference attainment of policy advocates 
after the Dutch general election of 2017. This chapter uses a unique data source 
in order to study lobbying during coalition negotiations and the conditions under 
which policy advocates attain their preferences in the coalition agreement. It com-
pares the letters with policy requests that policy advocates sent to the negotiators 
at the coalition table with the policy positions of the negotiating parties in their 
election manifestos and the final coalition agreement. By placing the policy prefer-
ences of policy advocates and political parties on a common scale – requests and 
positions on specific policy plans – the study can help inform us about the relative 
strength of the two sets of actors. The data also allows for a test of the extent to 
which historic ties between a specific set of interest groups, business actors, and 
the parties at the negotiation table affect the policy choices made in the coalition 
agreement: providing empirical evidence for the assumption that these historic ties 
between policy advocates and parties indeed shape policy-making. However, the 
results also suggest that rather than historical ties it may be the electoral impor-
tance of the subgroup that is represented by a policy advocate that matters for 
its preference attainment – suggesting that the effects of ties between advocates 
and parties may be affected by the electoral strategy of the political party. Like the 
results of chapter 4 also suggested, these findings indicate that the policy implica-
tions of both ties and contacts with political parties are less straightforward than is 
often assumed (but not tested) in the literature. 
Research question: Under which conditions do policy advocates attain their preferences 
after elections?
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and the United Kingdom. With the exception of the inclusion of the United Kingdom in 
Chapter 4, the political systems studied in this dissertation share a number of impor-
tant features. For one, they are proportional electoral systems with high levels of party 
discipline – meaning that political parties in the legislature tend to vote unanimously. 
Similarly, and again with the exception of the United Kingdom, these countries have 
neo-corporatist systems of state-society relations, meaning that interest group access to 
the political systems has historically been relatively limited to a specific set of ‘privileged’ 
actors (Schmitter, 1974). While these characteristics will affect the studied mechanisms 
differently for each of the chapters (as discussed research design and conclusion sec-
tions of each chapter), one can generally expect the findings of this dissertation to best 
generalize to other (North) Western European democracies with (neo-)corporatist tradi-
tions and proportional electoral systems.
As can be seen in the overview of the dissertation provided in Table 1, Chapters 2, 3 
and 5 all rely on data from a single country. While this may imply some ‘loss’ of external 
validity compared to cross-national studies, an approach that keeps many institutional 
variables constant has important benefits. One advantage is that it allows for stronger 
internal validity. As an example, Chapter 2, which focuses on Germany, has both the 
disadvantage of studying only a limited number of parties and the advantage that it 
allows for high quality measurement of public opinion across a large set of policy is-
sues. Simultaneously, this research design has additional benefits for policy-centered 
research (Hacker & Pierson, 2014). Given that one of the major advantages of this analyti-
cal approach is that is allows for an analysis of the policies that actually affect the lives of 
citizens directly, a focus on a specific institutional setting facilitates the discussion and 
comparison of such specific policy issues. In addition to quantitative analyses, chapter 3 
therefore provides more detailed discussions of specific policy issues, which helps to il-
lustrate and understand some of the quantitative findings and facilitates the evaluation 
of the hypotheses (Toshkov, 2016, pp. 318-323).
To analyze specific policies, it is necessary to make choices regarding the policy 
issues that are (not) included in the analyses. Even if it were possible to construct a 
universe of cases consisting of all policy issues (in a country), it would be practically 
impossible to study them all (Burstein, 2014). Instead, the chapters in this dissertation 
rely on samples of policy issues. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 all follow the sampling strategy 
taken by the GovLis project. Given the project’s (and Chapters 2 and 3’s) focus on public 
opinion, the sampling started by identifying public opinion polls that concerned specific 
proposals to change the status quo (Gilens, 2012; Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 2018). This 
approach allows for tracing the development of policy on these issues for a number of 
years after the poll was held (or until the end of the time series in the case of Chapter 3). 
In addition, the question had to be about a single specific policy proposal that respon-
dents could answer on an agreement scale. Generally, the sampling also ensured that 
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there was variation on a number of important characteristics like the type of policy (kept 
constant in Chapter 3), the policy area, the amount of public support for the issue and its 
salience in the media. The latter can be argued to be especially important, as there are 
concerns in the literature that issues sampled from public opinion polls are more salient, 
i.e. attract more media and political attention than the average policy issue (Burstein, 
2014). While this may be the case, it is also necessary that citizens are informed about 
issues and hold real preferences on them when analyzing public opinion: meaning that 
the oversampling of salient issues may not be as problematic as it first appears (Gilens, 
2012; Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 2018). The issue sampling in chapters 2, 3 and 4 therefore 
includes issues of varying salience and the analyses contain control variables for the 
amount of media coverage of the issues.
Chapter 5 follows a somewhat different definition of both policy issues and sampling 
strategy. It relies on methods developed for studies of the pledge fulfillment of political 
parties (to what extent do parties implement their election promises?) to identify specific 
policy requests made by policy advocates (Thomson et al., 2017). Like in the sampling 
of the public opinion items, these only included requests for which it was possible to 
determine whether they were implemented (in 2017 Dutch coalition agreement). Unlike 
the other samples, the requests were formulated by policy advocates themselves mean-
ing that they were on average more detailed and specific than those included in the 
other chapters. At the same time, this means that while the study analyzed all requests 
made in letters sent to the 2017 Dutch coalition formation negotiators, it does not study 
a stratified sample of policy issues or requests. The fact that it includes many more policy 
issues than the other chapters (over 750 compared to the 102 in chapter 2) does have 
the benefit that the studied issues span a wide range of policy areas and issue types.
Finally, chapters 3 through 5 all include interest groups and other policy advocates 
in the analyses. They use an encompassing and behavioral approach to identify policy 
advocates (Baroni et al., 2014), meaning that they include all non-state actors who ob-
servably tried to influence policy-making, including individual experts, think tanks 
and international organizations in addition to traditional membership based interest 
associations like trade unions, employers’ associations and identity and public interest 
groups. There are two general exceptions to this rule, however: firstly, individual mem-
bers of the public (with no clear expertise on the topic) writing op-ed in newspapers or 
letters to the informateur (chapter 5) were excluded from the analyses. Similarly, unlike 
in chapters 3 and 4, the models in chapter 5 include subnational government actors (like 
municipalities) – although the findings do not change when these are excluded.
Especially in chapter 5, which empirically strongly relies on the historical ties 
between business advocates and center-right political parties this may be somewhat 
problematic: while some large individual firms may also have maintained such historic 
ties with political parties, many companies have not. It is therefore important to note 
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that results do not change substantially when individual firms are removed from the 
analysis (and only business associations and employers’ organizations included). Keep-
ing other types of organizations (like experts or think tanks) in the analysis helps to show 
how the preference attainment of (interest group) advocates that have these ties differs 
from those that do not – be they traditional interest associations or other types of policy 
advocates.
1.8 overvIeW AnD ouTlook
The studies in this dissertation all highlight the benefits of applying a policy-centric 
approach (Hacker & Pierson, 2014) to the study of political parties and how such an 
approach can help both our understanding of their representative role, as well the con-
sequences of their ties to interest groups. Table 1 outlines the buildup of and specific 
questions asked in the different chapters of this dissertation. It also provides a very brief 
summary of the case selection and choice of methods for each of the chapters. Chapter 2 
studies the relation between public opinion and the positions of political parties on 102 
specific policy issues in Germany. The third chapter then looks at the joint impact of me-
dia advocacy and public opinion on (political attention to) four regulatory policy issues in 
Sweden. Chapter 4 analyses whether working with which political parties is related to the 
preference attainment of policy advocates in five countries. The final empirical chapter 5 
studies whether policy advocates that sent letters to the (in)formateur during the Dutch 
2017 coalition negotiation attain their preferences and under which conditions.
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Table 1: Overview of the dissertation
Chapter Question Country studied Policy Issues method
1 Introduction
2 Are the policy 
positions of political 
parties related to 
the preferences of 
the general public 
or their supporters? 
And what are the 
covariates of these 
relationships?





predicting the positions 
of political parties on 
102 specific policy issues. 
Applying an extension of 
multilevel regression with 
post stratification to estimate 
the policy preferences of the 
supporters of political parties
3 Do public opinion 
and media advocacy 
influence (attention 
to) regulatory policy?







Public opinion data and 
public preferences on four 
policy-issues over longer 
time series, combined with 
an in-depth analysis of the 
issues.
4 Is working with 
(which) political 
parties related to 
the preference 













attainment of advocates who 
answered the GovLis survey
5 What explains 
the preference 
attainment of policy 
advocates after 
elections?





predicting the preference 






Do political parties listen 
to the(ir) public? Public 
opinion-party linkage on 
specifi c policy issues
An adapted version of this chapter was published as an article in Party Politics as:
Romeijn, J. (2018). Do political parties listen to the(ir) public?
Public opinion–party linkage on specifi c policy issues. 
Party Politics, Online First.
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AbsTrACT
Political parties are a crucial link between the public and policy outcomes. However, few 
studies have considered who political parties are responsive to when they take positions 
on specific policy proposals. This chapter explores the links between public opinion and 
the policy positions of political parties on 102 specific policy proposals in Germany us-
ing a novel application of multilevel regression with poststratification to estimate the 
policy preferences of party supporters. Whilst there is a link between general public 
preferences and the positions of political parties, this connection weakens considerably 
once political parties are in government. In fact, the study shows that the link between 
party positions and general public opinion is severed once parties enter government, 
whereas it is only weakened in the case of party supporters. Finally the chapter finds 
mixed evidence for differences between niche parties and mainstream parties.
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2.1 InTroDuCTIon
In many normative definitions of democratic systems, political parties are expected to 
represent their voters and pursue the policies they promised to deliver (e.g. Mair, 2008) 
to ensure a link between the preferences of the public and policy outcomes (Dahl, 1956). 
It is thus unsurprising that a literature has emerged studying who political parties rep-
resent when they take policy positions3. One influential strand of literature argues that 
niche parties are different to mainstream parties, because mainstream parties seeking 
to maximize their vote share will cater to the median voter, whereas niche parties, which 
are more policy-seeking will respond to the preferences of their supporters (e.g. Adams 
et al., 2006). Recently, scholars have also argued that political parties in government 
are constrained by coalition agreements and their responsibility to implement election 
promises. This means that unlike parties in opposition, they are less able to respond to 
the issue priorities of the public (Klüver and Spoon, 2016).
Such studies of party positions tend to study left-right or other policy dimensions 
like Europeanization. They have yielded many valuable insights, but are not directly 
aimed at understanding how political parties make decisions on concrete policy issues. 
Yet it is these specific policy issues like whether the pension age should be raised or 
extending more rights to same-sex couples that end up affecting the lives of citizens. 
There is also evidence that public preferences on specific policy issues are not strongly 
linked to the public’s positions on dimensions, indicating that studying specific issues is 
a valuable addition to the field (Lesschaeve, 2017).
Studies on the link between public opinion and policy outputs have studied specific 
policy issues (e.g. Gilens, 2012, Lax and Phillips, 2012), allowing them to complement 
findings from previous studies that considered policy scales (e.g. Stimson et al., 1995). 
Although the approach has its drawbacks, it is increasingly propagated because it 
provides insights into the concrete policies that are delivered to citizens and ensures a 
direct match between public preferences and policy (Wlezien, 2016).
This chapter contributes to both the literature on the public-party and the public-
policy linkages by exploring the link between public opinion and political parties on 
specific policy issues. It considers whether the policy positions of political parties are 
related to the preferences of the general public or their supporters, and whether this 
relationship is dependent on whether a party is a niche or mainstream party and in or 
out of government.
To do this, this chapter assesses the positions of political parties in the German 
Bundestag on 102 specific policy proposals in the period between 1998 and 2010. The 
issues concern possible policy changes like raising the taxes on petrol or increasing the 
3 For a review, see Fagerholm, (2016).
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size of the German military deployment in Afghanistan. The chapter records statements 
by political parties about these policy issues in two major newspapers to investigate 
whether the preferences of the general public and party supporters are represented in 
these claims.
This chapter complements existing methods of measuring the preferences of 
party supporters through an innovative application of multilevel modelling with post-
stratification (MRP) to individual survey responses. This method fits multilevel models 
to predict support amongst different sub-groups of party supporters, and then weights 
these predictions to obtain a final estimate (Lax and Phillips, 2012). The approach helps 
address concerns about small sample sizes for supporters of the smaller political parties.
The results show that there is a link between public preferences and the positions of 
political parties. However, the chapter finds little evidence for the expected differences 
between niche and mainstream parties. The results indicate that the link between public 
preferences and party positions disappears once parties enter government, whereas the 
link with the preferences of party supporters is weakened but not severed. The chapter 
thus contributes to the literatures on policy and party representation and illustrates the 
advantages of studying specific policy issues.
2.2 PolICy ouTComes AnD rePresenTATIon of The 
PublIC
Whilst there is disagreement over how the preferences of the public should be taken 
into account by politicians in democratic systems (Mansbridge, 2003), there is more 
agreement that there ought to be a general connection between what the public wants 
and what it gets in democracies (Dahl, 1956). Even if may not be desirable that public 
opinion influences all policies, like the rights or protection of minorities, there is a long 
tradition of studies investigating this link between public preferences and policy (for 
reviews, see: Burstein, 2014, Wlezien, 2016).
Early studies argued that policy was often in line with public opinion (Monroe, 1979) 
and that policies shifted in line with changes in public preferences (Page and Shapiro, 
1983). By moving towards designs that measured public preferences and policy on a 
common scale, later scholars could study public opinion over time and found strong 
links with policy (Stimson et al., 1995). Moreover, Wlezien (1995) demonstrates that 
public preferences and levels of spending react to one another - even if the relationship 
is conditioned by institutional factors (Wlezien and Soroka, 2012).
However, some studies argue that the ties between policy and the public are not that 
strong. Gilens (2012) shows that policy in the United States is more responsive to the 
preferences of the wealthy than to those of the poor. This study faces criticism for not 
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distinguishing between the preferences of the poor and the rich – and overlooking the 
fact that policy changed in line with the preferences of the rich and those of the poor in 
equal measure when the two disagreed (Branham et al., 2017). However, another study 
focusing on Europe and employing different methods finds results similar to those of 
Gilens (Peters and Ensink, 2015). Even if the jury is still out concerning whether policy 
outcomes reflect the preferences of the public, it is important to consider the mecha-
nisms through which this connection may (not) come about. Existing studies do cover 
some of these and have argued that the saliency of policy issues (Lax and Phillips, 2012), 
institutions (Wlezien and Soroka, 2012) and interest groups (Gilens 2012; Lax and Phil-
lips, 2012) may matter in this regard. However, these studies have paid scant attention 
to the role of political parties, even if these act as important intermediaries between the 
public and policy outcomes.
2.3 PolITICAl PArTIes AnD rePresenTATIon of The 
PublIC
In parallel to these studies there is an extensive literature that considers the role of 
political parties in representing the public. Through elections political parties are ar-
gued to obtain a mandate to represent their voters, which should ensure a connection 
between public opinion and policy (Mair, 2008). Numerous studies investigate these 
links between political parties and the public on left-right and other ideological dimen-
sions and generally find a link between party positions and public opinion (for a review, 
see: Fagerholm, 2016). This work argues that parties have strategic reasons to respond 
to public preferences, but that they are constrained by both party characteristics and 
external conditions.
Public preferences and policy positions are usually measured on left-right scales. 
Recently, authors have started to study more concrete dimensions (like immigration 
or environmental policy), furthering our understanding of how these impact both the 
policy choices of political parties (Dalton, 2017) and their attention to policy issues (e.g. 
Klüver and Spoon, 2016, Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014). Some studies employing policy 
dimensions may have the drawback that they measure the consistency of public prefer-
ences as opposed to ideological positions (Broockman, 2016): especially when scales are 
constructed from the preferences of citizens on specific policy issues, a citizen who holds 
extreme views in two directions will be rated as moderate. However, more consistent 
elite actors like the leaders of political parties will be rated as more extreme because 
their preferences consistently fall on one side of the scale. This becomes problematic 
when comparing the distance between public preferences and those of elite actors. 
To address this the following section outlines an exploratory theoretical framework on 
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how political parties take public preferences into account when deciding upon specific 
policy issues.
2.4 TheorIzIng The PosITIons of PolITICAl 
PArTIes on sPeCIfIC PolICy Issues
Apart from addressing potential methodological problems, a focus on specific issues 
also matters because these are the policies that end up affecting the lives of citizens. 
There are theoretical reasons to expect that political parties will indeed aim to represent 
(parts of ) the public. Parties are often assumed to be office-seeking actors who seek 
to maximize their vote share (Riker, 1962). Whilst they may pursue other goals (such as 
policy change), these are not mutually exclusive and will often overlap (Strøm and Mül-
ler, 1999b; Spoon and Klüver, 2014). Generally, politicians in political parties will, at least 
partially, be driven by a desire to get (re-)elected and are expected to pursue policies 
that are popular with their supporters or the general electorate (Stimson et al., 1995). If a 
specific policy is popular amongst the general public then, all else being equal, political 
parties will prefer to take a position that is in line with these public preferences. Hence, 
the first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The higher the public support for a specific policy issue, the more likely that 
a political party takes a position in favour of the specific policy issue.
Moreover, different parties may be inclined to relate differently to parts of the public. 
One relevant party characteristic concerns the distinction between niche parties and 
mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005) and scholars have argued that they act differently in 
a number of ways (e.g. Adams et al., 2006, Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014). Based on the idea 
of issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996), Meguid (2005) defined niche parties as those that 
reject the class-based orientation of politics, emphasize new issues that do not coincide 
with the traditional left-right division and focus on a narrow set of issues. Similarly, Wag-
ner (2012) postulates that niche parties compete on a few non-economic issues, and 
that the ‘nicheness’ of a political party is a matter of degree rather than a dichotomous 
choice. Both definitions have been critiqued for excluding economic issues, because a 
party can emphasize ‘niche’ economic topics and because mainstream parties can also 
choose to emphasize typical niche issues like the environment or immigration (Meyer 
and Miller, 2015). Meyer and Miller (2015) and Bischof (2017a) have relaxed this defi-
nition and define a niche party as a party that emphasizes other policy areas than its 
competitors and consider nicheness as a matter of degree. These authors posit that the 
‘nicheness’ of a political party is related to its issue profile. A party’s nicheness depends 
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on the extent to which it emphasizes issues that other political parties do not. Since par-
ties can change their issue offers over time, their nicheness can vary. An example would 
be a green party that enters parliament heavily emphasizing environmental issues. If 
it is the only party emphasizing the issue, this means that its issue emphasis gives it a 
strong ‘niche’ issue profile. However, if other political parties start to pay more atten-
tion to the environment, or if the environmental party starts competing on economic 
issues, its issue profile becomes more like that of other parties and the party becomes 
more mainstream. This thus addresses the concern that niche parties may become more 
mainstream, whilst mainstream parties may adopt ‘niche’ issues in response to the rise 
of niche parties (Bischof, 2017a; Meguid, 2005; Meyer and Miller, 2015). In contrast to 
previous studies, this chapter adopts the continuous definition of Bischof (2017a).
Turning to the public opinion - party position linkage, the argument in previous 
studies (using a dichotomous definition) is that mainstream parties are driven by vote 
and office-seeking goals and respond to shifts in preferences on a left-right scale of 
the median voter. On the other hand, niche parties are more policy-seeking and more 
responsive to shifts in preferences of their core party supporters (Adams et al., 2006, Ez-
row et al., 2011). This expectation can be translated to specific policy issues: mainstream 
parties take issue positions in line with the preferences of the general public and niche 
parties take position in line with the preferences of their supporters.
Recent studies have refined this claim, and argue that niche parties are only more 
responsive to the issue priorities of their supporters on issue dimensions that they own 
(Klüver and Spoon, 2016; Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014). However, it is less clear whether 
such theories of issue-ownership apply to the level of specific policy issues. Even if a 
policy area or dimension is owned by a party, this does not necessarily mean it is associ-
ated with a specific proposal in the area. As an example: a Green party may generally 
‘own’ environmental issues, but another party may be associated with a specific plan to 
store emitted CO2 underground. Still, Appendix 2.5 outlines a discussion and test of this 
argument regarding niche parties and issue ownership. Summarizing, and taking into 
account the continuous conceptualization of nicheness, the following hypotheses can 
be derived:
Hypothesis 2A: The policy positions of a more mainstream political party on specific 
policy issues are more likely to be positively related to the preferences of the general 
public than those of a more niche party.
Hypothesis 2B: The policy positions of a more niche party on specific policy issues are 
more likely to be positively related to the preferences of their supporters than those of a 
more mainstream party.
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Even if political parties generally aim to take popular positions on issues, they face 
constraints regarding the policy positions that they can take. One such constraint 
is participation in government and Klüver and Spoon (2016) argue that government 
parties are indeed less responsive to the issue priorities of the public than opposition 
parties. They claim that government parties are less able to emphasize the issues voters 
find important, because they are held more accountable for the implementation of their 
campaign promises than opposition parties, and thus have less room to manoeuvre.
Moreover, there are good reasons to expect that political parties in government 
are more restrained than those in opposition regarding the policy positions they can 
take. Firstly, the need to agree with coalition partners on an issue constrains a party’s 
ability to choose a position that is popular amongst either the public or its supporters. 
Secondly and unlike opposition parties, parties in government have to directly take into 
account constraints like the government budget and international commitments and 
are thus more limited in the positions they can take. Finally, parties sometimes blur their 
positions, for example when their policy position is unpopular with the public (Rovny, 
2012). Translating this to a specific issue like raising the retirement age, it is likely that 
government parties will be put under more pressure (for example by opposition parties) 
to take a position on the issue as they are responsible for its implementation, especially 
once it comes on the political agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). So where 
opposition parties may be able to avoid declaring their unpopular positions, govern-
ment parties have less opportunity to do so. This should limit the ability of a party in 
government to take policy positions that are related to the preferences of both the 
general public and their supporters leading to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3A: The policy positions of a government party on specific policy issues are 
less likely to be related to the preferences of the general public, than the positions of an 
opposition party.
Hypothesis 3B: The policy positions of a government party on specific policy issues are 
less likely to be related to the preferences of its supporters, than the position of an op-
position party.
2.5 reseArCh DesIgn
The relationship between political parties and public opinion
Since specific policy issues are different to the scales that are normally used in the 
literature on the public opinion - party position linkage, this chapter adopts a different 
approach. It relies on existing studies on the link between public opinion and policy 
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outcomes and studies the correlation between public preferences and party positions 
across issues (Lax and Phillips, 2012)4. In this definition of the linkage, one cannot say 
that a single party position is ‘related’ to public opinion, but rather that the positions of 
a political party are linked to public preferences in general – meaning the party is more 
likely to support a policy the more the public supports it. This definition does not as-
sume a causal link between public preferences and party positions, but is more agnostic 
regarding whether political parties are influenced by public preferences, or vice versa. 
This differs from the general approach in the literature on political parties, where the 
relationship is called responsiveness and defined as a positional shift by a political party 
in response to a change in public opinion (e.g. Adams et al., 2006). Finally, the analyses 
also consider whether the results are robust to operationalizing the linkage as congru-
ence, which is achieved when a political party takes a position that is in line (congruent) 
with the majority of either its own supporters or the general public on an issue (for 
the same definition regarding policy outcomes instead of party positions, see: Lax and 
Phillips, 2012).
Case selection
This chapter focuses on Germany for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is one of few coun-
tries for which enough high-quality survey data is available for many policy issues, that 
could also be disaggregated to allow for the estimation of the preferences of party 
supporters. Moreover, the bi-weekly German Politbarometer can be leveraged for the 
approximation of the demographic profile of party supporters in a given year, which is a 
prerequisite for the expansion of MRP used in this chapter.
Focusing on Germany has the added benefit of keeping institutional and other 
country-level variables that may impact the public opinion-party linkage constant. The 
country can be regarded as a typical case for studying the public-party linkage in (West) 
European countries with proportional or mixed electoral systems for several reasons 
(Seawright & Gerring, 2008). For one, the parties that are in parliament are all of major 
party families, and many (Western) European countries have similar parties and patterns 
of party competition. Moreover, during the observation period, which runs from 1998 
to 2010, the composition of government coalitions varied and covered left-wing, right-
wing and broad coalitions meaning that four out of five political parties in the country 
were in government at some point. The German case thus covers all kinds of government 
coalitions in proportional or mixed-electoral systems except for minority coalitions, 
which strengthens the inferences about the effect of being part of government.
4 Lax and Phillips (2012) define this as “responsiveness”. To avoid confusion and the causal implications of the 
term, this study calls this the public opinion-party position linkage instead.
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In addition, levels of party discipline are comparable to Western-European countries, 
especially within the Bundestag (Brettschneider, 1996; Sieberer, 2006). This means that 
the assumption in this study that the politicians from the same party in the Bundestag 
tend to be or present themselves as unified on most policy issues should hold.
The policy issues are selected from the high-quality Politbarometer surveys that 
were held across a stratified random sample of the German population between 1998 
and 2010. For a policy item to be included in the study, it has to meet three criteria. 
Firstly, it has to be about a specific policy proposal. Secondly, the policy issue has to 
fall under the national jurisdiction so that national political parties can reasonably be 
assumed to engage with the issue. Thirdly, the answer has to be measured on an agree-
ment scale. A total number of 102 policy issues meet these criteria and cover topics like 
the construction of a Holocaust memorial in Berlin and whether German soldiers should 
be withdrawn from Afghanistan. Appendix 2.7 provides an overview of all issues5. An 
advantage of this selection strategy is that it also includes issues that never make it on 
to the legislative agenda (Gilens, 2012).
Sampling issues from opinion polls means that these issues do not constitute a com-
pletely random sample of a potential universe of all policy issues, because the sampled 
issues will be more salient (Burstein 2014). However, it is necessary that citizens have at 
least somewhat informed opinions if we expect political parties to engage with these 
preferences, rendering the oversampling of somewhat salient issues less problematic 
(Gilens 2012, 50-56).
estimating parties’ policy preferences
There is extensive debate about measuring party positions on specific policy issues (e.g. 
Gemenis, 2013). This chapter relies on claims that representatives from political parties 
make about issues in two major newspapers (the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and 
the Süddeutsche Zeitung)6. These newspapers are on the right (FAZ) and left (SZ) side of 
the political spectrum. Although there is evidence that their political orientation does 
not steer the choice of topics (i.e. the likelihood covering an issue) there is variation 
in how these papers discuss political actors (Kühne, 2011). So it is important to code 
both newspapers to increase the likelihood that all party positions are covered. Student 
coders recorded each statement by representatives of the political party for a four year 
period after public opinion was measured, or until a policy change was implemented 
5 For some issues the proportion of respondents who answered “don’t know” is high. The results from the chap-
ter are robust to excluding issues where more than 10% of respondents answered “don’t know”.
6 This only included statements by national party leaders, spokespeople on the issue in the Bundestag, and 
cabinet members. Statements by local, EU and Bundesrat politicians were excluded as they are subject to 
somewhat different electoral pressures (Bäck, Debus, & Klüver, 2016). If no statements were found, student 
coders also looked at other broadsheet newspapers and reports from ARD and ZDF.
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(Gilens, 2012). Statements were coded as either in favour of, neutral or against the policy 
proposal. The final analysis excluded neutral positions. If multiple positions were found, 
all were recorded and the statement closest to the date of the poll was used in the 
analysis, but conflicting statements on the same issue from the same party were rare.
Of course, parties may vote differently on issues than they claim in the media, or 
take other positions in their election manifestoes. Yet especially in a country where 
internal party discipline is high, one can expect that statements in the media do reflect 
the unified party’s position (Brettschneider, 1996) and there is evidence that European 
political parties do ‘walk like they talk’ on nuclear policy (Bischof, 2017b). Moreover, 
other methods like manifestoes or voting in the Bundestag, are not feasible for measur-
ing the positions of political parties on this predefined set of issues, because most were 
not mentioned in party manifestos or voted on. Even though media coding provides 
the best coverage of party positions, eight issues in the dataset received so little media 
coverage that no party positions were found, meaning that the final models include 
94 policy issues. Policy positions were found for 72% of all 510 possible issue-party 
combinations (the positions of 5 political parties on 102 issues). Coverage was lower 
for smaller parties and issues that received less attention in the media, which is why the 
analyses control for party size and the media salience of an issue.
estimating the preferences of the public and party supporters using 
mrP
To measure general public support for a policy change this analysis relies on the Polit-
barometer. To estimate the preferences of the supporters of a specific party, however, a 
novel application of multilevel regression with poststratification (MRP) was used. MRP 
was developed to improve estimates for smaller subgroups of the population in survey 
research (Park et al., 2006; Kastellec et al., 2010). It has been shown to be especially effec-
tive in providing accurate estimates of public opinion when compared to disaggregation 
(Lax and Phillips, 2009b). The method uses a multilevel model employing several demo-
graphic categories to obtain predicted support for a policy issue for each demographic 
cell in the data7. Census data is then used to weight each cell to obtain a representative 
prediction. The advantage is that the multilevel models use more data than just that in 
the specific cell, leading to better estimates when there are few observations in specific 
sub-groups – like the supporters of smaller parties.
The Politbarometer surveys have an average sample size of around 1500. To estimate 
the level of support for the policy issue among supporters of a party, one would ideally 
know the demographic composition of the supporters of a party in a given year. Since 
such data is unavailable, this study pools all observations from the bi-weekly Politbarom-
7 For example: a 40 to 50 year old woman with a university degree who voted for the CDU.
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eter in a year to obtain a large annual and nationally representative sample. This pooled 
annual dataset is used to estimate the demographic composition of the supporters of 
a party in terms of age, gender and education level – the same variables used by the 
regular Politbarometer weights. Two survey questions are combined to identify party 
supporters. The first asks whether a respondent generally and in the long term tends 
to support a political party. Respondents who indicated they support a specific party 
were then asked how strongly they support that party on a five-point scale. Those who 
respond 3 (somewhat) through 5 (strong) are coded as party supporters8. For each issue, 
multilevel models are then run to predict support for each cell that intersects gender, 
age (ten categories), education (four categories) and party support. These estimates 
are weighted to obtain estimates of support for an issue amongst a party’s supporters. 
This method allows the estimation of the composition of party supporters on an annual 
basis, which is an advantage over other sources like election surveys.
measurement of other variables
Following Bischof (2017a), the nicheness of political parties is established through the 
coding of party programs by the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens et al., 2017). 
This definition considers nicheness as a matter of degree, rather than a dichotomous 
distinction. The extent to which a party uniquely focuses on niche topics in an elec-
tion manifesto is used as the basis of the definition. The nicheness of a party can thus 
vary from election to election, based on its issue emphasis. The measure combines 
two components: the first is the extent to which a party emphasizes niche topics (the 
environment, Euroscepticism, radical right sentiment, agrarianism and regionalism) in 
its party manifestos (measured as the percentage of all quasi-sentences in the manifesto 
dedicated to these topics). These topics are selected because they meet three criteria. 
Firstly, they were located at the periphery of the party system at some point in many 
European countries. Secondly, they could and in some cases have been used to desta-
bilize traditional left-right competition between political parties. Thirdly, all five topics 
are non-economic in nature and thus concern competition on another dimension than 
the main economic right-left dimension (Bischof 2017a, 225). Scholars working on issue-
ownership have described the environment as a valence issue, arguing that parties tend 
to take similar positions on the issue (i.e. no party wants to damage the environment) 
(Budge, 2001; Van der Brug, 2004). However, the conceptualization of niche topics used 
here focuses issue emphasis rather than position, meaning that it is compatible with the 
idea of competition on issue ownership. In addition, the issues of Euroscepticism and 
the environment may have become less ‘niche’ over the 1998 – 2010 period.
8 Rerunning the models with only those who scored 4 (rather strong) or 5 (strong) on this variable did not 
change the estimates substantially. Appendix 2.1 contains the exact questions.
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To address this, the second part of the measure indicates the degree to which the 
party’s emphasis on these issues is unique to the party. In other words this component 
measures whether the party emphasizes issues that its competitors do not focus on. 
As an example, this means that a party’s focus on Euroscepticism counts relatively less 
towards its nicheness when other parties start to emphasize the issues more. Based on 
this definition, the nicheness of a party can thus vary between elections. The combina-
tion of these two factors provides an estimate of the nicheness of a political party on a 
scale with higher values indicating a higher nicheness score (for technical details: see 
Bischof, 2017a). The score derived from a given manifesto is then assigned to all state-
ments made during the year before the election for which the manifesto was written (as 
this is the period during which is was written) until a year before the previous election. 
The final continuous measure thus indicates the degree of nicheness of a party at an 
election. Averaged across elections within parties during the observation period, the 
measure indicates that Die Grüne and Die Linke focus most on niche topics (relative 
to other parties), with CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD having (somewhat) more mainstream 
profiles. Although the nicheness of these parties varies from election to election and 
is measured as a matter of degree, the Greens and Die Linke would also be the two 
German parties that Adams et al. (2006) would rate as niche parties – giving face validity 
to the new measure. The government status of a party is a binary variable that indicates 
whether the political party was in government when the statement indicating the 
party’s position was made.
Studies on the public opinion-party position linkage also include other factors. As an 
example political parties which are organized in a way that gives more power to their 
members, are more responsive to their supporters, whereas more leadership-driven par-
ties tend to respond more to the median voter (Schumacher et al., 2013, Lehrer, 2012). 
These alternative explanations are important and since most vary at the party level, the 
analyses include dummies for political parties. The control variable of the media salience 
of a policy issue was measured as the average number of articles per day about issue 
in the observation period in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (see Appendix 2.5). Finally, party size is the percentage of seats a party had in the 
Bundestag when the statement about the issue was made. An overview of the variables 
is provided in Table 2.1.
modelling strategy
The final unit of analysis is a political party on an issue. Appendix 2.2 shows the structure 
of the stacked dataset for two hypothetical policy issues. The observations are nested in 
political parties and policy issues. That is why all models are run with random intercepts 
for issues and fixed effects for parties. Since the observations may also be clustered in 
government coalitions, the models contain fixed effects indicating whether the party 
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was a member of any of the coalitions that occurred during the observation period. 
Effectively, this should control for any effects that were specific to a coalition9. It should 
be noted that the preferences of the public and those of the supporters of a specific 
party on an issue are highly correlated (.82) and cannot be included in the same model10. 
Instead, separate models are run for the general public and party supporters. Results 
are shown for models predicting the former, whereas those for the latter are included in 
Appendix 2.3. Where the results differ, this is noted in the text. The correlation between 
the preferences of the public and those of party supporters also has substantive implica-
tions: it may mean that public preferences regarding these specific policy issues are not 
related (strongly) to the ideological preferences of voters (see also: Lesschaeve, 2017) 
and that parties often do not have to choose between their supporters and the general 
public.
2.6 AnAlysIs
Table 2.2 shows the results of a series of models that predict whether a political party 
supports a policy proposal. Model 1 directly assesses the relationship between public 
preferences and party positions outlined in Hypothesis 1, which is in the expected direc-
9 The observations may also be clustered in party-coalition combinations. Running the models with fixed-ef-
fects for these combinations does not change the results.
10 The preferences of the supporters of SPD, FDP and CDU/CSU correlate strongest with general public opinion 
(>.9), but correlations are also >.7 for Die Grüne and Die Linke.
Table 2.1: Overview of variables.
variable values range mean (std. dev) Description
Party position 0,1 0-1 .52 (.50) Dep var: party position on an issue
Public support 0 - 1 .06-.97 .52 (.22) Proportion of public in favour of policy 
change
Party support 0 – 1 0-.98 .52 (.24) Proportion of party supporters in favour of 
policy change
Nicheness 0 - 2 .12 - .88 .31 (.46) Degree of nicheness of a political party
Government party 0-1 .47 (.50) Whether party is in government (1) or not (0)
Party 1,2,3,4,5 1-5 Identifies each political party
Party size 0 – 100 4-41.5 22.02 (13.73) Percentage of seats in Bundestag
Media salience 0 - ∞ .002-2.46 .200 (.35) Average number of articles on the issue per 
day
Coalition 1,2,3,4,5 1-5 Whether a party is a member of a specific 
coalition
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tion and significant: the higher public support for an issue, the higher the chance that a 
political party supports it.
The interaction effects between public preferences and nicheness in Models 3 and 5 
show that contrary to Hypothesis 2A (mainstream parties’ positions are more likely to be 
positively related to the preferences of the general public than those of a niche party), 
the effect of public opinion on the position of a party is stronger for parties emphasizing 
niche issues than for parties focusing on mainstream topics. The effect disappears once 
Table 2.2: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a party was in favour of a policy issue.











































































































Coalition fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Policy-Level Random intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of cases 334 334 334 334 334
AIC 460 457 455 446 448
BIC 510 510 516 507 513
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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the interaction between public preferences and government parties is included in Model 
5, however. Appendix 2.3 shows similar results for the relationship between the prefer-
ences of party supporters and party positions. This provides some evidence for Hypoth-
esis 2B that the positions of parties with niche issue profiles are more strongly related to 
the preferences of their supporters than those of parties with mainstream issue profiles. 
Again, the effect disappears once the interaction with government status is included. 
Taken together, these results provide little evidence for the expectation that niche parties 
respond to their supporters and mainstream parties to the general public. If anything, 
the evidence suggests that the positions of parties with more niche issue profiles are 
more likely to be related to the preferences of the general public and those of supporters, 
which may be due to fact that niche parties are also more often opposition parties.
Models 3 through 5 in Table 2.2 show that the difference between government and 
opposition parties is much more pronounced, however. The interaction between gov-
ernment status and public support for an issue is negative and significant in both Models 
3 and 5, indicating that the policy positions of parties in government are generally less 
related to public opinion than those of opposition parties, in line with Hypothesis 3A. 
Based on Model 5, an increase in public support for a policy proposal from 40% to 70% 
raises the probability of an opposition party supporting the policy from 36% to 56%. 
The same increase in public support does not change the probability that a government 
party is in favour of a policy issue.
To demonstrate this Figure 2.1 plots the probability of a party supporting a policy 
issue at different levels of public support. In a scenario where party positions are tightly 
linked to public opinion, the likelihood of being in favour of a policy increases as public 
support rises, and increases most sharply around the 50% mark, from which point a 
majority of the public is in favour of the policy change. The figure shows that, at least 
when it comes to the statements in the media, German opposition parties (red, dashed 
line) are close to this ‘ideal’ linkage. However, once they are in government (black, solid 
line), the relationship between public support and party positions flattens. This suggests 
that whilst political parties may aim to make statements about policy issues that are 
popular, they weigh other interests much more strongly once the constraints of being 
in government are in place. To the extent that these government parties are also much 
more likely to get their way and decide whether a policy change is enacted, this may 
negatively affect the link between public opinion and policy. The negative interaction in 
Appendix 2.3 (results table) that is plotted in Appendix 2.4 (figure) shows a similar result 
regarding Hypothesis 3B that the positions of government parties are also less related to 
the preferences of their supporters than those of opposition parties. The main difference 
is that whereas the positions of government parties are unrelated to public preferences, 
they remain related to those of their supporters (but more weakly so than the positions 
of opposition parties). This may indicate that when political parties are constrained by 
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being in government, they choose to align with their supporters more than with the 
general public. The finding ties in with previous studies of statements by coalition par-
ties in several countries, who argue that these parties also use parliamentary debates to 
flag responsiveness to their supporters (Martin and Vanberg, 2008).
Assessing the results and robustness
To better understand whether (government) parties indeed follow their supporters 
when facing constraints (and following the logic of Branham et al. (2017)), we can con-
sider only those 38 cases, or about ten percent of the total, where the majority of the 
public and party supporters support different sides of the issue11. In these cases parties 
side with their supporters 84% of the time. An example is the position of the CDU/CSU 
regarding increasing the rights of registered same-sex couples. The supporters of the 
party were against this policy, whilst the general public supported it. The party took a 
11 Appendix 2.7 indicates which parties faced this situation on which policy issues.
figure 2.1: Predicted probability of a position in favour of a policy issue for government parties and op-
position parties (left axis) and the distribution of cases (right axis).
Figure note: The black solid line indicates the predictions for government parties and the red dashed line for 
opposition parties (left axis) with 95% confidence intervals, based on Model 5 in Table 2.2. The shaded grey area 
indicates the distribution of the cases (as a percentage of the total N) across public support (right axis).
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position against extending the rights of registered same-sex couples12. Although based 
on a limited number of cases, this supports the inference that when faced with the 
choice between the preferences of the general public and those of their supporters, 
political parties choose the position of their supporters most of the time.
In addition, a number of alternative specifications and robustness checks were run 
to validate the results. Appendix 2.5 demonstrates that the results for niche and main-
stream parties remain when issue ownership is taken into account (Klüver and Spoon, 
2016, Giger and Lefkofridi, 2014). It also explores the effect of media salience on the 
relationship between public preferences and party positions. In Appendix 2.6, Table 
A2.6.1 shows that results stay the same when taking congruence (whether the majority 
of the public and the position of a political party are on the same side of an issue) as an 
alternative dependent variable. Table A2.6.2 then shows that the results are robust to 
the exclusion of each political party13.
2.7 ConClusIon
This chapter used a novel application of MRP to study the representation of the public 
through political parties on specific policy proposals in Germany to explore whether 
niche and opposition parties incorporate public preferences differently than mainstream 
and government parties, respectively. The chapter finds little evidence for the expecta-
tion that the positions of parties with more niche issue profiles are more related to their 
supporters’ positions and parties with mainstream issue profiles more strongly linked 
to the general public’s. Given that these results differ from those found in other studies 
(e.g. Adams et al. 2006) it should be noted that the conclusions in this chapter are based 
on a comparison across a limited set of political parties14. Although this chapter used 
a more dynamic conceptualization of nicheness within parties (Bischof, 2017a), more 
comparative work on specific policy issues is needed to draw definitive conclusions.
That being said, this chapter was the first to show that parties in opposition are very 
effective in taking policy positions that are popular with the public. Yet once they are 
in government, the relationship with general public opinion disappears, whereas the 
link with supporters’ preferences weakens. The idea that political parties tend to take 
positions in line with what their supporters want when put under pressure is further 
underlined by the finding that when the public and a party’s supporters disagree on an 
12 In 2017 (after the observation period) the party did allow a vote on the introduction of opening marriages to 
same-sex couples, but only after a majority of its voters also supported the issue.
13 The results also do not change substantively when controls for political parties are not included in the models
14 The models (not shown) were rerun using the dichotomous definition used by Adams et al. (2006), according 
to which die Linke and die Grüne were classified as niche parties. This did not change the results substantively.
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issue, parties take the side of their supporters 84% of the time. Whilst mainly consider-
ing the preferences of one’s constituency is not problematic for representation, it might 
become more problematic if at this stage, the link between general public opinion 
and final policy outcomes is severed since government parties probably have a much 
stronger impact on policy outcomes.
Of course, the weakened linkage for government parties may also be a reflection of 
the need for parties in coalition governments to take the preferences of their coalition 
partners into account. Moreover, opposition parties may be better placed to avoid mak-
ing statements in the media when they have an unpopular position on a policy issue 
than government parties, which could somewhat impact the results (Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen, 2010; see also Appendix 2.5). Future studies could compare the German 
case to a country with single-party coalitions or adopt other measures of party positions 
to rule out a media effect.
Although this chapter included controls for political parties and the results were not 
reliant on any one specific political party (see Table A2.6.2 in Appendix 2.6) the inferences 
in the chapter are based on a limited number of parties. Whilst the chosen approach 
enabled studying a large number of policy issues it limits the extent to which inferences 
can be drawn across political parties. Future comparative work taking a similar approach 
could study other party characteristics such as whether ideologically extreme parties 
act differently than more moderate parties.
Still, the chapter demonstrates the added value of studying the positions of political 
parties on specific issues. The finding that on these issues, the general public and the 
supporters of a political party often want the same thing is important. It means that 
on most specific policy issues the supporters of a party agree with the general public 
and that political parties do not face a choice between the two and that studies using 
ideological dimensions miss part of the story (see also: Lesschaeve, 2017). This chapter 
has pinpointed at least one potential point in the chain from the public to policy where 
the link between public preferences and policy outcomes may be weakened, and shown 
that studying representation through political parties on specific policy issues is pos-
sible and can help generate new insights in the study of political representation.

 Chapter 3
Dynamics of regulatory 
Policymaking in sweden:
The role of media Advocacy 
and Public opinion
This chapter is co-authored with Anne Rasmussen and Dimiter Toshkov.
An adapted version was published as an article in Scandinavian Political Studies as:
Rasmussen, A. , Romeijn, J. and Toshkov, D. (2018). Dynamics of 
Regulatory Policymaking in Sweden: The Role of Media Advocacy and 
Public Opinion. Scandinavian Political Studies, 41: 49-74.
Chapter 3  |  Dynamics of Regulatory Policymaking in Sweden
54
AbsTrACT
While extensive literatures study the responsiveness of policy to public opinion and the 
influence of interest groups, few studies look at both factors simultaneously. We offer 
an analysis of the influence of media advocacy and public opinion on political atten-
tion and policy change for four regulatory issues over a relatively long period of time in 
Sweden. Our data pools together measures of public support for specific policies with 
new data on attention to the policy issues in the Swedish parliament, policy develop-
ment over time, and detailed coding of the claims of interest advocates in two major 
Swedish newspapers. Analysing this data, we reveal a complex picture without a general 
tendency for either public opinion or media advocacy to act as dominant forces in pro-
ducing policy change, although we find some evidence that the public is successful in 
stimulating political attention when it supports policy proposals aimed at changing the 
status quo.
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3.1 InTroDuCTIon
The question who gets the policies they desire is one of the central problems in the 
study of democratic governance. Normative accounts of democracy usually posit that 
the public’s preferences should have an impact on the policies delivered by politicians 
(Dahl, 1956). Accordingly, a large literature investigates the extent to which public 
opinion is related to policy (for reviews, see Shapiro, 2011, Wlezien, 2016). In parallel to 
this literature, another body of research considers an additional force in public policy 
making: the role of interest groups. In recent years, the extent to which lobby groups 
influence public policy has gained renewed interest and new designs to study interest 
group influence have been introduced (for an overview, see: Binderkrantz & Rasmus-
sen, 2015, Dür, 2008, Helboe Pedersen, 2013, Bernhagen et al., 2014, Rasmussen et al., 
2018). Although the question of how strong interest group influence really is remains 
unsettled (see, e.g. Lowery, 2013), there is considerable normative criticism of strong 
interest group influence, which may not be desirable due to the risk of interest groups 
persuading policy makers to adopt policies that differ from those desired by the median 
citizen.
While large bodies of literature exist that examine policy responsiveness to the 
public and to interest groups separately, studies of public policy that integrate both 
factors are limited (for recent reviews see Burstein and Linton, 2002, Burstein, 2014). 
Moreover, the evidence in the few existing studies (Burstein, 2014, Gilens, 2012, Gilens 
and Page, 2014, Lax and Phillips, 2012, Giger and Klüver, 2016, Gray et al., 2004, Bevan 
and Rasmussen, 2017) that examine both the impact of public preferences and interest 
groups on policy change is mixed. Most of these studies do not examine the evolution 
of policies over time even if a diachronic perspective is crucial for judging the potential 
causal impact of interest groups and public opinion on public policy.
In this chapter, we seek to deepen our understanding of how the public and interest 
groups active in the media (referred to as media advocates) influence public policy by 
examining two aspects of policy making – political attention (the attention to specific 
policy issues in the legislature) and policy change. We focus on four policy issues for 
which public opinion has been measured over a relatively long time period in Sweden: 
the phasing out of nuclear energy, the introduction of a six-hour working day, allowing 
the sale of beer, wine and liquor in supermarkets, and lowering taxes on alcohol. The 
four issues are selected so that they exhibit variation in the extent of public and media 
advocacy support for policy change both between and within issues over time.
For each policy issue, we carefully trace the policy developments over 10- to 16-year 
time periods using a variety of data sources. We link this policy information to data on 
public opinion on these four issues provided by the SOM-institute (See online supple-
mentary material). In addition, to track media advocacy on these issues, we conduct a 
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detailed media content analysis of all claims made by advocates on the policy issues in 
two major Swedish newspapers for the entire period of analysis. Our definition of media 
advocates covers a broad selection of non-state actors including ‘traditional’ interest 
advocates like labour unions, business associations and companies, but also actors such 
as scientists and think tanks.
We analyse the impact of media advocates and public opinion on public policy 
making in a mixed-methods design. We start with a quantitative analysis identifying the 
general patterns related to the dynamics of political attention and policy change in our 
dataset before examining these patterns at greater resolution in a set of in-depth studies 
of the individual policy cases. In this way we are able to scrutinize the mechanisms that 
drive political attention and produce change and to interpret the general findings in 
the context of the individual cases. Such a strategy is especially well-suited to the study 
of policy change, as this is typically a rare event that is not easily modelled statistically 
(Goemans, 2007).
We find some support for the hypothesis that public opinion affects political atten-
tion, but our findings invite scepticism as to the ability of either public opinion or media 
advocacy to strongly influence policy making. The evidence is particularly striking with 
respect to the production of actual policy change where neither the media advocates 
nor public opinion seem to play a leading role in any of our cases. Despite the high 
public support and considerable media advocacy support that some of the proposals 
for policy change have enjoyed, we observe only one genuine case of policy change in 
our dataset (and, remarkably, this one case has occurred in a context of modest public 
support and net opposition from media advocates).
These findings are important given the common expectation that the extent to 
which these two types of actors affect policy change should be inversely related. The 
worries about interest group influence are voiced because such influence is expected 
to come at the expense of diminished influence of the public, based on the expectation 
that groups, such as those active in the media, are not representative of broader public 
opinion. However, rather than finding a trade-off in the influence of these two types of 
actors, we discover little evidence that any of them play a strong role in our cases. This 
matters because, especially in a country with strong democratic credentials like Sweden, 
one would expect public opinion to have a stronger impact on both the attention paid 
to policy issues and policy change than in other countries. The implication is that neither 
advocacy nor public opinion may impact political attention or specific policy changes as 
much as is often assumed by the academic literature and citizens alike.
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3.2 PublIC oPInIon AnD InTeresT grouPs As 
DrIvers of PublIC PolICy
Most of the studies of policy responsiveness (for reviews, see: Shapiro, 2011, Wlezien, 
2016) examine either static congruence between public opinion and concrete policies 
(e.g. Lax and Phillips, 2012) or dynamic responsiveness between public opinion and 
indirect proxies for policy, such as spending (Mortensen, 2010, Soroka and Wlezien, 
2010), attention (Alexandrova et al., 2016, Bevan and Jennings, 2014, Mortensen, 2010), 
or latent constructs, such as the ‘policy mood’ (Stimson et al., 1995). Attention to policy 
issues during the agenda-setting stage and policy change are typically studied in isola-
tion, while both of these aspects are important for understanding public policy making. 
In this chapter we study the influence of both public opinion and interest groups on 
political attention and on policy change in a diachronic design that analyses concrete 
policy proposals with a methodology integrating quantitative analysis with in-depth 
case evidence. Combining a dynamic approach with a focus on concrete policy pro-
posals provides us with additional leverage to assess the causal relationships between 
opinion, interest groups, and policy.
Empirical studies of the link between public opinion and policy generally find 
ample evidence that the two are related, although some studies are somewhat sceptical 
regarding the strength of the link between public opinion and (US state) policy. In a 
comparison across policies and jurisdictions, Lax and Phillips emphasize that the likeli-
hood of policy being in line with the public opinion majority is roughly speaking equal 
to flipping a coin (2012, p. 149). Dynamic approaches to the study of the link between 
public policy and policy usually find stronger links between public opinion and policy 
and argue that public opinion drives policy change. Yet, as they mostly use indirect and/
or aggregate policy indicators, it remains difficult to connect their insights to the study 
of specific policy changes.
Studies of the representation of the public in policy have been criticized for not 
considering other factors, such as group advocacy that may confound the relationship 
between public opinion and policy – leading to fears that the impact of public opinion 
on policy is overestimated (Burstein, 2014, Burstein and Linton, 2002). However, just 
as with public opinion, it is not straightforward to assess the causal impact of inter-
est groups and advocates on policy. For many years, this led scholars to examine other 
questions (De Bièvre and Dür, 2007), but lately there has been a growth in studies that 
have presented new research designs for studying influence (for a review, see Dür, 2008). 
While groups may act as a transmission belt helping to transfer public views to policy 
makers (Rasmussen et al., 2014), group involvement in politics might also lead to bias in 
policy-making. This happens if decision makers listen to interest groups due to the re-
sources they may offer, even when groups do not represent the median voter. So it may 
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seem surprising that, for a very long time, separate bodies of literature have examined 
how public opinion and interest advocates influence policy making.
The few studies that do include both interest groups and public opinion find varying 
results about the impact of groups on policy making. Some reach the conclusion that 
they matter (Gilens, 2012, Gilens and Page, 2014, Lax and Phillips, 2012). Others present 
a more mixed view (Gray et al., 2004, Bevan and Rasmussen, 2017) echoing a trend in 
existing interest group scholarship of influence to find “only mixed or weak results” (Low-
ery, 2007). The differences in findings are interesting given that the vast share of existing 
research focuses on the US political system. However, rather than being contradictory, it 
is possible that they result from differences in analysis designs and operationalisations. It 
may for example be harder to find strong relationships in studies using crude indicators 
of groups and policy (such as when group counts are related to either policy liberalism 
(e.g. Gray et al., 2004) or attention to broader policy areas (e.g. Bevan and Rasmussen, 
2017)) than in studies linking policy positions to outcomes on specific policies (Gilens, 
2012, Gilens and Page, 2014). In the latter there may be a closer match between the 
explanatory and outcome variables since we can be confident that the interest group 
measures and outcomes relate to the same policies.
Moreover, even among studies of specific policies, it may matter how information 
about group preferences is collected. Those that measure interest group preferences 
based on the views of the most powerful interest groups only (e.g. Gilens, 2012, Gilens 
and Page, 2014, Lax and Phillips, 2012) could for example be more likely to find a 
relationship between their measures and policy outcomes than those which consider 
(activities of ) a wide selection of groups (Burstein 2014). Ultimately, it is important to 
be sensitive to such differences in approaches when comparing the findings from the 
different studies.
We opt for an issue-specific approach measuring advocacy and public opinion on 
concrete topics, which has the advantage that we do not have to assume that politicians 
react to general ideological views of the population or overall volumes of group activity 
when adopting specific policies. Moreover, we emphasize the need for studies to look 
at interest group opinions and activities, on the one hand, and the trajectory of these 
specific policies over long periods of time, on the other, while considering the potentially 
competing or complementary effects of public opinion.
To date, only a few US studies on social movement activity and specific policies 
adopt such a design, and they typically focus on one type of policy or interest only (Ag-
none, 2007, Burstein and Freudenburg, 1978, McAdam and Su, 2002, Olzak and Soule, 
2009, Soule and King, 2006, Soule and Olzak, 2004). We supplement these studies with a 
detailed analysis of how claims reported in the media by a wide range of advocates are 
related to political attention and policy change on four different policy issues over long 
time periods, while accounting for the dynamics of public opinion as well.
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3.3 The hyPoThesIzeD effeCTs of PublIC suPPorT 
AnD meDIA ADvoCACy on PolITICAl ATTenTIon 
AnD PolICy ChAnge
Theoretically, there are at least two ways in which politicians can respond to citizens and 
media advocates in the process of public policy making. The first focuses on political 
attention, meaning that politicians discuss and consider issues that citizens and inter-
est groups care about. The second puts emphasis on substantive policy outcomes and 
examines whether the opinions of citizens and groups are in fact reflected in actual 
policy outcomes (Berry et al., 2002) and whether policy changes are in line with public 
preferences. Political attention and policy change can be considered as two steps in the 
policy-making process that provide opportunity for responsiveness to public opinion 
and interest groups. Not only is political attention (and discussions in the legislature) a 
necessary step for policy change, but the former can also substitute to some extent for 
the latter. Discussing an issue can signal responsiveness to the wishes of the general 
public or special interests even when policy change is not feasible. Therefore, we analyse 
both outcome variables in the current chapter.
The public opinion–policy linkage
There are good theoretical reasons to expect that politicians in democratic political sys-
tems will be responsive to the public. As politicians are – at least partially –driven by the 
desire to be re-elected (Stimson et al., 1995), they would want to respond to shifts in the 
public desire for a given type of policy by introducing policy changes. When the public 
exhibits strong support for a policy proposal that is different from the status quo, politi-
cians and political parties can increase their appeal to the citizens by enacting the policy 
proposal. Otherwise, they risk being viewed as unresponsive to the wishes of the public 
and out of touch with what the citizens want, with negative electoral consequences. This 
dynamic is reinforced when party elites have positive views of the rationality of public 
opinion (as is the case in Sweden), which increases the likelihood that they consider the 
public’s wishes (Ekengren and Oscarsson, 2011).
However, even when policy change is impossible – for political, technological, or 
other reasons – politicians can still signal responsiveness to the public by bringing the 
issue to the political agenda and discussing it in the legislative arena. When the public, 
and especially the part with strong opinions on the policy issue, favours an alternative 
policy proposal, it implies that it is dissatisfied with the policy status quo. In that case, 
there are political points to be scored by debating the underlying policy problem and 
putting it on the political agenda. And, in any case, making and debating policy propos-
als is of course a necessary step before actual policy change – a point corroborated by a 
study finding that the attention paid to a policy area in the Danish parliament is related 
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to spending on that same issue (Mortensen, 2010). Therefore, we expect that public 
opinion will affect both political attention and policy change:
Hypothesis 1A: The higher the public support for a policy proposal (that is different from 
the policy status quo), the more attention politicians will pay to the issue.
Hypothesis 1B: The higher the public support for a policy proposal, the more likely that 
the policy proposal will be enacted.
media advocates and representation
But even when the public strongly supports a policy alternative, it needs to compete 
for political attention and influence with other actors, amongst which interest groups 
and advocates loom large. The media are an important venue for advocates and have 
become increasingly important in the communication between politicians and citizens 
(Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999). Advocates that want to raise awareness of an issue or 
change policy often have to rely on the media in addition to other strategies to achieve 
their goals (Binderkrantz, 2005), and media advocacy in European countries has received 
increasing attention recently (Binderkrantz et al., 2015, Binderkrantz et al., 2017). That 
many interest groups rely on media attention is also evidenced by the fact that news 
coverage in the media offers a somewhat closer reflection of the overall composition of 
the Danish interest group population than other arenas (Binderkrantz et al., 2015).
In theoretical terms, advocates use the media to pursue at least two goals. Firstly, 
actors who want to change the status quo will likely try and raise attention for the policy 
issue. Previous studies have shown that advocates tend to actively lobby at specific 
points in time and on specific issues (Baumgartner et al., 2009), usually around policy 
junctures when policy may change. Hence, we expect claim-making by advocates to 
occur around specific periods in time and to drive political attention to the policy issue.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the number of advocates making claims in the media on an 
issue, the more attention politicians will pay to the issue.
Theoretically, we should not expect that the number of media advocates on an issue 
as such should influence the likelihood of policy change. This is because the media 
advocates can split in supporting conflicting proposals for policy change or face a 
counter-mobilization in defence of the status quo. Therefore, it is the relative support 
by the population of media advocates that a policy proposal receives that should affect 
the likelihood of policy changes, rather than the overall volume of advocacy. In other 
words, when the population of advocates is dominated by actors supporting a policy 
alternative different than the status quo, there should be a higher chance that policy will 
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change in the direction that these advocates prefer (Gilens, 2012, Gilens and Page, 2014, 
Lax and Phillips, 2012). Similarly, we expect that if there is high relative support among 
the media advocates in support of a policy proposal (that is currently not the policy in 
place), this will put more pressure on politicians to address it – thus increasing political 
attention to the issue. To summarize the preceding discussion:
Hypothesis 3A: The higher the relative media advocacy support for a policy proposal that 
would change the policy status quo, the more attention politicians will pay to the issue.
Hypothesis 3B: The higher the relative media advocacy support for a policy proposal, the 
more likely that the policy proposal will be enacted.
3.4 reseArCh DesIgn
We examine the hypotheses presented above in an empirical study of four policy issues 
in Sweden. Sweden distinguishes itself by the availability of high-quality longitudinal 
data on public opinion on specific policy questions enabling us to examine a period 
of time that is relatively long compared to existing studies of policy responsiveness. 
Focusing on a single country also allows us to keep the institutional context constant 
across policy issues and over time. Sweden is a vibrant representative democracy with 
a stable party system, free media, and a well-established system of interest representa-
tion: all features that should make Sweden a likely case for finding responsiveness to 
public opinion compared to other political systems. In contrast, Sweden might offer less 
favourable conditions for media advocacy to influence policy making as a result of its 
corporatist tradition where policy is often decided in collaboration with the types of 
interest groups who have been granted privileged insider access to the political system 
itself (Öberg et al., 2011, Siaroff, 1999).
selection of policy issues
The sampling frame from which we draw our four cases is constrained by the availability 
of longitudinal data on public opinion. However, the set of specific policy issues on which 
relatively long time series on public opinion data are available in Sweden does not seem 
biased towards policy issues on which policy change has not happened yet and involves 
issues of varying media saliency. To control for the fact that the policy type of an issue 
(Lowi, 1964) might affect the overall level of advocacy, we select regulatory policy issues 
only. In addition, our issues are selected to ensure variation in public opinion and media 
advocacy support both between the issues and within issues over time. As discussed 
below, our sample includes a policy proposal for which public support went from posi-
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tive to negative to positive again, one that remained positive, and two that went from 
positive to negative during our study period. One proposal was supported by a minority 
of media advocates, another had majority support, and for the remaining two the level 
of support switched over time. The issues also vary in the volume of advocacy they gen-
erated, again both between issues and over time for the same issue (see Figure A3.1.2 
in the Supplementary Material). The selection results in the following policy proposals: 
the phasing out of nuclear energy in the long run, the introduction of a six-hour working 
day, allowing the sale of alcohol15 in supermarkets and lowering taxes on alcohol16.
These four issues vary in terms of the amount of media debate they generate, both 
across issues and within them over time. As an example, Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens 
Nyheter wrote on average 28.3 articles a year about the phase-out of nuclear energy, 
but only five about allowing the sale of alcohol in supermarkets. Our issues also vary in 
terms of the amount of political attention they receive. At most, the nuclear issue fea-
tured in 3.5% of all documents produced by the Riksdag in a given year. As an example, 
this is comparable to the very salient (in Sweden) topics of NATO membership (3.9% 
of all documents in a year) and privatizing elderly care (3.6% of all documents) in the 
same observation period, which suggests that at its peak the nuclear issue was very high 
on the political agenda. The other issues were less salient. Having variation in media 
saliency is important since it may influence the ability of citizens and media advocates 
to influence policy making (Lax and Phillips, 2012).
unit of analysis
We focus on concrete policy proposals to ensure a direct match between the way the 
public opinion survey items are phrased and the policy options we track, and we stick 
to a narrow interpretation of the survey questions (for example, we refrain from assum-
ing that lack of public support for increasing taxes is equivalent to public support for 
decreasing taxes). The advantage is that our measures attain high face and construct 
validity. The concreteness of our definition of the unit of analysis raises a relatively high 
bar for finding responsiveness, but we see this as a positive feature of our approach 
enabling us to connect public opinion, media advocacy, and public policy directly, with-
out further assumptions about the nature and dimensionality of the underlying policy 
space.
15 The formulation on the question of alcohol sales in Swedish refers to ‘livsmedelbutiker’, which is a slightly 
broader category of stores than just supermarkets.
16 The question on alcohol taxes refers to taxes on beer, wine and spirits, but since these cover most alcoholic 
beverages, we discuss them as taxes on alcohol.
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measurement and data
We consider both political attention and policy change. The former is defined as the 
attention to a policy issue in the legislature and measured as the number of documents 
that address a certain policy issue publicized by the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) in a 
year. The documents were retrieved from the online archive of the Riksdag and include 
the minutes from plenary sessions, motions, reports and legislative proposals by the 
government, reports by organizations that are associated with the Riksdag and plenary 
proposals by parliamentary committees. Since the measure includes documents that are 
presented by the government, it measures more than just the Riksdag’s agenda and we 
consider it a proxy for the attention paid to the issue by politicians.
To measure the second outcome of interest we construct a comprehensive picture 
of the policy developments on the four issues during the period of analysis. For each 
hypothesis we thoroughly and systematically study and use a wide variety of written 
sources: legislative documents, policy briefs, media analyses, as well as existing academic 
literature. For the statistical analysis we construct a binary variable that tracks whether 
national policy changed in line with the policy proposal as expressed in public opinion 
in a particular year.
Turning to the explanatory variables, we rely on data from the SOM Institute at the 
University of Gothenburg (see Appendix 3.2) to measure public opinion. This is a rather 
exceptional data source as the public has been asked about its opinion on the exact 
same policy issues during at least ten years. This is important given that existing large-
N scholarship on responsiveness has been criticized for not being able to assess the 
specificities and developments of specific policies (e.g. Petry and Mendelsohn, 2004). 
Based on this data, we constructed a measure of public support for a policy proposal 
defined as the percentage of the Swedish public who think the policy proposal is ‘good’ 
or ‘very good’ from those with an opinion (those who think the proposal is ‘good’, ‘very 
good’, ‘bad’, or ‘very bad’).
To capture our variables tracking media advocacy, we code statements in the media. 
For each of our policy issues, we conducted a search in two major broadsheet Swedish 
newspapers, Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter. Whilst Sweden lacks a newspaper 
that clearly represents the left side of the political spectrum, we have selected two 
broadsheet newspapers that describe themselves as independent-conservative and 
independent-liberal, respectively. Differences in ideological orientation might affect 
which interest groups are covered (see Binderkrantz et al., 2017)17.
17 While it is important to rule out such bias in coverage, we do not expect pronounced differences between 
them in practice. In fact, both newspapers also stress that they aim at providing neutral coverage except on 
their opinion pages. The fact that most statements by non-state actors about the six-hour work day (a policy 
on which one would expect these two newspapers to be ideologically opposed) were in favor of the policy, 
supports this expectation.
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Having retrieved the relevant articles on all four issues for our entire observation 
period, we manually coded all 2,219 articles to identify all statements about the policy 
issue and classified the type of advocates who made the statement and the tone of 
the statement. We only coded one statement per advocate per article, but one advo-
cate could have been included several times in each year. As mentioned, we use an 
encompassing, behavioural definition of interest advocates (Baroni et al., 2014) rather 
than limit the definition to non-state advocates with certain organizational structures. 
However, since we are interested in the impact of different societal actors on responses 
by politicians, we excluded statements by political actors, such as representatives from 
political parties and government officials, as well as private individuals.
To capture the volume of media advocacy, we track the total number of statements 
that was recorded in each year on an issue. This measure includes neutral statements as 
well, and serves as an indication of the extent to which advocates raised the issue in the 
media. Altogether, we record 401 statements by a total of 262 actors on our four policy 
issues.
To measure media advocacy support we calculated the percentage statements by 
advocates in the media in favour of a policy proposal published in a given year from all 




In this part of the chapter we present the results of the aggregate-level analyses start-
ing with models of political attention. Since this outcome variable is a count measure 
and not normally distributed (see Figure A3.1.1 in the Appendix), we used negative 
binomial regression (King and Zeng, 2001). The distribution is also over-dispersed so 
that a standard Poisson count model would be a poor fit to the data. We present four 
models: Model 1 has the main variables of interest but no interactions; Model 2 adds the 
interaction between public opinion support and the policy status quo; Model 3 includes 
the interaction between media advocacy support and the status quo instead; Model 
4 includes both interactions. In all models, we lagged the explanatory variables with 
one year to ascertain the causal direction of influence between attention, on the one 
hand, and public opinion and media advocacy activity, on the other. We also include 
separate intercepts for each policy issue (issue ‘dummies’) to take into account potential 
18 More information on the coding scheme, the codebook and classification of actors can be found on www.
govlis.eu
65
unobserved heterogeneity between them, and we add a lagged dependent variable to 
address potential auto-correlation in political attention over time.
Table 3.1 presents the results from the four estimated negative binomial regression 
models. According to the results, the (lagged) values of public support are positively 
and significantly associated with higher political attention. Moreover, the positive effect 
all but disappears for the cases when the policy proposal on which public support is 
expressed is in fact the policy status quo (see the negative interactions in Models 2 and 
4, which however are not statistically significant at conventional levels; see also the left 
panel of Figure 3.1 for a graph of the effects).
Table 3.1: Negative binomial (quasi-poisson) statistical models of political attention to four policy issues in 
the Swedish legislature.
(1) (2) (3) (4)

















































































Dispersion parameter 3.84 3.69 3.11 3.08
Number of cases 47 47 47 47
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Raw coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: number of documents addressing a 
particular policy issue in the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) in a year. All independent variables lagged with one 
year. One-year lagged values of the dependent variable included in all models.
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Media advocacy support for a proposal as such does not seem to be significantly 
associated with the political attention to an issue in the legislature. However, the 
significant negative interaction with the status quo (see Models 3 and 4) implies that 
when media advocacy is supportive of the status quo, the political discussion of the 
policy issues tends to be minimal (see the right panel of Figure 3.1). Finally, we find no 
support for hypothesis 2 that the volume (number) of media advocate claims on a policy 
proposal affects political attention.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the scale of the effects by plotting the predicted probability of 
the number of agenda items discussed in the Swedish parliament as public support (left) 
and relative media advocacy support (right) range from the minimum to the maximum 
of their respective observed ranges (according the estimates of Model 4; other variables 
set at median or typical values; the thin lines present 95 percent confidence intervals 
of the means of the predictions). The figure also illustrates the interaction effects as 
the predictions are drawn separately for scenarios when the proposal is the status quo 
(dashed red line) and when it is not (solid black line). In line with our expectation in 
hypothesis 1A higher public support for a policy increases political attention when it 
signals dissatisfaction with the status quo, but not otherwise. When public support 
moves from its minimum to its maximum, the level of predicted political attention more 
than doubles (left panel; black line).
When relative media advocacy support moves from its observed minimum to its 
observed maximum, the predicted number of agenda items being discussed decreases 
three times, but only when the policy proposal being polled is the current status quo 
(right panel; red lines). This implies that high relative support for the status quo sup-
presses political attention to the issue. Importantly, however, there is no evidence that 
advocates interested in changing the policy status quo are successful in stimulating po-
litical attention, contrary to what we hypothesized. We should remind, however, that our 
sample includes relatively few observations for which the proposal is the status quo and 
that these all concern one policy issue from the four. This invites caution in interpreting 
the predicted probabilities plotted in Figure 3.1.
Below, we present a closer examination of the policy developments of policy on the 
four issues over time to scrutinize the mechanisms that drive political attention and 
produce change and to interpret the general findings presented above in the context of 
the individual cases.
In order to provide an analysis of policy responsiveness, the qualitative discussion 
of our cases below places specific emphasis on the instance in which policy changed 
in line with how the proposal was formulated in the opinion poll (i.e. the closure of the 
second reactor at Barsebäck), to improve our understanding of how this policy change 
came about. To facilitate the discussion of each case, we present several figures for each 
policy issue – with the first representing the overall attention paid to the issue in the 
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media and by Swedish politicians over time and the second representing the relative 
public and media advocacy support for a policy proposal related to the issue. For each 
case, we systematically examine the policy developments and their possible relation-
ship with public opinion and media advocacy support to evaluate our hypotheses and 
the mechanisms behind the links.
nuclear energy
Background
Nuclear energy corresponds to almost half of all Swedish energy and has been a salient 
topic in Swedish politics19. After a 1980 referendum, Sweden decided to phase-out 
nuclear energy by 2010, but this deadline was abandoned in 1997 in favour of a policy 
of long-term phase-out with no specific end-date (Holmberg and Hedberg, 2010). The 
policy change was part of a cross-party energy agreement between the parties that 
had advocated the 2010 phase-out deadline in the 1980 referendum, i.e. the Social 
19 International Energy Agency (2014) Sweden. Balances for 2014. Date retrieved: 13-02-2017: https://www.iea.
org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?country=SWEDEN=&product=balances.
 






































































figure 3.1: Predicted number of agenda items discussed in the Swedish parliament.
Note: Modelled as a function of lagged public support for a policy proposal (left panel) and lagged relative me-
dia advocacy support (right panel), according to the estimates of Model 4 (Table 1). Other variables held at mean 
or typical values. Black solid lines: proposal is not the status quo; Red dashed lines: proposal is the status quo. 
Plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals of the means of the predictions.
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Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna), the Centre Party (Centerpariet) and the Left 
Party (Vänsterpartiet). In 1998 the decision was made to close the first of two reactors at 
the nuclear power plant at Barsebäck. The decision was eventually carried out in 2001. 
In 2004 the then-governing Social Democratic Party and its energy-partners decided 
to close the second reactor at Barsebäck by 2005. This decision constitutes the one 
instance of policy change in our dataset that is in line with the proposal as phrased in 
the public opinion survey (namely, to phase-out nuclear energy). Later, the new right-
wing government that came to power in 2006 reversed the phase-out and eventually 
abolished the phase-out plans in 2010.
Public opinion
While the plan to close the second reactor at Barsebäck was already discussed in 2001 
and 2003, both the energy-partners in the government and other political parties ar-
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figure 3.2: Political and media attention (left panel) and public opinion and advocacy support (right panel) 
regarding the proposal for phasing-out nuclear energy.
Note: Political attention: number of documents addressing a particular policy issue in the Swedish parliament 
(Riksdag) in a year. Media advocacy volume: number of relevant statements by interest groups and advocates 
on the policy proposal in Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter in a year. Public opinion support: percentage 
of the public who think the policy proposal is ‘good’ or ‘very good’ from those with an opinion. Media advocacy 
support: percentage of statements by advocates in the media in favour of a policy proposal published in a given 
year from all media statements that expressed an opinion on the specific policy proposal. The vertical dotted 
lines indicate relevant policy events and Table A3.1.3 in the Appendix lists the specific policy changes.
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expected loss in production from the shutdown. When the energy-partners did decide 
to close the second reactor at Barsebäck in 2004, as part of their long-term phase-out 
goal, they faced strong opposition from several directions. Not only were the other par-
ties in the right-wing block strongly opposed, but public opinion and media advocacy 
(see next paragraph) had also turned against the phase-out (see Figure 2).
Hence, on the face of it, the actions of the Swedish government do not seem par-
ticularly responsive to public opinion at the time. However, while closing reactors at 
Barsebäck, the government actually allowed other developments that undermined the 
impact of the phase-out plans. For example, a large nuclear power plant in Oskarshamn 
was completely renovated to expand its life span, and another company (Fortum) was 
allowed to expand the production capacity of its existing reactors. Combined, these 
developments largely offset the effects of the closures at Barsebäck over the course of 
the following years.
This would seem to be an opportunity for the Swedish energy-partners to flag their 
responsiveness to public opinion, but surveying both the media and parliamentary 
debates at the time reveals that the government continued to present their policy as a 
long-term phase-out. But then, after the new right-wing government came to power in 
2006, public support for a phase-out in the long run actually increased with a majority 
favouring a phase-out when the government decided to abolish the policy in 2010. The 
increase in public support for a phase-out after 2011 can be attributed at least to some 
extent to the Fukushima disaster (Holmberg, 2011, Holmberg and Hedberg, 2013). This 
shift in public opinion led to an increase in political attention, but no steps towards a 
phase-out of nuclear energy were taken in response.
Altogether, we can conclude that policy making regarding the nuclear phase-out 
was not directly responsive to public opinion (hypothesis 1B), even if, in line with our 
aggregate findings, more support for a proposal to change the status quo did seem to 
coincide with more political attention to the issue in 2011 (hypothesis 1A)20.
Media advocacy volume and relative support
From the right panel of Figure 3.2, it is clear that statements in the media by advocates 
were more negative than positive about the phase-out policy throughout almost the 
entire observation period. Most of the statements were made by power companies 
owning Swedish nuclear power plants – with the owner of Barsebäck, Sydkraft, being 
especially vocal in its opposition. Other advocates, such as labour unions and experts 
warning of increased CO2 emissions also spoke out against the phase-out.
20 This finding is somewhat contrary to the interpretation of Holmberg and Hedberg (2010), who find a close 
match between public opinion and policy output in Sweden. This discrepancy may be due to their broader 
focus (on all nuclear power policy) and to the fact that their study covers the period before the Fukushima 
disaster.
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There is no clear relationship between the number of statements in the media and 
political attention (hypothesis 2) (see the left panel of Figure 3.2), even if both political 
attention and the number of claims in the media spiked around the policy changes in 
2004 (the decision to close Barsebäck) and 2009 (when the new right-wing government 
announced it would abolish the nuclear phase-out policy). However, these spikes in 
attention seem to be driven by counter-mobilization against government plans, by e.g. 
the owner of the Barsebäck reactors, rather than by proactive agenda setting through 
the media by these actors.
Media advocacy also did not have a clear impact on policy change (hypothesis 3B). 
However, several actors that made many of the negative claims about the phase-out 
policy do seem to have had a more subtle effect on the implementation of the decision 
to close the second Barsebäck reactor. By refusing government attempts to come to 
an agreement regarding the closure of nuclear reactors, industry actors (especially Sy-
dkraft) were able to force the Swedish government to pay high levels of compensation 
for the closure21. Moreover, the same government allowed several energy companies to 
expand their production of nuclear in subsequent years.
The media advocates, who were largely against a phase-out, did attain their prefer-
ences after the 2006 election. However, this may be more a consequence of an overlap 
between the preferences of media advocates and those of the new pro-nuclear power 
government than the result of effective (media) advocacy. Additionally, in 2005 the Cen-
tre Party (previously part of the energy agreement and of the right-wing block) changed 
its decades-long position in favour of a phase-out to one against, which paved the way 
for the abolishment of the policy22. All in all then, the image emerges that even if policy 
sometimes did not follow the preferences of media advocates (as with the closure of 
Barsebäck 2), these actors did eventually attain their preferences or were compensated 
when they did not. When it comes to political attention, the relative increase in support 
for the phase-out by the media advocates in the wake of the Fukushima disaster (when 
the phase-out policy was not the status quo) was followed by increased political atten-
tion, providing some support for hypothesis 3A.
21 Sydkraft was compensated for all costs related to the closure and given ownership of a reactor with the same 
capacity as Barsebäck 2 that was owned by Vattenfal. Vattenfal, in its turn, was also compensated financially.
22 This interpretation is corroborated by other studies that have concluded that political considerations and par-
tisan politics have historically been important in Swedish policy making on nuclear power (Nohrstedt, 2010, 
Roßegger and Ramin, 2013).
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six-hour working day
The next proposal for policy change we analyse is the introduction of a six-hour working 
day. The idea of shortening the working day to six hours has been around for decades 
and was experimented with by Swedish companies and public service providers as early 
as the 1980’s. The idea is also regularly picked up in international news media. The Swed-
ish government commissioned expert committee reports on the six hour working day 
(Rohdén, 2000), and in recent years also funded a trial at a care facility. Still, there has 
been no formal policy change on the issue.
Public opinion
In line with our general findings, it seems that the public was successful in spurring 
parliamentary debate of the issue, which received quite some attention in the Riksdag 
(hypothesis 1A). However, this attention did not lead to policy change (hypothesis 1B), 
even if public support for the proposal was very strong, if decreasingly so, over time: the 
public was more positive than negative in all years but 2010 (Figure 3.3).
Media advocacy volume and relative support
This lack of adoption of a policy proposal that is very popular among the public does not 

























figure 3.3: Political and media attention (left panel) and public opinion and advocacy support (right panel) 
regarding a six-hour working day. For definitions of the variables, see the notes to Figure 3.2.
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The level of advocacy support fluctuated significantly, partly due to the overall low 
number of relevant statements. Moreover, these statements – made mostly by experts, 
LO (Sweden’s largest labour organization), and companies – were mostly positive about 
the six-hour working day. The opponents may have considered the proposal so unlikely 
to be implemented that they did not feel the need to mobilize to defend the status quo 
and express their preferences in the media. In any case, advocacy efforts in the media 
did not lead to a policy change (hypothesis 3B). But the volume of advocacy claims and 
the amount of political attention both peeked around 2005, providing some support for 
hypothesis 2B. During this peak in the number of claims (see Figure 3.3), positive and 
negative claims were balanced, which may explain why the peak in attention did not 
lead to further policy activity or more future political attention (hypotheses 3A and 3B): 
when more actors did briefly mobilize and political attention increased, mobilization 
was stronger amongst those who were opposed to the six-hour work day.
The six-hour working day emerges as a very popular policy proposal, both among 
media advocates and the public, even if there is some reason to expect that counter-
mobilization did not occur as actors did not deem the policy’s introduction immanent. 
Given that the introduction of such a policy would be a major departure from interna-
tional practices, it is perhaps not so surprising that the Swedish government has not 
implemented it yet, despite the support it enjoys.
Alcohol sale and taxes
The next two policy proposals we discuss relate to the regulation of alcohol use, so we 
discuss them together. Alcohol regulation policy in Sweden is more restrictive than in 
most other European countries (Karlsson and Osterberg, 2001) and has traditionally 
focused on a strategy to lower consumption that combines high prices with limited 
availability. Although Sweden has had to loosen some of its restrictive policies since 
joining the European Union, the country retains considerable freedom to formulate its 
own policies. This is evidenced by the two alcohol-related policies in our study: alcohol 
taxes, which are comparatively high in Sweden, and the sale of alcohol, which is only 
possible in Swedish stores under a state monopoly (called Systembolaget).
For both issues, political attention was high during the start of our observation pe-
riod, but declined shortly after 2005 (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). These relatively high levels 
of attention and media debate (in the case of lowering taxes) are likely related to several 
developments that increased attention. Importantly, 2004 was the year all EU member 
states were required to allow the import of alcohol for personal use, and fears existed 
that the Swedish policy of high pricing and restricted access would be undermined.
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Public opinion
Both proposals for changing the policies (i.e. lowering alcohol taxes and relaxing the sale 
restrictions) were popular amongst the public at the start of our observation period (Fig-
ures 3.4 and 3.5). Whilst the main government party at the time, the Social Democrats, 
was not unfavourable to these proposals, it did not initiate policy change – possibly in 
order to accommodate its junior coalition partners. As expected in hypothesis 1A, and 
in line with the results in our aggregate analysis, as public support for the proposals 
declined throughout the observation period, so did political attention. Similarly, even 
when the right-wing political parties that had earlier expressed support for both propos-
als came to power in 2006, they did not lower taxes on alcohol or relax laws regarding 
alcohol sale. In fact, these parties raised taxes on alcohol in 2013 and 2014, whereas the 
sale of alcohol in supermarkets remained banned. Given that public support for both 
policies had sharply dropped at this point, this pattern is consistent with hypothesis 1B.
Media advocacy volume and relative support
It is worth noting that media advocacy support varies strongly on both issues, partly due 
to the low number of advocacy statements (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). Most claims were 
made by health experts and actors involved in the sale of alcohol, and have not left an 
obvious mark on the enacted policy changes (hypothesis 3B). Moreover, even though 
the number of statements regarding alcohol taxes dropped as political attention also 

























figure 3.4: Political and media attention (left panel) and public opinion and advocacy support (right panel) 
regarding lowering alcohol taxes. For definitions of the variables, see the notes to Figure 3.2.
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declined (in line with hypothesis 2), most statements were reactions to political plans, 
rather than proactive strategies aimed at setting the agenda. Due to the low total num-
ber of statements, positive statements also did not clearly affect political attention for 
the issue (hypothesis 3A). To conclude, the story of alcohol regulation policies is one in 
which the Swedish public largely got what it wanted, while media advocacy was much 
less important and reactive.
3.6 ConClusIon
In this chapter we set out to investigate how the preferences of the general public and 
interest groups active in the media affect policy making. We focused on a small number 
of regulatory policy issues in Sweden and observed them over relatively long periods of 
time. We examined both the occurrence of policy change and the attention the policy 
issues received in the legislature using aggregate and issue-level analyses. The selection 
of a relatively low number of issues allowed us to analyse each one in depth and to trace 
the details behind the aggregate associations we found in the data.
Our findings reveal a complex picture, but the overall message is that there is not 
much evidence in favour of strong effects of either public opinion or media advocacy. 
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Media advocacy support
figure 3.5: Political and media attention (left panel) and public opinion and advocacy support (right panel) 
with regard to allowing the sale of alcohol in supermarkets. For definitions of the variables, see the notes to 
Figure 3.2.
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If anything, when the public strongly dislikes a proposal, policy might be adapted to 
reflect its wishes, as seems to have happened when taxes on alcohol were raised in 2013 
and 2014. But strong support for a proposal is not necessarily translated into policy 
change. While in the two alcohol regulation related issues public opinion and regulation 
seemed to move in synchrony, when it comes to regulating the duration of the working 
day and nuclear phase-outs, there is quite some disconnect between the dynamics of 
public opinion and policy. Yet, stronger public support for a proposal is associated with 
more discussion of the issue in parliament.
We find even less evidence that media advocacy matters. The aggregate-level 
analysis revealed no clear effects of media advocacy on attention for an issue, other than 
very low levels of political attention when the media advocates are strongly in favour 
of the status quo. When looking more closely at the cases, there is some evidence that 
politicians sometimes find ways to accommodate media advocacy pressure without 
changing formal policy. An example is the phase-out of nuclear power, where, in spite 
of closing the Barsebäck reactor, the Swedish government allowed the expansion of 
existing plants, which was a policy action in line with advocate claims in the media and 
against public preferences. In this case, media advocates do not seem to have lived up to 
the ideal of acting as a transmission belt between the public and the government, but, if 
anything, worked to prevent public preferences from being turned into policy.
Some of these null findings might be due to the fact that policy change is rare and 
that the greatest potential for public opinion and interest groups to influence policy 
might be for “non-decision-making”, i.e. to keep issues off the agenda. Although our 
study covers relatively long time periods compared to most existing analyses, our data 
still contains very few policy events. This is in itself a substantively interesting finding, 
as it reminds us that the policy status quo is rather stable, and the lack of policy change 
is possibly over-determined. One might need a very special confluence of factors to 
change policy, and strong support by the public and/or interest advocates might not be 
sufficient, and not even necessary for such change. In fact, there is some evidence in our 
case studies that political elites can play a strong role both when it comes to deciding 
to change policy as well as to keep popular issues off the political agenda. Rather than 
casting a view of policy making as involving a simple trade-off between responding to 
the views of either media advocates or the public, we find several instances where politi-
cians decide to follow a third course (for a similar view of Swedish politics, see Esaiasson 
and Holmberg, 1996, Holmberg, 1997). This suggests that politicians are aware of and 
rhetorically responsive to public preferences, but that they are not always able or willing 
to implement popular proposals, contrary to what many in the literature assume. It also 
implies that studying political attention alone is not sufficient, since even politicians 
who are rhetorically responsive may not be able to then deliver actual policy. Finally, 
our results indicate that often interest groups may not be well placed to strengthen the 
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responsiveness of policy to public opinion. The case studies suggest instead that other 
considerations may take primacy over public preferences when it comes to the actual 
introduction of policies.
Our findings are even more significant given our initial expectation that Sweden 
would be a likely case for experiencing a high degree of responsiveness due to its strong 
reputation of political accountability and well-established system of interest representa-
tion. In addition, it is remarkable that we find no impact of public opinion on policy 
change on issues on which the public has been polled for its policy preferences. The 
continuous polling implies that the public has been assumed to have meaningful and 
well-formed preferences with regard to the policy options on these issues. Moreover, 
polls may be more likely to be conducted on salient issues where there is greater pres-
sure on the policy-makers to be responsive. Still, when public preferences supported 
change in our cases, change did not occur23.
There is scope for future research to investigate these relationships further by ex-
panding our approach to analysing a larger number of policies and a broader range of 
countries. The sample of policy issues we study implies certain limitations about the 
generalizability of our inferences. All four issues can be considered regulatory ones. It is 
possible that policy making on distributive and redistributive issues generates a different 
dynamic and is embedded in different institutional settings so that public opinion and/
or interest groups play systematically different roles on such issues. Importantly, labour 
unions and employers’ organizations have direct access to the negotiation table when 
it comes to issues related to employment conditions, labour market policy or pensions. 
Still, corporatism in Sweden has been on the decline (Lindvall and Sebring, 2005) and 
one of our issues - the introduction of the six-hour workday - has both regulatory and 
distributive aspects, so the relevance of our findings beyond the universe of regulatory 
policy issues should not be dismissed entirely.
It will also be possible in future research to expand our study beyond that of advo-
cacy claims and statements in the media. Focusing on media advocacy means that we 
can map group involvement in a replicable way over a long time period without being 
dependent on the memory of experts or the use of formal ways of consultation on the 
issues. However, (print) media is but one strategy used by interest groups, and it remains 
possible that they have an impact through other, more covert channels. Our findings 
should therefore be scrutinized in future work comparing multiple channels of lobbying.
We also believe there are benefits to a continued use of a multi-method approach 
to explore the complex relationship between these different actors and policy. The 
23 For interest groups, it is less clear whether salience weakens or strengthens their impact, which is likely to 
depend on whether their position enjoys public support (Rasmussen et al. 2017). On the one hand, interest 
groups may have a greater say over policies that the public cares less about, yet on issues where groups and 
the public are united increasing the public visibility of an issue may be positive for them.
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combination of methods we employed in the analysis allowed us to look beyond the 
aggregate patterns that the statistical analyses provided and interpret the results. We 
showed how our aggregate findings can be interpreted only in light of the specific 
policy issue context and in light of issue-specific information about the evolution of 
the policies. With this, our approach tries to bridge the quantitative literatures on policy 
responsiveness and interest group influence and the case-study scholarship on policy 
evolution. As we demonstrated, both the quantitative and case specific parts of our 
study had a lot to benefit from each other.
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AbsTrACT
Do policy advocates benefit from working together with (certain types of ) political 
parties? Recent years have witnessed an expansion of studies mapping the ties be-
tween political parties and advocates but we know little about how these ties shape 
democratic decision-making. To address this lacuna, we analyze 50 specific policy is-
sues across five countries relying on a survey of 478 advocates. We do not find higher 
levels of preference attainment for advocates who work with political parties. Despite 
frequent discussion whether groups should target friends or foes, there is also no strong 
evidence that preference attainment is higher for advocates working with either allied 
parties on an issue or powerful parties in the legislature. Instead, the two reinforce each 
other: advocates are more likely to attain their preferences when they emphasize the 
importance of working with powerful parties on the same side of an issue. Our study has 
important implications for not only the literature on party-interest group ties, but also 
the extensive interest group literature discussing whom to lobby.
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Collaboration between organized interests and political parties is at the heart of 
representative democracy. Both types of actors help to ensure that the demands of 
different types of citizens and stakeholders are aggregated and translated into policy. 
However, rather than acting as alternative intermediaries (Schattschneider, 1960), these 
two types of political organizations are often complementary. Parties act as gatekeepers 
for organized interests to affect public policy, while organized interests offer resources 
to decision-makers that help them adopt complex policy decisions and cater to their 
voters (Allern & Bale, 2012, Witko, 2009). Policy is therefore often made in collaboration 
between organized interests and political parties, who benefit from mutual cooperation.
Despite strong interdependences between organized interests and parties, the study 
of these two types of political organizations was for a long period largely conducted in 
separate communities. However, recent research has demonstrated a renewed interest 
in studying collaboration between organized interests and parties from both party 
politics (e.g. Allern, 2010, Poguntke, 2002) and interest group scholars (e.g. DeBruycker, 
2016; Marshall, 2015; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). These studies have examined the char-
acter of party-interest groups links as well as how these links vary across different types 
of parties, organized interests and political systems. The study of organized interests and 
political parties has also broadened from looking at traditional forms of institutionalized 
linkage between the two to examining the more informal, ad hoc types of contacts that 
dominate group-party interactions in the 21st century (Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013).
Yet, even if it is widely believed that collaboration between parties and organized 
interests is not merely symbolic but shapes democratic governance (e.g. Allern & Bale, 
2012; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Thomas, 2001), we have limited systematic knowledge 
of the impact of such collaboration. Rather than being the object of analysis, the rel-
evance and importance of interest group-party contacts are often taken for granted and 
used as a motivation why we should study these relations in the first place. As a result, 
we cannot say whether and how these contacts actually affect political decision-making. 
Importantly, we know little about whether they matter for the preference attainment of 
policy advocates on specific policy issues.
This may seem surprising since the literature on organized interests makes clear that 
lobbying success is strongly affected by support from other players, such as the rest of 
the group community (Mahoney, 2007, Dür & Marshall, 2015, Furlong, 1997) or public 
opinion (Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 2018). Yet, contact with some of the key players in 
decision-making processes, i.e. the political parties themselves, is not considered in the 
models. Moreover, while a voluminous interest group literature is devoted to discuss-
ing which types of legislators organized interests should benefit from lobbying, the 
overwhelming majority of this research focuses on contact with individual legislators as 
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opposed to parties (e.g. Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Wonka, 
2017). The few studies that consider contact between political parties and organized in-
terests are exclusively interested in explaining the shape and intensity of group contacts 
with the different types of parties rather than the consequences of these interactions 
(e.g. DeBruycker, 2016; Marshall, 2015; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). This means that while 
recent research has expanded our knowledge of whether groups interact with allied or 
powerful parties, we know little about how these efforts ultimately affect their likelihood 
of obtaining their desired policies. Finally, while there has been a growth in research on 
the relationship between organized interests and political parties, only a limited share 
of this research is conducted at the level of specific policy issues despite the fact that 
there may be substantial variation in group-party connections across different issues 
(for exceptions, see Beyers, De Bruycker, & Baller, 2015; DeBruycker, 2016). The aim of 
this chapter is therefore to analyse whether working with political parties helps policy 
advocates attain their preferred outputs on specific policy issues and to consider differ-
ences in the gains derived from working with allied and powerful parties.
As a result, we theorize about not only why organized interests should benefit from 
political parties in their lobbying efforts but also how the potential gains of collabora-
tion with parties may depend on the type of party. Specifically, we formulate expecta-
tions that these gains are larger for organized interests whose work on an issue involves 
friendly parties and/or more powerful parties. Moreover, we expect these two factors 
to reinforce each other so that the positive effect for groups of building up a working 
relationship to parties they agree with is stronger, the more powerful these parties are.
We test our predictions on a sample of 50 policy issues across five Western European 
countries, which have different systems of interest representation. We rely on a new 
dataset including a cross-national survey of 478 advocates that were active on these 
issues and asked how important different political parties were for the advocates’ work 
on the issues. The survey is supplemented with data on public opinion about our issues, 
party characteristics, detailed coding of policy outputs and interviews with civil servants 
in all five countries.
Our cross-national study shows that groups do not benefit from interacting with all 
types of parties. We find no main difference in levels of preference attainment between 
advocates who emphasize the importance of parties for their work on an issue compared 
to those who do not. This main finding remains similar when comparing advocates who 
had direct contacts with members of parliament or the cabinet to those that did not 
report such contacts. Similarly, there is no clear relationship between working with pow-
erful or allied parties and lobbying success. Instead, the two types of parties may have 
an effect in combination: advocates working with both types of parties are more likely 
to attain their preferences than those that do not, or work only with one or the other. 
Importantly, this result holds even when we control for the share of political parties 
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(both in total and amongst government parties) that already supports the advocate’s 
position. As such, the chapter offers a first assessment of whether and how political par-
ties matter for the preference attainment of policy advocates.
4.2 grouP-PArTy lInkAge In exIsTIng reseArCh
Many of the seminal studies in the discipline of political science took a broad perspec-
tive on the political system paying attention to the role of both political parties and 
organized interests (e.g. Schattschneider, 1960; Truman, 1951). Later, the study of parties 
and interest groups became more “polarized” with scholars splitting into two different 
communities (Allern, 2010, Allern & Bale, 2012, Heaney, 2010, Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 
2013, Witko, 2009). Recent years have witnessed something of a revival in studies that 
take an interest in the links between policy advocates and parties. For a while, most of 
this work discussed these links with parties as the starting point (Allern, 2010, Katz & Mair, 
1995, Poguntke 2000, 2006), not least because many interest group scholars considered 
them less relevant in the era of corporatism (Allern & Bale, 2012). However, the interest 
group literature on the interaction between parties and organized interests has recently 
grown (e.g. Beyers et al., 2015; DeBruycker, 2016; Marshall, 2015; Otjes & Rasmussen, 
2017; Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013; Wonka, 2017). Many studies have moved beyond 
a focus on formal, institutionalized links to considering a broader range of actors and 
types of contacts (e.g. Allern, 2010; Marshall, 2015; Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013).
Yet, most studies focus on links between organized interests and parties without 
considering specific policy issues (e.g. Marshall, 2015; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). As a 
result, they make general assumptions about which parties and interest group types 
should be ideologically aligned (trade unions and social-democratic parties) rather than 
consider that the congruence of the positions of these actors may vary between policies. 
On some issues these political organizations may not follow what would be expected 
from their ideological predispositions and side with their traditional allies. Recent years 
have witnessed important exceptions to this pattern with issue specific studies examin-
ing both which parties and groups are aligned (Beyers et al., 2015) and the frequency of 
contacts between them (DeBruycker, 2016). Yet, similar to the remaining literature these 
studies pay little attention to the outcomes of interest group-party interactions.
A comparative study of Western democracies by Thomas acknowledges this chal-
lenge emphasizing how “the importance of the party-group connection has long been 
taken for granted, falling largely into the realm of intuitive axioms” (Thomas, 2001: 1). 
While a study of the systematic impact of relations between parties and organized in-
terests on democracy was also beyond the scope of their study, Thomas and coauthors 
make considerable progress by explicitly discussing the impact of party-group connec-
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tions in their country chapters. One of the conclusions that emerges from their study 
is that organized interests with close and cooperative relations to parties are generally 
better able at securing benefits and resources in their political systems. Similarly, a study 
by McMenamin and Schoenman (2007) of firms’ perceived lobbying success of Polish 
executives finds that big firms without relations to powerful politicians estimated their 
own success to be weaker than those with such relations, even if these firms are not 
significantly less likely to lobby than firms with party connections.
Yet, we do not know whether party-group relations are related to the preference 
attainment of a broad range of different organized interests on specific policy issues, 
nor whether there is variation in lobbying success of organized interests depending 
on the type of political party. Looking at specific issues allows us to take into account 
that collaboration patterns between parties and groups vary between policy issues 
(DeBruycker, 2016). It also allows adding to existing research on the lobbying success 
of organized interests. This literature has emphasized how preference attainment is 
not only a consequence of group and issue characteristics but also affected by support 
for advocacy positions by other actors (e.g. Dür, 2015, Furlong, 1997, Mahoney, 2007, 
Rasmussen et al., 2018). Yet, it has not systematically considered the role of group-party 
contacts.
4.3 TheoreTICAl frAmeWork: The benefITs for 
orgAnIzeD InTeresTs of WorkIng WITh PolITICAl 
PArTIes
Parties and organized interests can be seen as intermediary organizations that in a rep-
resentative democracy help aggregate and transmit the views of their constituencies 
into policy (Schattschneider, 1948, 1960). At the same time, they also differ in important 
respects. First, while interest organizations are external to the political system, parties 
run for public office. Second, organized interests typically represent a more narrow 
substantive focus than political parties, which need to relate to the broader political 
agenda to gain and maintain office (Allern & Bale, 2012; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). We 
use a behavioral and broad definition of advocates in this chapter including all organized 
non-state actors with an interest in influencing policy (Baroni et al., 2014). In addition to 
traditional membership based interest groups, we also include experts and individual 
firms, all of whom we refer to as (policy) advocates or organized interests.
We assume that policy advocates are interested in affecting the content of policy-
making to satisfy their stakeholders and ensure their long-term survival. To determine 
lobbying success, we rely on the strategy of preference attainment, which has been 
frequently used in recent studies (e.g. Dür et al., 2015). This approach aims to establish 
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the preferences of advocates or other actors on specific issues and then compares these 
to the final policy outputs. To assess whether advocates attained their preferences we 
compare the rates at which policy changed (or did not change) in line with the prefer-
ences of different sets of advocates. Even if our analysis includes a series of controls we 
do not assume a causal link between the actions of specific advocates and final policy. 
As a result, our analyses refer to “preference attainment” rather than “influence” (e.g. 
Mahoney, 2007). De Bruycker (2016) explains how even if interactions between groups 
and parties can be initiated by parties, organized interests often make the first move. 
Advocates have strong incentives to contact parties since they cannot introduce legisla-
tion, suggest amendments to legislative proposals or vote on such proposals. Through 
contacts with parties they therefore try to affect both a) which items (do not) appear on 
the political agenda and b) the content and fate of these items (Witko, 2009). They can 
do so in numerous ways e.g. by putting forward draft legislation and amendments or by 
presenting statistics and studies (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998).
Political parties are expected to be interested in helping organized interests fulfill 
their policy goals since they provide them with valuable resources. Advocates can for 
example offer technical expertise, information about voter preferences and financial 
contributions (Allern & Bale, 2012) or help parties increase the public legitimacy of their 
policy decisions (Witko, 2009). Hence, we understand their decision to engage with 
political parties from an exchange perspective where advocates and parties exchange 
useful resources with one another (Allern & Bale, 2012, Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013, 
Warner, 2000, Witko, 2009). This means that rather than seeing the relationship between 
organized interests and political parties as a zero-sum game, we expect the two to 
engage in a plus-sum game where they mutually benefit from interacting (Allern & Bale, 
2012).
According to Heaney, parties and organized interests act as “brokers” within one 
another’s network and in the policy process. He mentions how “parties may help to put 
some interest groups into key positions of influence or exclude others from decision 
making” (2010: 56). Yet, policy impact is not the only good that parties offer to policy 
advocates. The parties themselves can also be seen as information providers. Hence, 
through party contacts, advocates can get valuable access to information about party 
preferences and future political agendas, which may help them develop more effective 
lobbying strategies (Witko, 2009). Moreover, Klüver (2018) demonstrates that the atten-
tion that German political parties pay to policy issues is in part determined by interest 
group mobilization on the issue: the more organized interests mobilize on an issue, 
the more political parties pay attention to it. This suggests that organized interests can 
indeed get their issues on the agendas of parties – a first step towards influencing policy 
outputs. In sum, because parties enjoy control over the policy agenda and can provide 
policy advocates with important information about policy processes, we would expect 
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advocates who work with political parties to experience a higher degree of lobbying 
success:
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of congruence between the position of an advocate and the 
policy outcome on an issue increases when advocates work with political parties.
While we might expect organized interests to benefit from working with any political 
party, advocates should get more out of certain types of parties. A substantial share of 
the literature on lobbying by organized interests has focused on the decision of which 
legislators (e.g. Austen-Smith, 1994, Crombez, 2002, Gullberg, 2008, Hojnacki & Kimball, 
1998), or parties to lobby (DeBruycker, 2016; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). While these 
studies are not about lobbying success as such, the arguments stating ‘who to lobby’ are 
ultimately motivated by an expectation of which types of legislators/parties would help 
groups obtain the biggest impact on policy.
According to one logic, advocates should be more likely to attain their preferences if 
they work with parties that are powerful and control decision-making within the legis-
lature. In the US literature it has been suggested that it should be particularly beneficial 
for policy advocates to lobby legislators who hold powerful positions in Congress since 
they can decide on the future agenda and affect the decisions of their colleagues (e.g. 
Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998, Kingdon, 1989, but see Wonka, 2017). Although more unitary 
political parties, as opposed to individual legislators, are the focus of this chapter, this 
logic should also apply to parties, where certain types of parties may be more decisive 
for both whether legislation gets introduced and whether it gets adopted.
There are several potential sources of party power in (Western European) political 
systems. Firstly, the government status of parties should influence their impact of on 
policy. For one, it is the responsibility of the government to present an overall plan for 
their period in government and a corresponding budget proposal for each legislative 
term (Peter Bjerre Mortensen et al., 2011). Hence, they often act as gate-keepers de-
termining which items appear on the legislative agenda. Empirically, too government 
parties are much more likely to fulfill their election pledges (Thomson et al., 2017)24 
than parties in opposition – underlining their influence over political decision-making. 
Due to this central role played by government parties at all stages of the policy process, 
advocates should therefore benefit especially from working with this set of parties.
A second potential source of party power is the share of parliamentary seats a party 
controls. Of course, this is related to government status in the sense that larger parties 
24 We do not distinguish between majority and minority governments, as both can fulfill their pledges at com-
parable rates (Thomson et al., 2017) and are legislatively equally effective (Cheibub, Przeworski, & Saiegh, 
2004).
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are also more likely to enter government. Still, party size has traditionally been seen as 
linked to the political relevance of parties (Sartori, 1976). Larger parties often also have 
more resources at their disposal, at least in part because in many parliaments funds 
are allocated in proportion to party size (Brauninger & Debus, 2009), which should help 
them in their ability to introduce and develop legislative proposals.
Empirically, these characteristics often correlate strongly, which is why we follow 
the approach of previous studies (Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017) and combine party size 
and government status to identify more powerful political parties. Such an index has 
the added benefit of indirectly capturing other sources of party power. For example, 
larger government parties are statistically speaking also more likely to provide the prime 
minister (giving additional control over the policy agenda (Glasgow & Golder, 2011) and 
more likely to include the median legislator. We thus expect that working with powerful 
political parties should help advocates attain their preferences.
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of congruence between the position of an advocate and the 
policy outcome on an issue increases when advocates work with powerful parties.
While working with powerful parties might be beneficial for groups, an alternative 
logic would argue that organized interests would benefit if they worked with parties 
which share their policy views. In the US literature discussing which individual legis-
lators organized interests lobby, this is the perspective that has found most support 
(see Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). As an example, Hall and 
Deardorff (2006) describe lobbying as a process where lobbyists provide information 
to like-minded legislators as a “legislative subsidy” in return for policy influence. Parties 
with similar positions to the advocate’s might ultimately be the ones most likely to grant 
access and help them attain their preferences. Hence, even if advocates can choose on 
a case by case basis who to work with “party-group relations are not one-shot contacts 
and ‘collaboration’ often has a longer time horizon than ad hoc lobbying contacts” (Otjes 
& Rasmussen, 2017: 98). Importantly, the lobbying process also involves creating and 
maintaining “relationships of trust” (Baumgartner & Leech, 1996: 531-32).
It can be expected that when it comes to persuading someone to table and introduce 
new legislation and keeping issues of the agenda, reliance on traditional likeminded 
allies is important (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). Hence to affect these processes requires 
more than persuading a certain party to change its vote. Relying on allies may have the 
spin-off effect that groups can also rely on these parties as agents that negotiate and 
bargain on their behalf (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Wonka, 2017). Working with allied 
parties can therefore enable them to exert an impact on the efforts of a broader set of 
parties than the ones directly targeted by the groups. Even if the policy advocates have 
the resources to address different political parties, it may still be beneficial for them to 
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have other MPs act on their behalf and contact their fellow members of parliament. 
Hence, allied parties can often present their views in a more legitimate fashion than 
the advocates themselves who may be regarded as representing particularistic interests 
only. In sum, our third hypothesis therefore argues that working with likeminded politi-
cal parties can be expected to result in substantial benefits for groups.
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of congruence between the position of an advocate and the 
policy outcome on an issue increases when advocates work with parties with which they 
agree.
We expect that there should be independent benefits of working with both powerful 
and allied parties, but these effects may also re-inforce each other. Imagine a scenario 
where an advocate has convinced a party on its side of the issue to push for its introduc-
tion. This ally will be much more effective if it is not a small opposition party, but is 
instead a large government party enjoying more direct control over the policy agenda. 
The reverse is also likely. Working together with a government party will be more effec-
tive if the party is already positively predisposed towards the advocate and/or its policy 
position. In such a scenario, the advocate ‘only’ has to convince the party to actively push 
for the policy, rather than achieve a much more difficult position shift from the party in 
question. Summarizing, we expect the independent effects of working with a powerful 
or a party on the same side of an issue to re-inforce one another, leading to the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The positive impact of working with allied parties on the likelihood of 
preference attainment is stronger, the more powerful these parties are.
4.3 reseArCh DesIgn
Case selection and sampling
We inc lude five countries in this study: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and the UK. Although we do not expect large cross-national differences, the countries 
vary on a number of variables to ensure that our results are likely to travel beyond their 
immediate context. The first is whether interest representation is organized in a pluralist 
(the UK) or corporatist (the other countries) fashion (Siaroff, 1999), as this may influence 
whether advocates rely on political parties as the main targets of their lobbying activity 
(Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013). Our study also contains countries with patterns of 
wholesale government alternation where new governments tend to be comprised of 
different parties than the incumbents (UK, DK, SE), a system where this replacement 
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is usually partial (NL) and one where both scenarios occur (DE). This matters, because 
organized interests may approach parties differently based on the pattern of govern-
ment alternation (Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017).
As mentioned, we focus on specific policy issues. Whereas some organized interests 
might have an interest in pushing policy in a more left- or right-wing direction, most of 
their activities are directed at influencing specific policies (Berkhout et al., 2017). Un-
like recent studies adopting an issue-level approach (Beyers et al., 2015, DeBruycker, 
2016), we do not start from issues on the legislative agenda, but focus on 50 policy 
issues on which public opinion data was available (Appendix 4.1 contains a list of all 
issues and a description of the selection process), since the amount of public support for 
an advocate’s policy position may affect its lobbying success (Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 
2018). Further criteria were that the policy issue should include a change to the status 
quo to allow us to track policy (change), that it fell under the national government’s 
jurisdiction25 (for a similar approach, see Gilens, 2012). This allows us to include issues at 
different stages of the policy process, rather than only those that have on the legislative 
agenda. It means that we can also study the preferences and activities of advocates who 
tried to get their issues on the agenda, or keep them off it (Berkhout et al., 2017). We also 
ensure variation in terms of the type of policy issue (Lowi, 1964), as redistributive issues 
may generate more contestation and debate than regulatory and distributive issues. 
There are some concerns that issues included in polls are more salient than the average 
issue (Burstein, 2014). To address this, we have selected policy issues that vary in terms 
of the amount of media attention they attracted and our analyses control for the media 
salience of a policy.
Our final unit of observation is an advocate on a policy issue. To identify advocates 
active on our issues, we tracked three sources over a four-year period after the poll, or 
until policy change occurred following the approach of Gilens (2012). Firstly, student 
assistants hand-coded all newspaper articles about the issue in two major newspapers 
in each country to record statements about the issue26. This coding was complemented 
with a face-to-face interview with a civil servant who worked on the issue (response 
rate of 82%). In a third step, we identified advocates that used formal consultation tools 
available in their countries (such as consultations on legislative proposals, or hearings in 
parliament). Through December 2016 and the first months of 2017, an online survey was 
sent to the 1,410 advocates that were identified as active on our issues. As mentioned, we 
25 The data were collected for the GovLis project (www.govlis.eu).
26 We selected one left-leaning and right-leaning broadsheet newspaper per country to avoid bias in the cover-
age certain types of organized interests receive. The newspapers were Politiken and Jyllandposten in Denmark, 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in Germany, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph 
in the UK, Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet in Sweden, and de Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad in the 
Netherlands.
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included not just traditional membership associations, but focused on a much broader 
set of advocates including experts and businesses. A total of 410 advocates responded 
to the questions regarding political parties (29%, excluding “don’t knows”), with 478 
finishing the survey. Appendix 4.2 shows a non-response analysis of the likelihood of 
responding to the survey. The model shows that an advocate’s likelihood of responding 
was not dependent on whether policy change occurred on the issue, nor on its media 
salience or policy type. However, firms and business groups were significantly less likely 
to respond to our survey than others, which means that we are more confident general-
izing our results to non-business advocates. Similar to what we have seen in other inter-
est group surveys, responses vary between countries (Binderkrantz & Rasmussen, 2015) 
with Dutch, Danish and to a lesser extent Swedish advocates significantly more likely 
to respond to the survey than invitees from Germany and the UK. Although this may 
limit generalizability, the fact that the UK and German respondent samples are similar 
to those in the other countries means that results are likely to apply to these countries, 
too. In the survey, we included all parties that were represented in parliament during 
the observation period, with at least 1% of the total vote share during the observation 
period27.
measuring preference attainment
As a first step, we measured whether the position of an advocate is congruent with the 
policy outcome on an issue. The positions of advocates were coded as in favor, neutral, 
or against changing the status quo on the policy issue. We initially relied on coding 
the positions from written sources (like the newspapers and consultations mentioned 
above). Where we identified the advocate but not their position or a neutral position, 
we complemented these with self-reported positions from the survey. To determine 
whether policy changed we used minutes of parliamentary meetings, legislative texts, 
and media sources and corroborated our coding during the interviews with civil ser-
vants. Our final dependent variable measuring preference attainment takes on a value 
of 1 if the final policy output was in the advocate’s preferred direction, and 0 if it was not.
4.4 meAsurIng The InDePenDenT vArIAbles
Research on the collaboration between organized interests and political parties has 
relied on both attitudinal and behavioral measures (see also Allern & Bale, 2012; Otjes 
& Rasmussen, 2017). Behavioral measures focus on interactions between organized 
27 With the exception of the SNP and DUP in the UK and the Socialistisk Folkeparti in Denmark, which were not 
included in the interviews with civil servants.
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interests and parties (e.g. Allern, 2010), whereas attitudinal ones typically ask organized 
interests to rate the importance and degree of cooperation with parties (e.g. Otjes & Ras-
mussen, 2017). Without discarding the value of behavioral measures, this chapter relies 
on an attitudinal approach, because we believe it best fits our research question. For one, 
it is complicated to retrospectively map all interactions between advocates and parties 
– especially on our specific policy issues. Although some formal communication might 
still be retrievable, many informal channels through which advocates may have worked 
with parties would be difficult to systematically assess. Secondly, the channels through 
which advocates sought to contact parties may vary across countries, further complicat-
ing the construction of a valid behavioral measure. The difficulty of pre-defining a set of 
possible contact channels is demonstrated by Rasmussen and Lindeboom (2013) who 
found that even when using an extensive list of possible contacts and parties based on 
previous studies, the “other” category was still selected most often. Moreover, Otjes and 
Rasmussen (2017) show that their measure, which asks about intensity of cooperation 
between an interest group and a party correlates very highly with measures enquiring 
about specific points of contact.
We therefore asked advocates to indicate how important each political party in their 
country was to their “work on the issue”. We expect most advocates who say a party 
was important to their efforts to have at least (tried to) engage(d) with parties they 
deemed (very) important. This formulation has the dual advantage of not probing any 
specific activities, whilst at the same time still requiring that the party was important to 
a respondent’s advocacy work on the issue.
However, there is a risk that parties that influenced policy-making on the issues are 
rated as “important” by advocates, independent of whether the party was contacted. We 
have taken two steps to address this concern. Firstly, all our analyses include a control 
variable that measures the share of political parties that was on the same side of the 
issue as the advocate. This should help ensure that the simple fact that many parties 
may have independently pushed for a policy does not affect the main effects28. Secondly 
and importantly, we also asked whether direct contact with both members of parliament 
and members of the government on the issue were important to the advocate. These 
measures correlate significantly and strongly with our measure; 85% of advocates who 
indicated at least one party was (not) important or very important to their work on the 
issue, also indicated that direct contact with members of parliament was (not) important 
or very important, and a Kruskall-Wallis equality of populations rank test of ordinal ver-
sions of the measures was significant (p <0.001). Correlations are slightly less strong but 
28 We also estimated our models using a measure that includes the share of parliamentary seats controlled by 
parties on the same side of an issue as the advocate, a measure for whether at least one and the number of 
government parties sharing the advocate’s position (models not shown). All results remain substantively un-
changed.
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still significant for our question about direct contact with members of the cabinet. The 
full question formulation and alternative analyses are presented in Appendix 4.6
To measure whether advocates worked with political parties (H1), we construct a 
binary variable for all respondents who answered that at least one party was important 
or very important for their work on the issue (1) and those that did not (0).
For the hypotheses related to the power of the political party (H2) we create an index 
to measure the strength of how powerful the average party that advocates said was 
important to their work was. It is composed of two measures: the first related to the size 
of the average important party, the second to whether the average important party was 
in government29.
We operationalized the size of the party as the average share of seats controlled 
by the parties that were deemed important or very important by the advocate. Since 
our observation period varies per issue and sometimes spans an election, the size of 
a party is measured as the average proportion of seats in the national parliament that 
was held by the party during the observation period, weighted by the number of days 
the party held those seats. So a political party that held 20% of all seats during half the 
observation period and 30% during the second half, is scored as having held 25% of 
all seats on the issue. The final advocate-level variable is then the average size of the 
average party that was deemed (very) important. To illustrate this, imagine advocate 
A, who deemed parties A and B important. Party A held on average 20% of all seats in 
parliament during the observation period, and party B held on average 10% of seats in 
the observation period. Advocate A is then scored as 15% on this variable, since this is 
the average share of seats held by the parties it deemed important. To measure working 
with government parties, we look at the share of all important parties that were in gov-
ernment at least 30% of the observation period. The cut-off point is set to ensure that 
we capture working with parties that spent a reasonable amount of time in government 
to make it feasible that the party could have pushed for a policy change. Both measures 
run from 0-1 (and are correlated at .78), which is why we summed them and divided 
by two to create our index. It runs from 0 (no party was important) to 1 (the average 
“important party” controls all seats in parliament and is in government). In our data, the 
variable runs from 0 to .78.
To capture whether advocates worked with parties they agreed with (H3) we first 
measured the positions of political parties through expert judgements. In interviews 
we asked civil servants to assess the positions of parties (against, neutral or in favor) 
on the issue. These expert assessments correspond well with our impressions from the 
29 The centrality of a party in the political system is another potential source of party power. However, it is not 
immediately clear which party controls the median legislator on a specific policy issue, especially given that 
our observation period sometimes spans elections.
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extensive coding of newspapers and other documents, giving them a high face-validity. 
Relying on interviews does mean that we did not obtain positions for some parties on 
some issues, leading to a lower number of parties included in the calculation of this 
variable. However, it has the advantage that we measure these positions relying on 
experts with considerable public and hard to access private information. Moreover, the 
amount of missing data would have been higher had we relied on party manifestos, 
which do not mention the vast majority of the issues in our sample. Expert interviews 
for the mapping of policy positions have successfully been used in studies of EU policy 
negotiations where experts have located actors’ policy positions spatially (Thomson, 
2006, Dür & Marshall, 2015). The final variable “Worked with parties on the same side” 
was then operationalized as the share of parties the advocate agreed with, out of the 
total number of political parties that the advocate found important for their work on the 
issue, meaning that the variable measures whether the advocate focused more (or less) 
on parties they agreed with.
Finally, we test whether the effect of working with parties with which advocates 
agree is stronger when these parties are powerful (H4) by interacting our measure of 
“Worked with parties on the same side” with the index of party power. Appendix 4.3 
provides a full overview of our variables.
Control variables
Our analysis contains a number of controls. As mentioned the first control variable is 
the share of political parties in the system that agreed with the advocate, regardless of 
whether the advocate worked with them. The second control is the media saliency of an 
issue, which is measured as the average number of articles about the issue in the two 
coded newspapers per day during the observation period. We also include the type of 
advocate since business actors may be more likely to attain their preferences (but see 
Dür et al., 2015; Yackee & Yackee, 2006). Based on an organization’s website, we distin-
guish the following actor types: a) trade unions and occupational associations, b) expert 
and think tank organizations and institutional associations, c) business associations, d) 
firms, e) religious, identity and hobby groups and f ) public interest groups. An overview 
of the advocate coding is provided in Appendix 4.4.
Moreover, we control for resources, which have been linked to the preference at-
tainment of advocates, although the evidence is mixed (e.g. Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
We use two survey questions to capture different types of resources. The first probes 
the extent to which an advocate agreed that they spent “a large amount of economic 
resources” on the issue to capture whether their advocacy was backed by financial 
resources. The second question asks whether the advocate agreed that they had “a large 
amount of media attention” for their work on the issue, to measure whether the advo-
cate perceived their outside lobbing as successful. For the final binary variable those 
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who said they neither disagreed nor agreed, agreed or agreed strongly were coded as 
possessing these resources on the issue.
We also include the share of other advocates on the same side of an issue as the 
advocate, which should be positively related to the likelihood that the advocate gets 
its way (e.g. Mahoney, 2007). In addition, we control for whether advocates who have 
strong public support are more likely to attain their preferences (Rasmussen, Mäder, et 
al., 2018). The variable indicates the share of the public (as indicated in the opinion poll) 
that was on the same side of an issue as the advocate.
Finally, studies on policy change and organized interests show that, at least in the 
US, there is a considerable ‘status quo bias’ meaning that actors who want to change 
the status quo are at a disadvantage (Mahoney, 2007; Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 2018) 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Gilens, 2012). We thus include a measure indicating whether 
the advocate wants to change the status quo.
4.5 AnAlysIs AnD resulTs
Table 1 shows the results of a series of logistic multilevel models predicting whether an 
advocate attained its preference, with random-intercepts for policy issues to account 
for the nesting of our advocates in policy issues (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). Models 1 
through 3 each investigate the effects of hypotheses 1 through 3 separately. Models 4 
and 5 then include interaction effects to test our fourth hypothesis arguing that there 
are additional benefits of working with parties on the same side as an advocate when 
they are also powerful.
Our results tell a somewhat different story than expected based on existing research 
arguing that party-group connections should increase the ability of organized interests 
to secure benefits and resources in their political systems (Thomas, 2001) and increase 
the perceived degree of lobbying success (McMenamin & Schoenman, 2007). Hence, 
against the expectations formulated in hypothesis 1, we see that – at least on specific 
policy issues –working with political parties on an issue is generally not related to higher 
rates of preference attainment, as there is no significant relationship between working 
with any party and preference attainment in model 1.
We also find little evidence that working with powerful parties is directly related to 
preference attainment (H2) in model 2, even if the effect is close to significant (p <0.1) 
when we introduce the control variables (model 2 in Appendix 4.5). When it comes to 
working with parties on the same side, the results are somewhat mixed. The relationship 
between working with friends and preference attainment (H3) is not significant in Model 
3 (p<0.1), but does become significant when the control variables are added to the 
model (see model 3 in Appendix 4.5). While we assume the full model including controls 
95
Table 4.1: Multilevel logistic regression models for the preference attainment of an advocate on an issue.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H1: Worked with any party -0.04
(0.32)



































Perceived media attention -0.74
(0.55)




Pro policy change -0.76*
(0.34)
Actor type (ref: business)
Religious & identity groups -0.40
(1.11)
Public interest groups 0.88
(0.76)










Constant -0.58 -0.75 -0.87 -0.78 -2.88*
(0.60) (0.60) (0.58) (0.62) (1.15)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue random intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of advocates 264 264 264 264 264
Number of issues 34 34 34 34 34
AIC 357 357 354 353 320
BIC 386 385 383 389 395
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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is the correct specification, the relatively large number of variables and low number 
of observations at the issue-level does make us reluctant to draw too firm conclusions 
about the effect of working with friends. If anything, however, the data are somewhat 
more consistent with the pattern that working with friends is related to preference at-
tainment on an issue than vice versa.
In models four and five we assess the expectation that the effect of working with 
parties on the same side of an issue is stronger the more powerful these parties are 
on average (H4). The significant interaction term in model 4 supports this expectation 
(p<0.05). Moreover, we demonstrate that the effect holds once we add our remaining 
control variables in model 5. Figure 1 shows that the marginal effect of working with 
parties on the same side increases the more powerful they are. We also see that the ef-
fect of working with a party on an advocate’s side is only significant when the advocate 
works with parties scoring on above 0.27 on our power index, although this exact point 
does vary somewhat depending on the specification of the model. Appendix 4.8 shows 
the inverse relationship: the effect of working with powerful parties only becomes 
significant when on average 36% of those parties are also on the same side of the issue 
as the advocate, again keeping in mind that this cut-off point is somewhat sensitive to 
different model specifications. These results confirm the expectations that the effect of 
working with parties on the same side of the advocate becomes stronger once those 
parties are also powerful.
Regarding our control variables we find a strong and significant effect of the share 
of parties that share the advocate’s position on the issue. Keeping all other variables at 
their mean and based on model 5, the predicted probability of an advocate attaining 
their preferences when no parties support its position is around 47% and increases to 
66% when all parties are on the same side as the advocate.
In addition, the share of organized interests on the same side as an advocate 
increases its likelihood of preference attainment. Similarly, the stronger the public’s 
support for the advocate’s position, the higher the likelihood that the latter attains its 
preferences. We also find evidence for a status quo bias (Mahoney, 2007; Rasmussen, 
Mäder, et al., 2018): advocates who want to change the status quo are less likely to at-
tain their preferences than those who want to maintain it. We find no evidence of an 
effect of media salience, nor any systematic differences between business groups and 
the other types of advocates. Similarly, we echo recent conclusions in the literature that 
the relationship between lobbying resources and success might be less straightforward 
than often expected (Baumgartner et al., 2009). None of our measures of self-reported 
resources are significantly related to an advocate’s preference attainment. Finally, we do 
not find any significant cross-national differences.
Taken together, the results provide very limited evidence that working with politi-
cal parties is effective per se. The same applies when it comes to simply working with 
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powerful or friendly parties, where we find only weak evidence for the latter. Instead, our 
results suggest that the strategy is only related to preference attainment under certain 
conditions: when organized interests work with parties that are on average both power-
ful and on the advocate’s side.
robustness and model checks
We have run a number of robustness checks, which are shown in Appendices 6 and 7. 
Importantly, we considered more behavioral measures of working with political parties, 
relying on survey questions asking about the importance of direct contact with MPs and 
members of the cabinet. The models in Appendix 4.6 show that, in line with our findings 
regarding H1, there is also no difference in levels of preference attainment for advocates 
that directly contacted either MPs or the national government and their preference at-
tainment.
To test the robustness of our interactions (H4), models 1 and 2 in Appendix 4.7 show 
that the results are robust to replacing the power index with each of its components. 
Model 1 interacts the party size component with the share of parties a group worked 
with that were on the same side of the advocate. Model 2 does the same for the share 
of parties a group worked with that were in government. Both interaction terms are 
figure 4.1: Marginal effect of working with parties on same side on preference attainment, by the power of 
the parties with 95% confidence intervals. Based on Model 5.
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positive and significant, underlining that the findings are not driven by just one of these 
(correlated) aspects of party power. In addition, we reconstructed the index for party 
power counting parties as “in government” that were in government at least 20% of 
days of the observation period (instead of 30%) in model 3. Moreover, model 4 uses the 
number of parties a group worked with on the same side as the advocate rather than the 
share of parties. Both models produce results similar to those presented above.
To ensure that the interactions in our logistic models are accurately estimated (Ai 
& Norton, 2003), we also ran multilevel OLS regressions instead of logit models which 
does not change the main findings either, although p-values for our interaction effects 
do increase to just over 0.10 when we use clustered standard errors instead of random 
intercepts for issues (not shown). Our interaction effects also meet the assumption of 
linearity. To test this, we used the Interflex package by Hainmueller et al. (2018) and 
estimated models 7 and 8 as OLS regressions with robust standard errors for policy is-
sues confirming that the interactions are indeed linear in this specification. Finally, some 
advocates indicated that no single party was important to their work on the issue. These 
advocates were scored a “0” on the power index and “worked with parties on their side” 
variables. To ensure that these observations do not affect the results in models 4 and 
5, we re-ran the analysis with only the 150 advocates who said at least one party was 
important to their work on the issue and found similar results.
4.6 ConClusIon
While interaction between organized interests and political parties is widely perceived 
as shaping democratic governance, the relevance of interest group-party linkage is of-
ten “taken for granted” in existing research (Thomas, 2001). We examined one important 
way in which interest group-party collaboration might matter by conducting the first 
systematic, cross-national study of how it affects the preference attainment of advocates 
on specific policy issues.
Our analysis finds little evidence to suggest a general relation between working with 
political parties and preference attainment. Even when replacing our survey measure 
about the “importance of a party for an advocate’s work on the issue” with questions 
asking about direct contact with members of parliament or the cabinet, we still do not 
find higher levels of preference attainment for advocates using this strategy. There is 
also no strong evidence that groups benefit from working with either powerful or allied 
parties only, even if there is some indication that working with parties on the same side 
as the advocate may be related to preference attainment. The two do seem to work 
in combination, however: advocates stating that both powerful and allied parties are 
99
important for their work on an issue are more likely to attain their preferences than 
advocates who state none or only one of them was important.
This chapter has important implications for not only the study of party-interest group 
links, but also the interest group literature discussing whom to lobby. It is particularly 
interesting that there is no general benefit of working together with powerful parties. 
Hence, findings that organized interests are more likely to collaborate with larger parties 
(DeBruycker, 2016; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017) would suggest that at least the advocates 
themselves expect to gain more from working with such parties. It is possible, however, 
that working with powerful players matters less in our sample of policy cases which in-
cludes issues at all stages of the policy cycle rather than just those that have made it on 
to the legislative agenda. Hence, it has been argued that lobbying powerful legislators 
should mainly be effective at the later stages of the decision-making process (Crombez, 
2002), which is something future studies could consider.
The chapter also qualifies the view that advocates should lobby their friends 
(Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). We add that this strategy is 
more strongly related to preference attainment if the parties with which actors work are 
also powerful enough to affect policy. In this way, our study emphasizes an image of lob-
bying where preference attainment is more likely when advocates reach out to parties 
sympathetic to their policy ideas and influential enough to influence policy (change). 
Affecting policy outcomes through working together with allied powerful parties can be 
seen as a subtle form of lobbying success, because these parties and advocates held the 
same preferences from the outset (Kollman, 1997, Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). It suggests 
that the influence of advocates on policy (through the lobbying of political parties) may 
work mainly through reemphasizing existing preferences, or by influencing whether 
issues make it on to the legislative agenda (Kollman, 1997, Klüver, 2018). At the same 
time, our findings are robust to controlling for the overall support of either all or only the 
governmental political parties for an advocate’s position on the policy issue. This lends 
support for the conjecture that what (also) matters is working together with powerful 
allies and not just co-incidental agreement between advocates and parties.
There are two limitations that are worth emphasizing here, however. The first is the 
relatively low response rates among business. This means that we are less confident 
generalizing our findings to this particular set of policy advocates. Secondly, our survey 
measure does not allow us to disentangle the many possible ways in which advocates 
may seek to lobby political parties (for example: contacting members of parliament, 
working groups, or manifesto committees). Although we confirm our main finding 
regarding the lack of a main effect of lobbying parties with measures of direct contact 
with parliament and government, future studies could include more detailed strategy 
measures.
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While this chapter presents an important step forward by considering the impor-
tance of political parties for the preference attainment of policy advocates, there are 
still many other questions that future research could take up. For one, although we 
ensured cross-national variation on a number of important variables, our study cannot 
fully distinguish important potential institutional factors. This matters because there are 
indications that such institutional mechanisms shape tie formation between advocates 
and parties (Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). Future research could also examine in more 
detail which possible sources of a party’s political power matter most, or compare issue 
at different stages of the policy cycle.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that while our examination of interest group-par-
ty ties and lobbying success makes an important contribution to the existing literature, 
this is only one possible way that such relationships may shape democratic governance. 
Future research should therefore also consider how (different types of ) group-party 
interaction may affect more general patterns of influence between policy makers and 
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AbsTrACT
Elections produce shifts in power and policy that give lobbyists incentives to influence 
the policy plans of new governments, but we know very little about such lobbying. This 
chapter directly observes lobbying during government coalition negotiations and its 
consequences for coalition agreements by studying the letters that policy advocates 
send to the chair of coalition formation negotiations. While political parties are crucial 
for the preference attainment of lobbyists, the analysis shows that advocates that are 
traditional allies of a negotiating party sometimes benefit more from making a request 
in line with the preferences of that political party than other advocates. This seems to 
be especially the case when advocates represent a constituency that is important to 
a party’s electoral strategy, suggesting that the policy implications of ties between 
parties and organized interests are determined by more than the presence of historical 
ties between parties and groups alone. The findings also highlight the importance of 
non-partisan actors in coalition negotiations.
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Democratic elections can produce changes in the party composition of government and 
future policy (Mansbridge, 2003). On average 60% of the pledges that political parties 
make in their manifestos are implemented by new governments (Thomson et al., 2017). 
In many Western democracies the political parties that form coalition governments 
outline their policy plans in coalition agreements (Strøm & Müller, 1999), which strongly 
constrain future legislative action by the government (Moury, 2010; Schermann & 
Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Zubek & Klüver, 2015). This influence on future policy-making 
makes coalition agreements attractive documents for policy advocates to influence. 
However, there are no existing studies of the impact of lobbying on coalition agree-
ments. The goal of this chapter is therefore to study the conditions under which policy 
advocates can attain their preferences when trying to influence coalition agreements.
The existing literature on coalition agreements suggests that the direct influence of 
lobbying on coalition agreements is limited. A main purpose of such agreements is to 
reduce uncertainty about future actions by the other parties in the coalition (Klüver & 
Bäck, 2019; Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2012; Strøm & Müller, 1999; Timmermans, 
2003). Given this primary focus and the (time) pressure on negotiating politicians, it 
seems unlikely that organized interests can exert much influence over the negotiations.
This chapter argues that that there are two ways through which advocates can attain 
their preferences, however. Firstly, policy advocates whose policy requests are in line 
with the policy position of a party entering the government coalition are hypothesized 
to be more likely to attain their preferences. Secondly, politicians negotiating about 
the agreement also pursue another goal in addition to reducing uncertainty about the 
future actions of their coalition partners: maximizing their party’s ability to implement 
its preferred policies in the new coalition (Eichorst, 2014). When reaching compromises 
on specific policy pledges made during the campaign, politicians face uncertainty about 
which of their policy plans would be (un)popular with their voters and supporters. The 
second expectation in this chapter is therefore that political parties will rely on policy 
advocates they share historical and interpersonal ties with to provide them with such 
information. (e.g. Allern, Aylott, & Christiansen, 2007; De Bruycker, 2016, Öberg et al, 
2011). These historical allies of political parties can therefore increase their likelihood 
of preference attainment in coalition agreements by emphasizing the popularity of 
specific campaign promises, as this signals to the negotiating parties which electoral 
pledges (not) to compromise on.
The hypotheses are tested using a dataset that covers lobbying after the 2017 Dutch 
general election. During the negotiations about a new government coalition, 775 advo-
cates sent letters containing specific policy requests to the (in)formateur chairing the 
negotiations. They offer a direct observation of the policy requests of most active inter-
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est groups and other lobbying organizations. Hand-coding of the letters using methods 
developed by studies on pledge-fulfillment by political parties (Thomson et al., 2017) 
identifies 1200 unique policy requests that are analyzed in the chapter. Coding whether 
these policy requests were fulfilled in the coalition agreement helps identify whether 
advocates attained their preferences (Dür, 2008). In addition, the policy requests of ad-
vocates are compared to the election manifestos of the negotiating parties to determine 
whether the party had a policy position on the request.
The findings underline the image that political parties are crucial for the preference 
attainment of policy advocates in coalition agreements. The multilevel regression mod-
els support the expectation that advocates whose policy requests are in line with policy 
positions held by negotiating parties are more likely to attain their preferences. Results 
are more mixed when assessing the impact of historical ties between groups and par-
ties. Some policy advocates with ties to a political party are more likely to benefit from 
a policy request in line with a policy position from an allied party than other advocates, 
specifically business advocates who benefit more from overlap with the main liberal 
right-wing party than other advocates. However, the analyses indicate that these ties 
do not always increase the preference attainment of advocates and a discussion of the 
findings suggests that the usefulness of the ties may depend on the electoral strategies 
of political parties, rather than historical ties alone. The chapter therefore presents a 
mixed picture of lobbying influence on coalition agreement negotiations: while there 
are some indications of such influence, advocacy influence remains constrained, making 
it hard to establish whether lobbying after elections is more or less effective than at 
other stages of the policy-cycle.
These findings therefore align with and contribute to studies of the ties between 
groups and parties (Allern & Bale, 2012; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Thomas, 2001), which 
suggest that historical alliances between groups and parties have weakened in recent 
decades (Christiansen, 2012) and replaced by more ad-hoc cooperation (Rasmussen & 
Lindeboom, 2013). In addition, the study highlights an overlooked channel that inter-
est groups use to try to influence policy-making in Western European political systems: 
lobbying during coalition agreement negotiations. Finally, the results are important 
for studies of coalition agreements (e.g. Bäck, Müller, & Nyblade, 2017; Schermann & 
Ennser-Jedenastik, 2012; Strom & Müller, 1999) as they highlight the limited but some-
times important role played by non-party actors in coalition negotiations in multiparty 
democracies.
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5.2 CoAlITIon AgreemenTs AnD TheIr APPeAl To 
lobbyIsTs
In Western-European democracies, political parties that form government coalitions 
write coalition agreements in up to 80% of all formations (Eichorst, 2014), typi-
cally including election pledges the new government plans to implement (Schermann 
& Ennser-Jedenastik, 2012; Timmermans, 2003). Crafting these agreements is attractive 
to negotiating parties for at least three reasons: they help manage the diverging policy 
preferences of coalition partners by outlining policy plans for the future government. 
Secondly, they reduce uncertainty about and opportunism in the actions of future 
government partners and their freedom to shift policy into their preferred direction. 
Finally, they help parties explain the trade-offs and choices made to parties’ audiences 
(their members or voters). Since not all coalitions have to solve these issues to an equal 
extent (their preferences may diverge more or less, for example), coalition agreements 
vary in the extent to which they are formalized, and range from very short documents 
containing few policy-specific details to long formalized agreements that outline com-
prehensive policy plans. Some contain not just policy plans, but also outline the ‘rules of 
the game’ within the coalition (Müller & Strøm, 2008).
In spite of this variation, the majority of European coalition agreements contains 
rather comprehensive policy plans, is crafted after elections and most of the content 
is indeed policy-related (Müller & Strøm, 2008, pp. 174-179). While it may depend on 
their degree of formality and policy-content, coalition agreements affect the legislative 
activity of the new government. In a study of Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands, Moury 
(2010) shows that 30% of all cabinet decisions relate directly to the coalition agreement, 
with up to 50% of all decisions constrained by the agreements in some way. Polish cabi-
nets also implement on average 60% of the policy plans that they outline in coalition 
agreements (Zubek & Klüver, 2015), and election pledges by Austrian and Dutch political 
parties that are included in the coalition agreement are more likely to be turned into 
policy than those that are not (Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Thomson, 2001). 
Bäck et al. (2017) also show the limiting effect of coalition agreements on government 
spending across Western Europe. There is thus strong evidence that both elections and 
coalition agreements play an important role in determining future policy change.
Their influence on (future) policy-making makes coalition agreements interesting 
targets for lobbyists. However, existing research does not directly study advocacy influ-
ence on coalition agreements. This is likely due to the fact that these are by their nature 
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inter-party negotiations, which makes political parties likely both the most powerful ac-
tors and logical object of study. However, this does not preclude other actors like policy 
advocates also exerting some influence over the agreements. In addition, if we accept 
the normative standard that politicians ought to implement the policies on which they 
were elected (Mansbridge, 2003), it makes sense to first evaluate the extent to which 
they do so (e.g. Thomson et al, 2017). However, if policy advocates affect whether and 
which election pledges end up in policy and lead parties to deviate from their pre-
election promises, this may have important democratic implications.
What is more, there is empirical evidence that interest groups in Norway do indeed 
attempt to influence coalition negotiations (Allern & Saglie, 2008). Two interviews 
conducted for this chapter also suggest that both the run-up to general elections and 
the coalition formation period are very important to Dutch interest groups30. Moreover, 
while not directly related to coalition agreement negotiations, Brown (2012) shows 
that groups spend more on lobbying in the transition period between the election and 
inauguration of the American president than in the period before or after it. Although 
he does not systematically study preference attainment, he offers numerous examples 
of policy plans influenced by policy advocates – further emphasizing the importance of 
the period directly after election to policy advocates.
5.3 lobbyIng CoAlITIon AgreemenT negoTIATIons
In spite of these incentives for interest groups to try to affect the negotiations of coali-
tion agreements, there are reasons to expect that actually exerting influence over the 
negotiations is difficult. For one, political parties in most European countries are funded 
through state subsidies and private contributions make up on average only 10% of the 
revenue streams of European parties (Biezen & Kopecký, 2017). At least compared to 
the US, this should reduce direct incentives for politicians to implement requests by 
advocates that may have supported a party’s campaign31.
More importantly, negotiating parties have limited incentives to accommodate 
policy requests from policy advocates. A main reason for writing coalition agreements is 
the desire of negotiating parties to reduce uncertainty about the cooperation with coali-
tion partners (Laver & Shepsle, 1990; Moury, 2010; Strøm & Müller, 1999; Timmermans, 
2003). Especially when policy preferences diverge politicians use a public coalition 
30 In the fall of 2018 semi-structured interviews were held with representatives and employees of political par-
ties involved in the drafting of the 2017 manifestos of two major political parties, as well as with employees 
from two major interest organizations.
31 Although even in the US the evidence of the effect of campaign donations on lobbying success is mixed 
(McKay, 2018).
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agreement to reduce uncertainty and the possibility that coalition partners pull policy 
too much in their preferred direction. Negotiators therefore face the complicated task of 
finding ways to agree on policy and reach compromises, as well as the need to distribute 
cabinet portfolios (Laver & Budge, 1992).
Hence, political parties in negotiations are unlikely to be very receptive to lobbying, 
which means one may generally expect that advocates are unlikely to attain their prefer-
ences in the coalition agreement. However, advocates may still see their preferences 
included in coalition agreements. Firstly, parties are especially unlikely to be receptive 
to policy requests about issues that were not part of their own campaign promises and 
not already part of the negotiations: after all, granting such a lobby request would mean 
bringing more issues to the negotiation table that the coalition partner may poten-
tially disagree with and further complicate the substantive compromises that have to 
be reached. One may therefore expect that advocates are more likely to see their policy 
requests fulfilled when at least one negotiating party holds a policy position in line with 
their request.
However, existing studies show that political parties put more emphasis on policy 
issue areas (like the environment or migration) where they disagree with their coalition 
partners, to prevent them from moving policy in an undesirable direction (e.g. Klüver & 
Bäck, 2019). This might lead to the expectation that advocate’s preferences are especially 
likely to be reflected in the coalition agreement if one party shares a policy position with 
an advocate, and another opposes it (as the issue area is more likely to feature in the 
agreement). However, most lobbying occurs on much more specific policy proposals 
than the policy areas studied in the literature. Even when negotiating parties disagree 
on the policy area, like environmental policy, and therefore discuss it in the agreement, 
they will still want to signal to voters that they intend act on the issue and are therefore 
likely to include the specific policy plans they do agree on, for example: closing down a 
specific coal powered power plant. In short, while policy areas are more likely to feature 
in a coalition agreement when the negotiating parties disagree, this is not necessarily 
the case for the more specific policy preferences that policy advocates lobby for.32 The 
following expectation can therefore be formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Policy requests by policy advocates are more likely to be fulfilled if the proposed 
policy position was part of a coalition party’s manifesto.
32 To test whether this is indeed the case, Appendix 5.4 shows that there is indeed a positive correlation between 
the number of parties that has the same policy position as the advocate’s request and the likelihood of prefer-
ence attainment.
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In addition, coalition agreements serve another purpose for politicians that can provide 
advocates with leverage to successfully lobby the negotiations: the function of ‘advertis-
ing’ how entering the government coalition allows the party to implement its election 
promises, to both their voters and party members (Eichorst, 2014; Müller & Strøm, 2008; 
Timmermans, 2003). Since parties that enter government often lose seats at the next 
election (Müller & Louwerse, 2018), it is important for them to show which election 
pledges they are able to implement by entering the coalition (Eichorst, 2014). Politicians 
have to decide on which of their electoral pledges they are willing to reach compromises 
and will want to implement those pledges that are popular with the general public and/
or their voters. Coalition negotiations are generally closed off and take place under 
considerable time pressure (Timmermans, 2003). As a consequence, the regular ways of 
gauging voter preferences like media coverage, debates in parliament and consultations 
are not as readily available to politicians. Policy advocates can therefore try to use their 
lobbying to signal which election pledges are especially (un)popular with the voters of 
the negotiating parties.
Advocates that have strong historical ties with political parties will be especially able 
to use this mechanism. Studies of the relations between interest groups and parties 
emphasize the importance of such ties (Allern et al., 2007; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; 
Thomas, 2001). They highlight the historical and institutional relations between trade 
unions and social democratic parties (Allern et al., 2007; Allern et al., 2019), as well as 
those between other types of parties and groups, such as the Danish employers’ or-
ganization DA and the conservative party (Christiansen, 2012) and the environmental 
movement and Green parties (Blings, 2018).
In each of these cases, the interest group and the party it shares ties with were and 
often continue to be able to offer each other resources that make a long-term exchange 
relationship mutually beneficial from a rational-institutionalist perspective (Allern et al., 
2007; Christiansen, 2012; Öberg et al., 2011). Parties can offer interest groups they share 
historical ties with a way to influence political decision-making, even if this influence 
remains an untested assumption in the literature (e.g. Allern & Bale, 2012; Otjes & Ras-
mussen, 2017; Thomas, 2001). Traditionally such groups had the ability to deliver voters 
for political parties through their members. However, some groups’ ability to do so may 
have declined over time (Allern et al., 2007; Christiansen, 2012; Öberg et al., 2011) and 
contacts between groups and parties have generally become more ad-hoc (Rasmussen 
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& Lindeboom, 2013). Still, such historical ties do persist to this day (e.g. Allern et al. 2019) 
and while not on all points, historical allies of parties are likely to still share a similar 
ideological outlook. In addition, such groups may still have members that politicians 
will be aiming to represent and from whom they will want to secure support for the 
new government’s coalition agreement. The longer-term cooperation between such 
traditional allies will also mean that they are more likely to have access to the negotiat-
ing parties: either through existing institutional integration between the groups and the 
party, or ‘simply’ because their cooperation means representatives of the groups and 
parties will move in similar networks. The second hypothesis is therefore:
.Hypothesis 2: Policy advocates that make requests that are in line with the policy posi-
tions of historically allied political parties, are more likely to attain their preferences than 
advocates that make requests that are in line with policy positions of political parties 
that are not historical allies of the advocate.
5.4 CAse seleCTIon AnD reseArCh DesIgn
The hypotheses are tested using a dataset covering the 2017 Dutch general elections, 
which was collected as part of the GovLis project33. The election led to a long govern-
ment formation process. After the election it quickly became clear that four parties 
would be required to achieve a majority coalition government (the norm in Dutch poli-
tics). From the start, the liberal right-wing party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
(VVD: 33 out of 150 seats in parliament) that would provide the new prime minister, 
the more centrist liberal Democraten 66 party (D66: 19 seats), the center-right Christian 
democrats of the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA: 19 seats) were very likely to be 
part of any majority coalition. After negotiations between these three parties and the 
Green-Left party failed, the smaller center-left Christian Union party (CU:5 seats) joined 
the negotiations and finally the government coalition following a 225-day negotiation. 
The number of negotiators during the formation was relatively small: only two represen-
tatives from each for the parties and the (in)formateur (the person chairing the negotia-
tions) were present on most days. Negotiations about some policy areas were prepared 
by specialized members of parliament, and the main negotiators were in touch with 
other members from their parties and invited policy advocacy organizations, advisory 
bodies and ministerial departments on some days of the negotiations.
The parties outlined their detailed government agenda and policy plans in a post-
electoral coalition agreement of over 35 000 words. The negotiation period and final 
33 For more: www.govlis.eu.
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agreement were lengthy compared to both previous Dutch formation processes and 
internationally (for a discussion, see: Timmermans, 2003). The agreement is likely rela-
tively formalized compared to other agreements and contains a comprehensive set of 
detailed policy plans (see Müller & Strøm, 2008). While there is variation across coalition 
agreements and the selection of a single case comes with trade-offs, the majority of 
coalition agreements tend to contain specific policy plans, be mainly focused on policy 
and concluded after the election – making the 2017 Dutch coalition agreement a case 
that occurs often relatively across Western Europe (Müller & Strøm, 2008). Still, especially 
where coalition agreements contain less specific or formalized policy content, coalition 
agreements may be less attractive objects of lobbying.
However, the described theoretical mechanisms are likely to hold in other countries, 
at least for post-electoral coalition agreements. For one, both Dutch and non-Dutch ne-
gotiators alike will use coalition agreements to reduce uncertainty about the behavior of 
their coalition partners. The constraining effects of coalition agreements on policy have 
also been demonstrated in other European countries (Bäck et al., 2017; Moury, 2010; 
Schermann & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014; Thomson, 2001; Zubek & Klüver, 2015). Simi-
larly, the tendency to want to use the coalition negotiations to implement pre-election 
promises also applies beyond the Dutch context. In fact, Dutch politicians manage to 
implement their election pledges in policy at a rate that is about average in Western 
democracies (Thomson et al., 2017, p. 535).
It is therefore likely that lobbying to affect coalition agreements takes place after 
more elections than the one observed here. In the Netherlands, previous elections with 
generally shorter formation periods attracted similar or higher numbers of lobbying 
letters than the 2017 election34. Moreover, in the only study to describe this kind of lob-
bying in Europe, some Norwegian interest groups also indicated they tried to influence 
the coalition agreement (Allern & Saglie, 2008, p. 94). Given that Norwegian coalition 
negotiations last an average of just 6.5 days (Golder, 2010) it is likely that lobbying to 
influence coalition agreements occurs in other settings with longer formations, too. Of 
course, where negotiations are fast, there may be less opportunity for interest groups to 
exert influence. Media coverage also shows that this type of lobbying is indeed common 
in at least some other Western-European countries.35 Finally, the Dutch coalition nego-
tiations involve a rather small number of negotiators. On the one hand this may make it 
harder for the average interest group to influence the negotiations when compared to 
countries like Germany, where many more negotiators are involved in the negotiations. 
34 See the official evaluation of the 2017 formation: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34700-64.html
35 See for example: Finland: https://www.hbl.fi/artikel/gron-lobbyist-lamnar-regeringsforhandlingarna/ and 
Germany: https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2009-10/lobbyisten-koalitionsverhandlungen.
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On the other, it may mean that in the Netherlands influence is relatively concentrated 
around those advocates that do have access.
measuring the policy preferences of advocates
To observe the policy preferences of advocates lobbying during the formation period, 
the analysis relies on letters they sent to the (in)formateur36 outlining policy requests 
for the following government period and the coalition agreement. 2017 is the first time 
these letters have been made publically available37. Following an observational defini-
tion of lobbyists/advocates, the study includes all actors who observably tried to exert 
influence by sending letters (Baroni, Carroll, Chalmers, Marquez, & Rasmussen, 2014). A 
total of 775 policy advocates sent letters containing specific policy requests. In itself, this 
is an indication that advocates do indeed actively lobby after elections. It also provides 
us with a snapshot of the policy requests of Dutch advocates during the formation 
period.
The mechanism of being able to send letters to an informateur is specific to the 
Dutch context and may make it comparatively easy to (try to) contact the negotiating 
parties and have increased the amount of observed lobbying. However, the expectation 
is not that these letters directly gave policy advocates influence over the final coalition 
agreement. Given their large quantity it seems unlikely that the (in)formateur would 
read all letters. Instead, they provide an excellent opportunity to directly observe the 
policy preferences of a large number of Dutch policy advocates and their issue priorities 
during the formation period. The interviews done for this chapter also confirm the im-
age that even if these letters do not directly influence the negotiations, they do contain 
the preferences of the interest groups sending them – forming the basis for lobbying in 
other ways. These may include inside strategies, like contacting political parties and ne-
gotiators, or civil servants involved in drafting the agreement. Lobbyists also use outside 
strategies (e.g. Kollman, 1998) like commentary in the media or protests. For example, 
primary school teachers’ organizations sought the media and and successfully protested 
for higher wages during the 2017 coalition negotiations. Unlike the instrument of send-
ing letters to an informateur, these strategies are also available in other countries, so 
while more advocates’ lobbying (preferences) may be observed than are active in other 
countries, they still provide the best available observation of the policy requests of a 
wide range of advocates that tried to influence the negotiations.
All letters sent to the (in)formateur were hand-coded to detect the policy requests 
made by advocates. Drawing on methods developed by studies on the pledge fulfill-
36 The informateur chairs the negotiations during most of the negotiations. It is only in the final stages that the 
formateur (typically the leader of the party providing the prime minister) chairs the meetings.
37 Through https://www.kabinetsformatie2017.nl
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ment of political parties (Thomson et al., 2017), a request is coded if it meets the fol-
lowing criteria. Firstly, it has to be an explicit request for the future government to take 
action or for the coalition agreement to include something, containing a marker word 
such as “request”, “ask”, or “demand”. Secondly, it has to be possible for the request to 
be fulfilled theoretically in the coalition agreement and the requirements for fulfillment 
have to be specified in the request itself38 (Thomson et al., 2017). Examples of included 
requests would be a demand to increase subsidies for daycare services, or to close all 
coal-powered power plants. On the other hand, more general requests to “make policy 
greener”, or enforce “stricter immigration laws” would be excluded, because it is impos-
sible to determine from the request alone whether any part of the coalition agreement 
fulfills these requests. Requests to prioritize an issue in the coalition agreement are also 
included, but the results presented here are not conditional on their inclusion (see Ap-
pendix 5.6).
measuring preference attainment
While the goal of this chapter is to ultimately study the influence of policy advocates, 
the approach taken here stops short of claiming to observe influence directly (Dür, 2008; 
Mahoney, 2007). Instead, the analysis relies on an approach called “preference attain-
ment” (Dür, 2008) or “lobbying success” (Mahoney, 2007), which compares the rates at 
which different groups of policy advocates got what they wanted. An advocate is thus 
considered as having attained their preferences (but not necessarily influential) if its 
policy request is fulfilled in the coalition agreement. The final measure is dichotomous 
and outlines whether an advocate did not (0) attain their preferences, or did so some-
what through fully (1). Appendix 5.1 contains more information about the measurement 
of the dependent variable and inter-coder reliability.
The measure used here overcomes several drawbacks typically associated with 
studies of preference attainment (Klüver, 2013, chapter 3). Firstly, the policy requests of 
advocates are observed directly, rather than retrieved through interviews or surveys. Al-
though letters may also have been sent to signal engagement to the members of some 
advocacy groups, it is likely that the policy requests outlined in the letters contain the 
policy priorities of the advocate. This assumption was also confirmed in two interviews 
with major interest groups. Secondly, the fact that the letters were sent to the (in)forma-
teur with the goal of influencing the coalition agreement means that there is a good fit 
between the policy requests and the measure of preference attainment. Thirdly, since 
the requests are formulated by the advocates themselves, the advocates’ own formula-
tions are used to assess preference attainment, instead of often used pre-defined sets of 
issues that are on the legislative agenda, or formulated by researchers.
38 Akin to what Thomson et al (2017) call a “narrow” definition of a pledge.
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Party policy positions
To identify the policy positions of political parties on the requests, the first step was to 
code whether a request was present in the election manifesto of a negotiating party 
(Krippendorff alpha: 0.95. 2 coders and 88 coded units) and then code whether the 
party position was in line with the request (Krippendorff alpha: 0.73). To test H1, that 
advocates are more likely to attain their preferences when their request is line with the 
policy position of a negotiating party, a binary measure is used that captures whether 
at least one political party supported the issue prior to the election (in its manifesto).
Parties with historical ties to interest groups
To assess hypothesis 2 about historical ties, the chapter relies on ties between business 
advocates (employers’ organizations and firms) and two major right-wing political 
parties (see Christiansen (2012) for a discussion of similar ties in Denmark). The first of 
these parties is the liberal VVD party. The most economically right-wing of the major 
parties that regularly participate in Dutch government, the VVD maintains strong ties 
with business actors. While cooperation between the VVD and private sector advocates 
was never as institutionalized as between trade unions and social-democratic parties in 
some Nordic countries (e.g. Allern 2007), the party has maintained strong ideological 
and interpersonal links with large businesses and employers’ organizations since its 
foundation in the 1940’s. One of its founders was very active in a major employers‘ 
organization and ties between employers’ organizations, business advocates and the 
party remained relatively strong throughout the decades (Lucardie, 1986). What is more, 
such ties persist to the present day. As an example, VVD MPs are much more likely to 
have previous work experience in the private sector than those of other parties39, its 
party leader and prime minister during the 2017 election Mark Rutte’s previous career at 
multinational Unilever providing an example. These strong historical and interpersonal 
links between the VVD and private sector actors, as well as its identity as a party for 
entrepreneurs (for example in its 2017 election manifesto, see also Lucardie, 1986), make 
it likely that the party is more receptive to policy requests by business advocates than 
other advocates.
Secondly, the Christian democratic center-right CDA party identified itself less clearly 
as pro-business – at least in its 2017 election manifesto where it, for example, advocated 
reducing the role of market forces in health care. At the same it arguably shares stronger 
historical and organizational ties with the main employers’ organization VNO-NCW, than 
even the VVD. VNO-NCW is a merger between two employers’ organizations, one of 
which has Christian roots. Like the Christian parties that the CDA is a merger of, NCW 
was part of the Christian pillar of post-war Dutch society and historical ties between 
39 See: https://www.vn.nl/de-haagse-banencarrousel/
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the organization and the party were close (for an example illustrating this cooperation, 
see: Hordijk, 1988). While it is likely these ties may have weakened somewhat over the 
decades (like in Scandinavia: see Öberg et al, 2011), there is also evidence that these ties 
continued at the time of the 2017 negotiations. For example, the chairman of VNO-NCW 
in 2017 was a member of the CDA and its previous chairman served as a senator for 
the party. In 2019, the party appointed a chairman who also serves as the secretary of 
VNO-NCW. Hence, the CDA shares strong links to business advocates that should make 
it easier for these advocates to contact the party’s politicians and make them relatively 
receptive to their requests.
Hypothesis 2 is tested by interacting a binary variable (right-wing support) indicating 
whether a request was supported by either the VVD or the CDA, with a binary variable 
that indicates whether the request is made by a business group/firm, or a non-business 
actor. The analyses also look at the interaction effect of both parties separately to explore 
differences between them and the nature of their ties to business actors. This measure is 
a relatively crude way to operationalize the ties between business advocates and these 
two political parties, as it does not focus on specific advocacy organizations. If anything, 
this should make it harder to observe an effect of these ties on preference attainment, 
however. There were no Social Democratic or Green parties in the cabinet, which means 
that the influence of their ties with other group types cannot be tested. There were 
also not enough requests by religious interest groups to reliably model possible shared 
constituencies between them and the Christian Union or CDA party.
Control variables
The analyses contain three control variables. Firstly, advocates may access and influence 
the coalition negotiations directly. The interest group literature tends to assume “that 
groups with political access are on average more likely to be influential than groups 
without such access” (Binderkrantz, Pedersen, & Beyers, 2017, p. 307). The analyses 
control for the possibility that rather than party-group ties, it is simply advocates with 
access to the negotiations who attain their preferences. Access may have enabled policy 
advocates to influence the negotiations in two ways. Firstly, some advocates are invited 
to the negotiation table. To control for this, the daily calendars of the (in)formateur are 
analyzed to code who secured such a meeting. Secondly, civil servants from govern-
ment departments also visit the negotiations and are involved and drafting some of 
the text of the coalition agreement. That is why – based on the coding by Berkhout 
and colleagues40 - the twenty advocacy organizations with the most access (defined as 
having a meeting with a government minister, or invitations to round-table hearings in 
40 Compiled by scholars at the University of Amsterdam and based on a report published in the magazine Vrij 
Nederland: https://www.vn.nl/lobbyclubs-schaduwmacht/
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parliament) are also coded as having access. The two measures are combined in a single 
binary variable.
Advocates often formed coalitions when sending letters, likely in order to signal the 
broad support for their requests. Previous studies show mixed or conditional effects of 
coalitions on preference attainment (Junk, 2019; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2004). To 
control for the possibility that these coalitions affect the preference attainment of ad-
vocates, the analyses include a control for coalition size, which is a count of the number 
of advocates that sent a specific letter. The third control variable captures whether an 
advocate’s request was in favor of changing the status quo. Studies of the United States 
document a ‘status quo bias’ (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009) and 
policy advocates who defend the status quo are more likely to attain their preferences, 
at least at the national level in Western Europe (Rasmussen et al., 2018). Even if 94% 
of the requests in the data are to change the status quo, this bias may still persist in 
the setting studied here. Appendix 5.2 provides more descriptive information about the 
data many requests to change the status quo.
modelling strategy
The unit of analysis is a policy request (nested) in a letter by an advocate to predict 
whether an advocate did not (0) or somewhat to fully (1) obtain their preferences, re-
quiring logistic regression. This means that if a letter is sent by three advocates, each 
request also features three times in the data. To capture variation at the level of letters 
and because the coalition size variable is measured at this level, random intercepts are 
fitted for letters (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002).
5.5 AnAlysIs AnD resulTs
To test hypothesis 1 (that advocates are more likely to attain their preferences if the 
policy request was part of a coalition party’s manifesto), a first step is to consider the 
descriptive statistics alone. Around a third of all requests are supported by at least 
one political party (34%). There are only 30 out of 1201 unique non-procedural policy 
requests to change the status quo (or around 2.5%), that were fulfilled when no political 
party actively supported the advocate’s position in their election manifesto. This offers 
initial support for H1: in order for advocates to get their requests for policy change 
included in the coalition agreement, a party having a policy position in line with their 
policy request is close to a necessary condition.
Turning to the multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attain-
ment presented in table 1, the importance of political parties for advocates’ preference 
attainment is underlined further: model 1 shows that the relationship between a request 
Chapter 5  |  Lobbying during government formations
118
being present as a policy position in a political party’s manifesto and preference attain-
ment is both strong and significant. The predicted probability of preference attainment 
when no party holds a policy position in line with the request in its manifesto is around 
23% and increases to 64% when at least one political party has a position in line with 
the request. Appendix 5.4 demonstrates that taking into account whether another party 
also opposed the request does not substantively alter this finding. While measures of 
preference attainment are often used as an indicator for influence, this may not be the 
case here: advocates’ may either simply be ‘lucky’ that a party had a policy position in 
line with their request, or they may have successfully influenced the party’s manifesto 
before the election.
Secondly, models 2 through 4 then test hypothesis 2, that advocates that make 
requests that are in line with the policy positions of traditionally allied parties are more 
likely to attain their preferences. The empirical implication of this expectation was that 
a request in line with the policy preferences of the center-right parties (the liberal VVD 
and the Christian democratic CDA) in the coalition should be more strongly related to 
preference attainment for business advocates than other advocates. The interaction 
effect in model 2 supports this expectation: the effect of a request in line with a policy 
position of these right-wing parties is stronger for business advocates than for other 
types of actors.
However, when the analysis is split by party in models 3 and 4 it becomes clear that 
this correlation is driven by the VVD: the interaction effect between business advocates 
requests in line with the VVD’s policy position in model 3 is positive and significant, 
whereas the interaction effect is much smaller and insignificant for the CDA in model 
4. Figure 5.1 shows the increase in the predicted probability of preference attainment 
for different advocates when a party has a position in line with their request. The figure 
underlines that while the increase is stronger for business advocates that make a request 
in line with the policy positions of right-wing parties (grey triangles) than non-business 
advocates, this effect is driven by the VVD (blue squares). The VVD seems to distinguish 
between requests from business and non-business advocates. Importantly, the increase 
in predicted probability that comes from making a request in line with a VVD position 
is only 12 percentage-points for non-business advocates and just over 50 percentage-
point for business advocates. On the other hand, the CDA (orange dots) does not signifi-
cantly distinguish between the two sets of advocates: both business and non-business 
advocates see an increase in the predicted probability of attaining their preferences of 
around 40 percentage-points when their request is in line with a CDA policy position.
These results partially support hypothesis 2: whereas there is a clear effect for the 
VVD in support of the hypothesis, the absence of the expected interaction effect for the 
CDA goes against the expectation.
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One alternative explanation for these results may be that rather than historic ties 
between a party and a set of advocates, it is the importance of the constituency an 
advocate represents to the political party’s electoral strategy that matters: VVD’s 2017 
election campaign was relatively pro-business and suggested, for example, tax cuts for 
business actors, making business advocates (representatives of ) an important electoral 
constituency to the party. On the other hand, the CDA’s campaign was more critical of 
free-market forces and proposed, for example, to reduce the role of the market in the 
Table 5.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy 
preferences.
























































Letter random intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of requests 2281 2281 2281 2281
Number of letters 346 346 346 346
AIC 1954 2123 2176 2122
BIC 1994 2169 2222 2168
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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health care system, which should reduce the importance the constituency represented 
by business advocates. These impressions are underlined by data from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (Volkens et al., 2019): where 3.6% of the VVD’s manifesto consisted of 
positive mentions of the free market economy, the comparable figure was 1.3% for the 
CDA. In addition, the VVD’s position on the CMP’s market economy index was for example 
5.4 (more pro-market), compared to 2.6 for the CDA. Similarly, the CDA made more refer-
ence to economic planning and very positively referenced welfare state policies. These 
differences in campaign strategy, or at least issue emphasis and position, may help to 
explain why the VVD attached additional value to requests by business advocates where 
the CDA did not.
To further assess this, Appendix 5.5 also repeats the analyses from table 1, looking 
at trade unions rather than business advocates. Although declining, trade unions still 
represent large numbers of members (the largest trade union Federation FNV having 
around 1 million members in 2017). If parties were aiming to ‘please’ the largest share 
of the public possible, rather than specific (electorally relevant) constituencies one 
would expect to find a significant interaction effect. The fact that no such effects appear 
emphasizes that the interaction between the VVD and business is about more than just 
pleasing the largest number of voters possible. Hence, the importance of the constitu-
ency that a group represents may in part depend on the electoral strategy of a political 
figure 5.1: The marginal effect of gaining the support from a party on preference attainment (expressed in 
increases in predicted probabilities) for different sets of actors.
Figure note: based on table 1. Calculated for both right-wing parties (grey triangles, model 2), the VVD (blue 
squares, model 3) and the CDA (yellow dots, model 4). All other variables kept at their means. 95% confidence 
intervals.
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party, rather than just the historical and personal links between an advocate and a party 
or the number of members represented by the advocate. That possible explanation 
would also align with findings that historical ties between groups and parties have 
weakened (Allern et al., 2007; Christiansen, 2012) cooperation has become more ad-hoc 
or pragmatic (Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013).
Finally, turning to the control variables, only the effect of defending the status quo is 
strong and significant in all models (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Access has a positive but 
insignificant relationship with the likelihood of preference attainment. The size of a coali-
tion has a positive effect on preference attainment, but it is not significant across differ-
ent model specifications – underlining previous findings of more conditional effects of 
coalitions on preference attainment (Junk, 2019; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2004).
robustness and alternative explanations
The appendices outline a number of checks to ensure the robustness of the findings and 
control for alternative explanations. Firstly, it may be the case that the issue ownership of 
specific political parties (Petrocik et al, 2003) makes certain requests more attractive to a 
party than others. Since business advocates are likely to make requests about economic 
issues, the importance of economic issues to the VVD may mean that the interaction 
effect in model 3 is an artefact of this. Appendix 5.3 therefore includes an interaction be-
tween making a request in line with the policy position of the CDA and VVD and whether 
the request was in the field of economics and taxation to exclude the possibility that the 
party’s ownership of economic issues explains the results regarding hypothesis 2. The 
models show that VVD support is more valuable for advocates’ requests about economy 
and taxation than requests in other policy areas. However, this effect is independent 
of the interaction between requests by business advocates and VVD positions. This 
indicates that the findings in table 5.1 are not just the result of issue ownership by the 
VVD party. However, even business requests about non-economic issues may be about 
specific policies that were more salient to the VVD than requests by other advocates: 
something that the analysis cannot fully preclude.
Appendix 5.6 shows that results remain unchanged when analyzing only requests 
for policy change. Appendix 5.7 reruns the analyses using robust standard errors instead 
of multilevel modeling to account for the clustering of observations in letters and indi-
vidual advocates. This leaves the substantive results unchanged.
5.6 ConClusIon
Are lobbyists able to attain their preferences in coalition agreements? In line with ex-
pectations derived from the literature on coalition agreements, this article shows that 
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making requests in line with the policy positions of political parties is crucial for the 
preference attainment of policy advocates: requests are generally not fulfilled if they are 
not first present in the election manifestos of political parties (H1). At least to the extent 
that these party manifestos make explicit the mandate of political parties (Thomson et 
al., 2017), most policy requests are only implemented after such a mandate is obtained 
through elections. To the extent that political parties are expected to implement the 
policy platforms on which they were elected (Mansbridge, 2003), this is good news in 
democratic terms. After all, policy advocates likely do not hinder the implementation 
of election promises that parties were elected on in coalition agreements, or introduce 
new policies into the coalition agreement that were not previously featured in a nego-
tiating party’s manifesto.
Secondly, the article shows that policy advocates that make policy requests that are 
in line with the policy positions of negotiating parties they share historical ties with 
are more likely to attain their preferences (H2). The analyses demonstrate that this 
mechanism does not necessarily apply to all sets of parties and groups that share such 
ties, however. Whereas there was an effect for business advocates and the VVD, business 
advocates did not benefit more from making requests that were in line with the policy 
positions of the CDA than other types of advocates – even though the CDA (traditionally) 
has strong organizational ties with business groups. This unexpected result might be a 
consequence of the different campaign strategies these parties followed, which may 
have meant that business advocates’ represented constituencies that were more salient 
to the VVD than the CDA. Either way, the findings indicate that the policy-implications of 
ties and contacts between interest group and parties are nuanced, and that the impact 
of these ties on policy-making requires further theorizing. Future studies could therefore 
focus on other political parties and interest groups to further investigate when relations 
between parties and interest groups matter for policy-making. Although more difficult, 
they could also seek to separate ideological congruence and historical ties with a party 
to further study this question.
The findings demonstrate the general importance of including elections and the 
policy changes they help produce into the study of lobbying success outside the US 
context (see also: Binderkrantz, 2015; Farrell & Schmitt-Beck, 2008). While this chapter 
shows that there are reasons to expect some (limited) lobbying influence on coalition 
negotiations, future studies may also focus on whether policy advocates are more or less 
influential during elections and coalition formations than at other stages of the policy 
cycle (see also: Binderkrantz, 2015).
The fact that the Dutch 2017 formation lasted long may have made it relatively likely 
that policy advocates were able to affect the negotiations. At the same time, similar 
numbers of letters were sent during shorter previous negotiations in the Netherlands 
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and interviews with two interest groups conducted for this study also suggest that lob-
bying before and after the election is an important strategy to these organizations.
The coalition agreement studied here is likely relatively formalistic and high in policy 
content (Müller & Strøm, 2008) and this may have made it more attractive for policy ad-
vocates than other coalition agreements. Still, many coalition agreements are policy-rich 
(ibid) and coalition agreements have been shown to shape future policy-making across 
a range of countries, making them attractive to advocates beyond the Netherlands (e.g. 
Moury, 2010).
The finding that advocates are especially likely to attain their preferences when 
they make requests that are in line with the policy preferences of political parties can 
of course mean they were simply lucky to have same policy preferences as an incoming 
government party. On the other hand, they may have already influenced the election 
manifesto of the party as it was written. This would provide lobbyists with another way 
to introduce their requests into both coalition agreements and final policy. There is also 
evidence from interviews with the writers of manifestos and groups that policy advo-
cates do indeed use this strategy in Austria, Norway and Ireland (Allern & Saglie, 2008; 
Däubler, 2012; Dolezal, Ennser-Jedenastik, Müller, & Winkler, 2012), requiring further 
research.
Finally, the result that advocates may be able to affect the calculations made by 
politicians negotiating the coalition agreement is important for studies of how coalition 
agreements are produced. It highlights the role of non-party actors in a literature that 
is understandably predominantly focused on the role of the negotiating parties, but 
which does not consider the role of lobbying or other actors like the administration (e.g. 






6.1 InTroDuCTIon AnD ConClusIons Per ChAPTer
This dissertation studied the representative role of political parties and their interactions 
with interest groups and other policy advocates on specific policy issues. Studying these 
policy issues, like abortion policy, constructing nuclear power plants, or retirement plans, 
was an important goal in itself for the simple reason that these policies directly influence 
the lives of citizens. Specifically, given the expectation that in democratic systems politi-
cal parties help transmit public preferences into policy, studying their positions on these 
issues is important (Dahl, 1956; Mair, 2010). This chapter first outlines and recapitulates 
he most important findings per chapter, to then discuss the general conclusion of the 
dissertation.
Chapter 2 studied the positions of 5 German political parties on 102 specific policy 
proposals. In addition to the main finding– that the correlation between public prefer-
ences and party policy positions was only found for opposition parties – the results also 
demonstrated that differences between mainstream and niche parties did not play out in 
the ways often suggested in existing studies (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, & Glasgow, 2004). The 
chapter found little to no evidence for the expectation that niche parties’ positions were 
more strongly related to those of their supporters than to those of the general public, 
nor for the opposite expectation for mainstream parties. The ‘nicheness’ of a party was 
measured as a concept that varies both within parties (over time) and across parties, but 
the generalizability of this inference is limited as it was based on only 5 political parties 
(not including a radical right-wing party). The focus on specific issues also highlighted 
a weakness in existing studies of programmatic differences between mainstream and 
niche political parties. Many of these studies have in the past relied on issue-ownership 
theory to study the emphasis these different types of parties place on different policy 
areas (Klüver & Spoon, 2016), but as Appendix 2.5 shows, this theory told us little about 
the actual positions political parties took on specific policies within these broader policy 
areas. Importantly, even if a political party (for example a Green party) generally owns a 
policy area (environment), another party may be closely associated with a specific policy 
within the area (a plan to construct a nuclear power plant from another party).
Finally, the chapter also introduced the use of Multilevel Regression with Post-
stratification (MRP) (Park et al., 2006) to estimate the preferences of the supporters of 
(especially smaller) political parties. Existing studies that previously included estimates 
of the political preferences of the supporters of specific parties usually simply disag-
gregated public opinion surveys, meaning that estimates of the political preferences 
of these supporters would rely on as few as twenty respondents (e.g. Dalton, 2017). 
Aggregating multiple surveys to determine the demographic composition of the sup-
porters of a political party in a year, and then applying MRP to estimate the preferences 
of these supporters helped to address this: the model used information about voters 
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that had comparable characteristics to those supporting the party to better estimate the 
policy preferences of the sub-group. The approach had the additional advantage that 
the smaller the number of respondents in the data that supported the party, the more 
the model relied on information from other comparable respondents (for a discussion, 
see: Lax & Phillips, 2009b).
Chapter 3  focused on four regulatory policy issues in Sweden: the phasing-out of 
nuclear energy, the six-hour work week, allowing the sale of alcoholic beverages in 
supermarkets and raising taxes on alcohol. It studied how public opinion and media 
advocacy related to both the attention that Swedish politicians paid to these issues, 
as well as actual policy-making on them. The relatively narrow focus on a limited set of 
policy issues meant a clear trade-off in terms of the generalizability of the findings, but 
also had important advantages. The first is that it allowed for observing these policies 
over much longer time periods than was common in previous studies. The approach 
also made it possible to combine a quantitative analysis with more qualitative assess-
ments of policy-making on these issues.
The chapter showed that – at least on these four issues – increases in public support 
for an issue (and when the policy was not the status quo) were related to the attention 
of Swedish politicians in the year after. This finding suggested that Swedish politicians 
were rhetorically responsive (i.e. talked about issues the public finds important) to public 
opinion on the issues studied. At the same time, media advocacy did not seem to have 
the same effect on the attention of politicians to the issues. In addition, the discussion 
of each of the policy issues highlighted several aspects that tended to be overlooked in 
the literature. Firstly, it showed that both public opinion and media advocacy related to 
policy-making (and political attention) in a way that was far from deterministic: on spe-
cific policy issues, many other factors including party politics came into play. Secondly, 
even at the level of specific policy issues, lobbying and lobbying success could and often 
did occur on even more subtle or detailed elements of a policy, which current studies 
(including those in this dissertation) of specific policy issues generally overlook. The 
issue of phasing-out nuclear energy provides an example of this. Even with a long-term 
phase out policy in place, a parliamentary majority in favour of it and several actions 
like closing the nuclear reactors at Barsebäck, the Swedish government was not able to 
reduce the amount of energy produced in nuclear power plants. In part this this might 
be attributed to the successful lobby by several energy companies to renovate their 
existing nuclear power plants in a way that allowed them to increase their production 
capacity – effectively offsetting the effects of closing the nuclear reactors at Barsebäck.
Chapter 4 studies whether working with political parties increased the preference at-
tainment of policy advocates on 50 policy issues in 5 countries (Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The analyses were based on responses 
to the interest group survey of the GovLis project that was sent to 1400 actors active on 
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the issue, and interviews with senior civil servants (one per issue) in all five countries to 
obtain the policy positions of political parties on our issues. In addition to investigat-
ing the direct relationship between preference attainment and working with political 
parties on a policy issue, the chapter also formulated and tested expectations about 
the type of political party. Specifically, it studied whether working with more powerful 
parties (larger parties or those in government), or parties that agreed with the advocate 
increased the likelihood that advocates got the policy output they preferred.
The results showed that working with a political party on an issue was not sig-
nificantly correlated with lobbying success in itself. Moreover, when the measure was 
replaced with a question about contacting members of parliament or the national 
cabinet, no relationship was found. These findings cast some doubt about assumptions 
in the existing literature that study the links and contacts between policy advocates and 
political parties that these contacts are very important for policy-making (e.g. Otjes & 
Rasmussen, 2017; Thomas, 2001). In addition, working with parties that are powerful or 
have the same position as an advocate on a policy issue was not associated with higher 
levels of preference attainment in the data. However, when policy advocates worked 
with political parties that were both powerful and shared their positions on the issue, 
they were more likely to attain their preferences. The chapter did have the limitation that 
it included only a rather low number of business advocates and only a single question 
to probe collaboration between groups and parties. This meant that there was and is 
ample scope for a future research agenda that looks into the policy consequences of ties 
and contacts between interest groups in political parties.
Chapter 5 focused on the lobbying success of interest groups and other policy 
advocates during the 2017 coalition formation in the Netherlands. The analyses in the 
chapter relied on a hand coding of all letters that interest groups and other policy ad-
vocates sent to the (in)formateur chairing the coalition agreement negotiations. While 
the letters themselves may not have been read, the assumption was that they allowed 
for directly observing the policy preferences that advocates lobbied for. This assumption 
was confirmed in interviews with two major interest groups. By comparing the requests 
to the final coalition agreement, it became possible to analyze which requests were 
granted in the coalition agreement. Also coding whether the policy request already 
occurred as an election promise in the manifesto of the negotiating political parties, 
enabled an analysis of the importance of political parties for the preference attainment 
of policy advocates after the election.
In addition to the finding that parties remained very important for policy decisions, 
but that historic ties between groups and political parties can affect policy, the chapter 
made several contributions to our knowledge about lobbying. The first was simply that 
it helped to empirically establish that lobbying after elections also occurs in Europe (see 
also: Allern & Saglie, 2008, but cf. Binderkrantz, 2015). In addition, the findings were 
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important for observers of Dutch politics as they contradicted the public image that 
successful lobbying dominated the coalition negotiations. Specifically, the highly salient 
plan to abolish the dividend-tax was one of only 29 policy requests (out of over 1200) 
to change the status quo, that made it into the coalition agreement and was not part 
of a negotiating party’s election manifesto before the election. This suggested that on 
the whole, lobbyists did not manage to introduce many new issues into the coalition 
agreement that were not previously part of the electoral platforms of the new govern-
ment parties. To the extent that these platforms made explicit the electoral mandate 
of political parties (Mansbridge, 2003) this meant that lobbying did not induce large 
deviations to this mandate. At the same time, the finding that the VVD appears to have 
treated requests from business advocates differently to those from other advocates did 
suggest that policy advocates were able to play a role in which election promises a party 
was willing on compromise on during the negotiations.
6.2 broADer ConClusIons
In addition to the results and conclusions presented above, the findings from this disser-
tation also collectively provide broader theoretical reasons to study the policy positions 
and activities of political parties and interest groups on specific policy issues (Hacker & 
Pierson, 2014).
Firstly, we knew from previous studies that public preferences on specific policy 
issues do not correlate strongly with public preferences on ideological scales like the 
left-right dimension (Lesschaeve, 2017). As Lax et al. (2019) argued, this means that even 
when there is ideological congruence between the preferences of citizens and policy 
(or the positions of political parties) on dimensions like left-right scales, this does not 
necessarily mean that citizens actually get the policies they prefer. Chapter 2 showed 
that when studying the congruence between political parties and the public on specific 
issues, the image was indeed less positive than that often found in studies of ideological 
congruence between public preferences and party positions (cf. Golder & Ferland, 2017; 
Golder & Stramski, 2010). While German political parties’ positions on policy issues cor-
related with the preferences of the general public, the chapter showed that this correla-
tion was driven by opposition parties alone: political parties in government took policy 
positions that no longer correlated with the preferences of the general public. Although 
more negative than conclusions from studies of left-right congruence, these findings 
were more in line with studies on specific issues that also argued that correlations be-
tween public opinion and policy outputs (instead of party positions) are less strong than 
it may seem on the surface (Gilens, 2012; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Schakel, 2019). Combined 
with findings from studies on a number of policy areas (like migration or environmental 
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policy) (Dalton, 2017), the findings suggested that political parties may be less able to 
fulfill their representational role than previously thought, but in line with more skeptical 
theoretical accounts of political parties’ representative capacity (Mair, 2010).
However, it should be noted that findings from chapter 2 did show that government 
parties’ positions correlate with the preferences of their supporters. This is important, 
as it suggests that those voters that (strongly) support a German party that then enters 
government do see their preferences represented. Especially in a proportional multi-
party system, where one may expect parties to firstly represent their voters this is good 
news for representation. Moreover, one may argue that the fact that public preferences 
on left-right scales are only weakly correlated to positions on specific issues (Leschaeve, 
2017), may mean that for parties to represent popular public opinion on issues is a very 
high bar to clear. That may be so, but chapter 2 does show that opposition parties are 
able to clear it. This suggests that rather than the difficulty of aggregating relatively un-
structured public preferences (for example acting responsibly) may impede congruence 
between majority voter preferences and the policy positions of German government 
parties.
Studying political parties using a ‘policy centered’ approach (Hacker & Pierson, 2014) 
also enabled the second major contribution of this dissertation: analyzing the policy 
implications of the ties and contacts between interest groups and political parties. The 
importance of the interactions between these two sets of possible aggregators of public 
preferences had often been taken for granted or assumed in the literature, but not stud-
ied empirically (e.g. Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013; Thomas, 2001). This dissertation 
made at least two contributions to our knowledge about these consequences for policy. 
Firstly, the chapters contained multiple indications that political parties remained very 
important for policy change. The Dutch coalition negotiations studied in chapter 5 
were a setting where we might have expected political parties to be relatively strong 
compared to other stages of policy-making. Still, the fact that interest groups and other 
policy advocates seldom managed to get policy requests into the coalition agreement 
that were not previously held positions of political parties indicates that the latter did 
dominate at least this stage of the policy-making process. The control variable measur-
ing the share of political parties on the same side as an advocate in chapter 4, which 
encompassed policy issues at different stages of the policy cycle, also provided support 
for this conjecture. When the political parties had the same position as an advocate 
and controlling for a range of other factors, the predicted probability that an advocate 
attained their preferences increased by 19 percent points. Although this was not the 
main focus of chapter 3, some of the cases of regulatory policy-making in Sweden also 
highlighted this continued importance of political parties for policy-making. As a clear 
example, the Center-Party’s position on nuclear energy was pivotal in shaping nuclear 
energy policy in Sweden. All in the chapters of this dissertation therefore suggested 
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that while interest groups may help to transmit public preferences to political parties 
and policy-makers (see also: Flöthe & Rasmussen, 2019; Rasmussen & Reher, 2019), the 
continued strength of political parties indicated that organized interests are not likely 
to fully offset representational gaps left by political parties due to their comparatively 
limited influence on policy.
A second finding regarding the policy implications of ties between groups and 
parties was that even if parties still appear as more dominant forces in policy-making, 
the contacts or ties between interest groups and political parties can matter for policy-
making. However, these effects were less straightforward or strong than expected. 
Firstly, chapter 4 showed that policy advocates that worked with political parties that 
were both powerful and on their side were more likely to attain their preferences on an 
issue than other advocates. While these results were suggestive of the potential policy 
implications of contacts between groups and parties, there was no significant difference 
in preference attainment between advocates that did and did not work with a political 
party on an issue, nor between advocates that worked with members of parliament or 
the national cabinet and those that did not. The finding in chapter 5 that the VVD party 
was less likely to compromise on election promises that were supported by business ac-
tors than other types of advocates (even when controlling for the policy area) suggested 
that the VVD did differentiate between requests from advocates that it had traditional 
ties with and those it did not. However, there was no such effect for the CDA party, 
which had – if anything- stronger traditional ties with employers’ organizations. Where 
the results from chapter 4 suggested that the policy implications of working with politi-
cal parties on a policy issue are not directly related to preference attainment, the results 
from chapter 5 contained similar results for the policy implications of more traditional 
linkages between business groups and center-right parties. The discussion in the result 
section of the fifth chapter suggested that one mediating factor may be the electoral 
strategy of the political party itself.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this dissertation does not paint a purely 
positive vision of representation in what are affluent Northwestern European countries 
with strong democratic credentials. Political parties remain very powerful actors when 
it comes to decision-making on specific policy issues, which is not in itself problem-
atic. However, the concerns voiced by Mair (2008, 2010) that parties, especially when in 
government, are not able to fully live up to their representative role are supported by 
the data presented in chapter 2. What is more, the results suggested that even though 
interest groups and other policy advocates were sometimes able to represent and 
translate public preferences to political elites and parties, they were unlikely to act as 
credible replacements of political parties, at least as long as the latter remain influential 
in policy-making (cf. Mair, 2010, p. 6).
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Of course, not all the findings amounted to an equally negative image. For one, there 
were several indications that the links between the public and party politicians were 
not fully severed. Firstly, chapter 2 showed that while parties in government took policy 
positions that were unrelated to general public opinion, their policy positions did cor-
relate with the preferences of voters who supported the party. Admittedly these were 
smaller parts of the public, but German voters supporting a government party were 
likely to see the party they voted for taking the policy positions they preferred. Secondly, 
the fact that parties in opposition generally took positions that correlated strongly with 
the preferences of the general public suggested that politicians were likely to be aware 
of public opinion, even if they did not or could not act on it once they entered govern-
ment. Similarly, the evidence from chapter 3 also indicated that even though – on the 
four issues studied in the chapter – public opinion did not necessarily influence policy 
directly, it did affect the attention that Swedish politicians paid to an issue: the larger the 
share of the public that wanted to see a change to the status quo, the larger the share of 
the Swedish’ parliament’s attention in the following year - again suggesting that politi-
cians were aware of public policy preferences. Using a similar research design to that 
used in chapter 2, Toshkov, Mäder, and Rasmussen (2019) also found that public opinion 
did have a small effect on the likelihood and speed of policy change, suggesting some 
connection between public preferences and policy decisions. Finally, to the extent that 
the reduced correlation between public preferences and the positions of government 
parties in chapter 2 was due to a choice for responsible over responsive policy making, 
something this dissertation did not directly measure, this is not necessarily negative. 
While Mair (2010) was very skeptical of what he saw as the increasing tendency of po-
litical parties to prioritize responsible policy-making over representative policy-making, 
responsible policy-making is in itself important: it often implies actions that can be 
considered positive or even democratic like safeguarding the environment or pension 
plans for future generations, creating economic stability or protecting human rights as 
defined in international treaties.
In addition, some observers of politics may also welcome that the findings in chap-
ters 4 and 5 did not provide an image of interest groups dominating democratically 
elected political parties. Even if studies have shown that interest groups may often have 
measures in place to make sure they accurately represent their members (Albareda, 
2018), and that their preferences are more likely to align with those of the public than 
often thought (Flöthe & Rasmussen, 2019), they remain unelected organizations, and 
there remains considerable concern about the possible bias that groups may introduce 
to policy-making. Especially in chapter 5, it seems that policy advocates, under certain 
conditions, predominantly affect the choices made by negotiating politicians regarding 
which election pledges to fulfill. This can even be seen as (very) positive, as too strong 
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advocacy influence that would make a coalition agreement deviate from election prom-
ises is hardly good news for democracy.
Finally, each of the dissertation’s chapters also contributed to the literature beyond 
the general points outlined in the introduction and the discussion above. The following 
section therefore highlights important additional findings from each chapter.
6.3 lImITATIons AnD fuTure reseArCh
While the above clearly demonstrated the advantages of studying political parties 
and their activities on specific policy issues, there are of course also limitations to the 
approach in general and this dissertation in particular. This section therefore outlines 
a number of these limitations. Each of the chapters also included some discussion of 
the limitations of the respective chapter, which is why this part focuses predominantly 
on limitations that cut across multiple chapters. Of course, some of these could be ad-
dressed in future research, which is why this part of the chapter also provides several 
suggestions for future studies.
A first limitation of this dissertation is that it focused on a relatively small number 
of countries that, with the partial exception of the inclusion of the United Kingdom in 
chapter 4, shared many institutional and cultural features. This means that the findings 
from the chapters, even those including single countries, were likely to generalize to ex-
actly this set of wealthy, (neo) corporatist countries with proportional electoral systems 
and traditions of (multiparty) cabinet governments. It also means that while some of the 
findings may apply to democracies outside of North-Western Europe, such generaliza-
tions would be more speculative.
The conclusions above did not paint a very positive image of the ability of political 
parties to represent public opinion, nor of the ability of interest groups to help address 
this. More research is necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn, however. Future 
studies could, for example, expand the number of political parties and countries stud-
ied in a similar research design as the one used in chapter 2. This would also allow for 
investigating the possible causes of the differences in congruence between opposition 
and government parties. For example, are the policy positions of certain types of gov-
ernment coalitions (for example those with relatively high levels of ideological conflict) 
less congruent with public opinion than others (for example minority governments that 
can cooperate with different parties depending on the issue)? Or are the lower levels of 
congruence related not to coalition politics, but to the restrictions placed on governing 
parties by international treaties, the obligation to pay for policy plans and other features 
of responsible government?
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Another important avenue of future research that is needed before we can draw 
firmer conclusions about the representative roles of political parties and interest groups, 
is to examine the representative consequences of the ties and interactions between 
them. Chapters 4 and 5 showed that these ties mattered for the lobbying success of policy 
advocates under certain conditions, but it is less clear how they affected the representa-
tive capacity of either interest groups or political parties. The consequences of these ties 
and contacts may also be different for each of these two sets of interest aggregators. As 
an example, lobbying political parties may help interest groups to better represent their 
members’ preferences and get them translated into policy. At the same time, too much 
interest group influence might move the policy positions of political parties away from 
their voters’ or members’ preferences. These are important questions for future studies. 
One concrete way future studies could study this would be by studying how parties’ 
election manifestos are written. There is evidence from qualitative studies that inter-
est groups are often involved in the writing of these manifestos in Austria, Ireland and 
Norway (Allern & Saglie, 2008; Däubler, 2012; Dolezal et al., 2012). Dutch political parties 
are also approached by organized interests when writing their manifestos, evidenced 
both by the interviews done for chapter 5 and the Dutch Social Democratic party (PvdA) 
which discloses that it consults with several dozen interest groups and experts when 
drafting its election manifestos. Finally, there is evidence that in corporate countries 
with high levels of trade union membership, social democratic parties are more likely 
to pay attention to issues pertaining to the welfare state in their election manifestos 
(Otjes & Green-Pedersen, 2019). While this is not necessarily problematic, future studies 
could investigate whether these ties help political parties make policy plans that also 
represent their members’ or voters’ wishes, or work in the opposite direction.
There are also limitations that are inherent to the policy-centered approach used in 
this dissertation. An important limitation is that while each of the chapters in this disser-
tation had a clear definition of what constituted a specific policy issue for inclusion in the 
analysis (or a request in the case of chapter 5), a general definition of what constitutes 
a specific policy issue is less readily available (Burstein, 2014, p. 20). This especially has 
implications for studies of the preference attainment of interest groups. While a specific 
organization may be rated as having attained its preference to ‘raise the retirement age 
to 67 years’, the organization may have actually lobbied for much more than just this: 
perhaps the organization also wanted an exception for workers doing manual labor, 
or wanted the pace at which the retirement age was raised to be more incremental. 
Chapter 5, which studies lobbying success based on requests made by policy advocates 
rather than predefined issues, therefore comes closer to measuring whether advocates 
were successful in achieving their self-defined goals (see also: (Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
Variation in the definition of an ‘issue’ also permeates to existing studies have chosen 
different definitions of issues, ranging from those available in opinion polls (Gilens & 
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Page, 2014; Rasmussen, Mäder, et al., 2018) to those on legislative agendas (Beyers, Dür, 
Marshall, & Wonka, 2014; Burstein, 2014). Yet others, especially those studying policy 
agendas, use the term ‘policy issue’ to mean what this dissertation has called an issue 
area or dimension like environmental policy or immigration policy (e.g. Bevan & Jen-
nings, 2017; Klüver, 2016; Volkens et al., 2019). As also argued by Burstein (2014), future 
research could more critically reflect on the effects of defining a policy issue for studying 
lobbying success and political representation, because even a focus on ‘specific’ legisla-
tive proposals or policy issues may still hide a lot of lobbying influence.
Thirdly, while even the specific issues that were studied here can be argued to 
not be specific enough, it is important to stress that broader ideological conflicts and 
congruence do also matter. Political actors care about the broad direction of policy or 
policy areas and act accordingly. An example from this dissertation comes from chapter 
5, appendix 5.3, which showed that policy requests that were about economic issues 
and supported by the VVD were more likely to end up in the coalition agreement than 
requests in other policy areas. These results suggest that beyond the specific issues, the 
VVD party also aimed to generally grant lobbying requests (or at least was less likely 
to compromise) on economic issues that it also owned (Petrocik, 1996). Future studies 
could help improve our understanding of politics by theoretically linking the different 
levels at which policy can be both measured and conceptualized. An example is the in-
creasing evidence in the literature on congruence that an exclusive focus on ideological 
scales may conceal considerable gaps in representation (Broockman, 2016; Lesschaeve, 
2017), a finding also highlighted in chapter 2 of this dissertation.
On the other hand, studies of interest groups and advocacy generally focus on spe-
cific policy issues. Given that lobbying tends to work at this level and since most advo-
cacy organizations do not aim to push policy in a more general left-right direction, this is 
a sensible choice. Many advocacy organizations do, however, have aims that are broader 
than the specific issue that is studied. Examples are environmental organizations that 
aim to raise environmental standards across the board, or business organizations that 
seek to generally create favorable economic conditions for their members or economic 
sector. Like chapter 2 of this dissertation moved the study of political parties to the level 
of specific policy issues, future studies that estimate interest group ideal points on such 
‘intermediate’ issues like Europeanization or immigration (see McKay (2008) and Van-
noni (2017) for efforts in this direction) and connect these to more specific policy issues, 
could further our understanding of interest group influence. They may also provide 
another avenue for studying organizational ties and cooperation between political par-
ties and interest group.
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6.4 ConCluDIng remArks
All in all, this dissertation demonstrated that a policy-centered approach (Hacker & 
Pierson, 2014) could be applied effectively to studying the representative capacity and 
policy positions of political parties. It showed that taking such an approach challenges 
the relatively positive findings about the congruence between public opinion and party 
positions in previous studies. These findings are important, not in the least because we 
know that levels of ideological congruence between the public and parties are related 
to citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (Reher, 2015). Overestimating the extent to 
which such congruence occurs on the policy issues that matter for the daily lives of 
citizens may therefore lead to overlooking possible causes of citizens’ dissatisfaction 
with democracy. Similarly, the policy centered approach made it easier to analyze the 
positions of government parties: again, the finding that these tend to take positions that 
were unrelated to public preferences in Germany, opens up important future questions 
about the implications this has for democratic representation and legitimacy.
Moreover, the approach made it possible to study the policy implications of the 
contacts and ties between interest groups and political parties. Placing the policy pref-
erences of these two sets of interest aggregators on a common metric helped move the 
literature studying these ties forward. Understanding the policy implications of these 
ties is important. One area where such an understanding may help is in formulating 
lobbying regulation that helps improve or safeguard representation. An example from 
chapter 5 is the finding that although lobbying seems to have had some effects on the 
coalition agreement, these effects were relatively modest and generally did not make 
political parties deviate from their election pledges. In spite of the large amounts of 
media attention for one granted lobbying request that did not previously feature in an 
election manifesto (scrapping the dividend tax), the data clearly showed that this policy 
was the exception, not the rule. The fact that this specific request was picked up by 
the media and opposition parties and the government abandoned the plan, suggests 
that stricter regulation of lobbying contacts during the government formation would 
possibly not have changed the final outcome of the negotiations. Instead, existing laws 
and practices regarding the public availability of government information seem to have 
worked as a better safeguard than the publication of all letters sent to the government 
(which did of course facilitate chapter 5 of this dissertation). This example serves to illus-
trate the importance of studying the activities of political parties from a policy-centered 
perspective, as it can help us better understand their representative capacity and the 
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APPenDIx 1.1: DIvIsIon of lAbour
This dissertation benefitted from being written as part of the GovLis project led by Anne 
Rasmussen. The embedding in this larger project, which among other things studied the 
extent to and conditions under which interest groups mediate the relationship between 
public opinion and policy outputs, enabled analyses on a much larger scale than would 
otherwise have been possible, especially for chapter 4. This appendix briefly outlines the 
contributions of the author to the data collection for the different empirical chapters in 
the dissertation.
The 102 German policy issues studied in chapter 2 were selected and coded by the 
principal investigator and other project members. The author of the dissertation did, 
however, develop the coding scheme for the media coding of party positions, as well as 
conducted and oversaw the coding done by student assistants. The application of MRP 
was developed in close cooperation with Lars Mäder and all analyses were conducted 
by the author of the dissertation.
The four regulatory issues in chapter 3 were selected jointly by the co-authors of the 
chapter, with the author of the dissertation conducting large parts of the data collection 
himself. While based on code-books used in other parts of the project (to which the 
candidate also contributed) all coding of media articles by student assistants for this 
study was coordinated and checked by the author of the dissertation. The quantitative 
analyses were primarily conducted by Dimiter Toshkov in close cooperation with the 
author of the dissertation, with the latter being primarily responsible for the qualitative 
analysis (in close cooperation with both co-authors).
Out of all the chapters, chapter 4 benefitted most from being embedded in the 
GovLis project. Here, the author was an active part of the team that conducted the 
media coding and administered and developed the survey of policy advocates (taking 
several months’ fulltime work), but many of the choices (for example the selection of 
countries, policy issues, design of the media coding as well as the survey’s focus) were 
the result of the choices made by Anne Rasmussen in cooperation with the entire team. 
The interviews for determining the positions of political parties in five countries would 
also have been impossible without the GovLis project, even if the author did conduct 
some of these interviews. All analyses in the paper, as well as the collection of data about 
political parties and data cleaning were conducted by the author of the dissertation.
Finally, for chapter 5, all data collection, cleaning, codebook development, super-
vision of a student assistant as well as analyses were conducted by the author of this 
dissertation.
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APPenDIx 2.1: The PolITbAromeTer QuesTIons To 
IDenTIfy PArTy suPPorTers
The original formulation of the survey questions in German:
1. In Deutschland neigen viele Leute längere Zeit einer bestimmten politischen Partei zu, 
obwohl sie auch ab und zu eine andere Partei wählen. Wie ist das bei Ihnen: Neigen 
Sie - ganz allgemein gesprochen - einer bestimmten Partei zu? 
2. Falls die/der Befragte einer Partei zuneigt








Translation by the author:
1. In Germany many people tend to support a specific political party over a longer period 
of time, even if they sometimes also vote for another party. How is that for you? Do 
you – speaking generally – tend towards a specific political party?
2. In case the respondent does tend to favour a political party:
All things considered, how strongly or weakly do you tend to favour this party?...
0 – TNZ
1 – Very strongly
2 – Rather strongly
3 – Moderately
4 – Rather weakly
5 – Very weakly
9 – Don’t know
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APPenDIx 2.2: sTruCTure of The sTACkeD DATAseT 
IllusTrATIng TWo hyPoTheTICAl PolICy Issues
Case Policy Issue general 
public 
support
Political party Party 
position
government party
1 1 .6 SDP Favour 1
2 1 .6 CDU/CSU Against 0
3 1 .6 FPD Against 0
4 1 .6 Greens Favour 1
5 1 .6 Linke Neutral 0
6 2 .2 SDP Against 0
7 2 .2 CDU/CSU Favour 1
8 2 .2 FPD Favour 1
9 2 .2 Greens Against 0
10 2 .2 Linke Against 0
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APPenDIx 2.3: mulTIlevel logIsTIC regressIon 
moDels PreDICTIng WheTher A PArTy WAs In 
fAvour of A PolICy Issue











Nicheness 3.23* -0.72 3.83* 3.15























CDU/CSU -0.07 -1.21+ -1.17 -1.27+ -1.27+
(0.48) (0.73) (0.73) (0.74) (0.74)
FDP -0.44 -0.38 -0.33 0.33 0.31
(1.15) (1.17) (1.16) (1.33) (1.32)
Grüne 0.43 -0.42 -0.41 0.22 0.19
(1.24) (1.28) (1.28) (1.47) (1.47)
Linke 0.15 -0.58 -0.66 -0.11 -0.15
(1.21) (1.25) (1.25) (1.43) (1.42)
Party size 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Media Salience -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41)
Constant -2.87+ -4.66* -2.46 -7.71** -7.18*
(1.57) (1.88) (2.07) (2.36) (2.87)
Coalition fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Policy-level random intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of cases 334 334 334 334 334
AIC 416 414 411 399 401
BIC 465 472 472 460 466
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPenDIx 2.4
figure A2.4.1: Predicted probability of a position in favour of a policy issue for government parties and 
opposition parties (left axis) and the distribution of cases (right axis), based on the proportion of party sup-
porters in favour of the issue
Figure note: The black solid line indicates the predictions for government parties and the red dashed line for op-
position parties (left axis) with 95% confidence intervals, based on Model 5 in Appendix 2.3. The shaded grey area 
indicates the distribution of the cases (as a percentage of the total N) across public support (right axis).
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APPenDIx 2.5: exPlorIng Issue-ChArACTerIsTICs
This appendix explores the conjecture that niche parties may not generally side more 
with their supporters than more mainstream parties, but only do so on the policy is-
sues they own (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Klüver & Spoon, 2016). The argument has so far 
been tested in terms of the attention that niche parties paid to issue dimensions like the 
environment or immigration (Giger & Lefkofridi, 2014; Klüver & Spoon, 2016). Applying 
issue-ownership to specific policy issues is not straightforward. In order to establish issue 
ownership, the section below relied on data from the Comparative Manifestos Project 
(Volkens et al., 2017). Firstly each specific policy issue was tied to a policy dimension (see 
Appendix 2.7). Secondly the topics of quasi sentences in the manifestos of the political 
parties that were dedicated to the same policy dimension were calculated (see table 
A2.5.2). A party’s ownership of an issue is then defined as the share of sentences in the 
manifesto that were dedicated to the general dimension at the time of the statement 
by the political party (Klüver & Spoon, 2016). Since manifestos are only written before 
elections, the ‘ownership’ score of a single manifesto was applied from one year before 
the election for which the manifesto was written to one year before the next election. 
The one-year period is chosen because it is the period during which the manifesto was 
written.
Table A2.5.1 reports on models that investigate whether niche parties’ positions are 
more related to those of their supporters on issues they own. Model 1 demonstrates 
that the three way interaction (testing whether the effect of being a more niche party on 
the effect of public opinion depends on the extent to which the party owns an issue) is 
not strong nor significant. Importantly and against the expectations, Model 2 shows the 
same for the effect on the relation between (niche) party positions and the preferences 
of supporters. Moreover, Models 3 and 4 show the same results but with congruence 
(whether a majority of the public (Model 3) or a party’s supporters (Model 4) are on the 
same side of a policy issue). Here the effect of owning an issue does not affect (neither 
strongly nor significantly) the likelihood that a niche party’s position is congruent with 
those of its supporters – again disconfirming the expectation. Of course, this is a very 
tentative test and future studies could more systematically assess the ownership op spe-
cific policy issues by political parties and the consequences it has for the public - party 
position linkage.
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Table A2.5.1: Multilevel logistic models exploring issue-ownership. Models 1 and 2 predict a party’s posi-
tion and models 3 and 4 whether a party’s position was congruent with public (3) or supporters’ (4) prefer-
ences. Tests of issue ownership theory marked in bold.
model: (1) (2) (3) (4)










































































































Coalition fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue random-intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of cases 334 334 334 334
AIC 456 413 454 416
BIC 529 486 511 474
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A.5.2: Additive policy scale dimensions from the CMP categories.
names CmP left CmP right
Education spending 506 Educational Provision Expansion: 
Positive




501 Environmental Protection: Positive 
+
416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive
410 Productivity: Positive
Foreign Alliances 101 Foreign Special Relationships: 
Positive
102: Foreign Special Relationships: 
Negative
Free Market Economy 403 Market Regulation: Positive +
412 Controlled Economy: Positive +
413 Nationalisation: Positive +
415 Marxist Analysis: Positive
401 Free Enterprise: Positive +
402 Incentives: Positive
Internationalism 107 Internationalism: Positive 109 Internationalism: Negative
Justice and Freedom 201 Freedom and human rights: 
positive +
202 Democracy: positive
605 Law and order: positive
Macroeconomic 409 Keynesian Demand Management: 
Positive
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive
Militarism 105 Military: Negative 104 Military: Positive
Multiculturalism 607 Multiculturalism: Positive 608 Multiculturalism: Negative
Target groups 705 Underprivileged minority groups/
positive
704 Middle-class and professional 
groups/positive
Traditional Morality 604 Traditional Morality: Negative 603 Traditional Morality:
Welfare State 504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive 505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive
Labour groups 701 Labour groups: Positive 702 Labour groups: Negative
Political system 301 Decentralisation 302 Centralisation
European Union 108 European Community/Union: 
Positive
110 European Community/Union: 
Negative
Constitutionalism 204 Constitutionalism: Negative 203 Constitutionalism: Positive
National way of life 602 National Way of Life: Negative 601 National Way of Life: Positive
General left right scale 103 Anti-Imperialism: Anti-Colonialism 
+
105 Military: Negative +
106 Peace: Positive +
107 Internationalism: Positive +
202 Democracy: Positive +
403 Market Regulation: Positive +
404 Economic Planning: Positive +
406 Protectionism: Positive +
412 Controlled Economy: Positive +
413 Nationalisation: Positive +
504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive +
506 Education Expansion: Positive +
701 Labour Groups: Positive
104 Military: Positive +
201 Freedom and Human Rights: 
Positive +
203 Constitutionalism: Positive +
305 Political Authority: Positive +
401 Free Enterprise: Positive +
402 Incentives: Positive +
407 Protectionism: Negative +
414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive +
505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive +
601 National Way of Life: Positive +
603 Traditional Morality: Positive +
05 Law and Order: Positive +
606 Social Harmony: Positive
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The second part of this Appendix explores whether the link between political parties 
and the positions of the general public and their supporters is affected by the media 
salience of a policy issue. There is some evidence that policy outputs are more aligned 
with public preferences on issues that attract media attention (e.g. Lax & Phillips, 2012). 
The argument is usually that the actions of politicians are more scrutinized on such is-
sues which should increase the electoral costs of ignoring public opinion (Erikson et 
al., 1995). Moreover, politicians may be more aware of public preferences as a result of 
media attention.
On the other hand and applied to political parties, media salience should make it 
harder for parties to hide or blur unpopular positions (Rovny, 2012). Similarly to how 
government parties may be more pressured into voicing unpopular policy decisions 
(Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010), media attention for an issue may reduce the op-
portunities for hiding an unpopular position.
Table 2.5.3 shows that the latter of these two arguments bears out in the data. Both 
the effects of public opinion (Model 1) and of supporter preferences (Model 2) on party 
positions are weakened on salient issues. However, the interaction effect between me-
dia salience and supporter preferences is only significant at the 10% level in Model 2 and 
not at all for models predicting congruence in Models 3 and 4, even if they are in the 
same general direction. Taken together, the models provide some (but not strong) evi-
dence for the conclusion that political parties – at least when it comes to the positions 
they take in the media – take less popular positions on salient issues. The fact that party 
positions are also measured through the media and the fact that missing party posi-
tions mainly occurred on non-salient issues means that these results may be dependent 
on the method used here – even if the support for blurring behaviour (Rovny, 2012) is 
interesting in its own right.
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Table A2.5.3: Multilevel logistic models exploring media salience. Models 1 and 2 predict a party’s position 
and models 3 and 4 whether a party’s position was congruent with public (3) or supporters’ (4) preferences. 
Effects of media salience highlighted in bold.
model: (1) (2) (3) (4)






Media salience 3.71** 2.49+ -0.43 -0.58

















































































Coalition fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue- level random 
intercepts
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of cases 334 334 334 334
AIC 451 413 448 408
BIC 508 474 501 462
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPenDIx 2.6: robusTness CheCks
Table A2.6.1: Multilevel Logistic models predicting congruence between a party’s position and the pref-
erences of the general public (models 1 and 2) and between a party’s position and the preferences of its 
supporters (models 3 and 4).
model (1) (2) (3) (4)








Nicheness 1.70 1.34 2.07 1.38
(1.34) (1.36) (1.48) (1.49)




























































Coalition fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue level random 
intercepts
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Cases 334 334 334 334
AIC 452 448 414 408
BIC 501 501 464 462
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table A2.6.2: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a party is in favour of a policy issue, 
excluding one political party at a time. Based on Model 5 from Table 2.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Excluding SPD Excluding 
CDUCSU


























































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issue level random-
intercepts
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Cases 253 256 268 264 295
AIC 337 331 366 358 400
BIC 390 388 424 412 459
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
1In Model 1 (which excludes SPD), the reference category is CDU/CSU
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APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues












Making Hartz IV receivers do “generally useful 
work” more strongly than before1
WelfareState 81% 4%
Cutting government expenditure on welfare WelfareState 31% 4% FDP
Cutting government expenditure on 
healthcare
WelfareState 15% 2% SPD





Cutting government expenditure on defence Militarism 85% 3% CDU/CSU
Cutting government expenditure on 
childcare
WelfareState 6% 2%
Cutting government expenditure on 
pensions
WelfareState 8% 1%
Cutting government expenditure on family 
promotion/support
WelfareState 14% 2% SPD





Reversing the raise of the VAT level Free Market 
Economy
78% 6% SPD
Abolishing the rule that allows people who 
self-report their tax evasion to only pay 





Only returning soldiers from Afghanistan 
later than 20112
Militarism 79% 5%





Providing a government loan of 50 million 




Extending the duration of the military 
deployment in Afghanistan2
Militarism 40% 3% CDU/CSU, Grüne
Increasing the number of German soldiers in 
Afghanistan
Militarism 38% 57%
There are different rules for cancelling long 
term rental contracts for those to rent a 
property and those who own it. The term 
for cancellation is three months for renters, 
but depends on the duration of the contract 




50% 9% CDU/CSU, Linke
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APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues (CONTINUED)












Selling a part of fully state owned Deutsche 




Ensuring that pensioners who have paid into 
the pension system for an extensive period 
of time receive a pension that is above the 
poverty line
WelfareState 86% 3% SPD





Giving out consumer coupons 
(“Konsumgutscheine”) to all citizens5.
Macroeconomy 17% 3%
Lowering taxes for private persons Macroeconomy 83% 4%
Giving financial support to individual 




Providing stronger tax reliefs for companies Free Market 
Economy
67% 7%
Introducing a wealth tax for the wealthy Targetgroups 68% 5%





Also employing German soldiers in parts of 
Afghanistan with more conflict
Militarism 17% 4%
Changing the constitution to allow the 
military to assist the police in cases where the 
threats are of such a nature that the policy 
alone cannot deal with them
Militarism 71% 4% CDU/CSU, Grüne
Raising the unemployment benefits II 
(“Arbeitslosengeldes II”) in the Hartz-IV 
regulation
WelfareState 81% 8%





Introducing state-controlled electricity prizes Free Market 
Economy
66% 5%
Stopping all nuclear power plants by 2021 Environmental 
Protection
47% 7% CDU/CSU, FDP
Storing fingerprints of all German citizens 








APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues (CONTINUED)












Raising the level of obligatory contributions 
to health insurance to match health care 
expenditure
WelfareState 17% 2%
Banning computer games that celebrate 
violence (“gewaltverherrlichenden”) 





During times of peace the army is only 
allowed to operate on German territory in 
case of disasters: allowing the army to assist 
the police also when there are no disasters
Militarism 71% 3% Grüne
In the construction sector the minimum 
wage is set as the lowest wage level of the 
collective labour agreement to protect 
workers from cheaper foreign labour. 





Raising income taxes on very high incomes Targetgroups 72% 3%
Abolishing a number of tax returns to 
introduce a flat-rate income tax
Targetgroups 45% 37% FDP
Unemployed spouses receive health 
insurance through their partner. Introducing 
a contribution to health insure for the 
unemployed spouses of high income 
employees
WelfareState 76% 4%
Additional compensation payments for 
working nights, Sundays and holidays are 





Reducing the subsidies on coal Free Market 
Economy
76% 14%
Raising the VAT-level Free Market 
Economy
23% 2%
Allowing the taking of DNA not just in case of 





Making it obligatory for parliamentarians 
(in the Bundestag) to report income 
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APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues (CONTINUED)






















Introducing a limited ban of Diesel-cars and 





Creating a new health insurance where all 
people, including the self-employed and civil 
servants, pay a certain percentage of their 
income (including interest and income from 
renting) as health insurance
WelfareState 62% 27% CDU/CSU, FDP
Lowering the contributions to health insure 
and letting people pay a part of treatment 
costs directly
WelfareState 29% 4%
Prosecuting illegal work (“Schwarzarbeit”) 





Founding elite-universities Education spending 38% 8%
Abolishing one holiday Macroeconomy 38% 3%
Raising the contribution of those 
without children to the care-insurance 
(Pflegeversicherung) by up to 9 euros a 
month to compensate those with children (in 
line with a judgement of the constitutional 
court)7
WelfareState 57% 3%
Abolishing the subsidies for buying a house 
(Eigenheimzulage)
Macroeconomy 26% 6%
Reducing the tax return for commuters by 
car, so that they are only compensated from 
travel above 21 kilometres
Macroeconomy 28% 3%
Cutting government expenditure on 





Reducing subsidies on coal Free Market 
Economy
73% 17%
Letting only employees pay for the cost of 
health insurance instead of splitting the cost 
between employers and employees
WelfareState 17% 3%
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APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues (CONTINUED)












Removing dental care from the obligatory 
health insurance and instead making 
employees take out an obligatory private 
insure for dental care
WelfareState 23% 2%
Making people pay a 15 euro contribution 
when visiting a doctor
WelfareState 21% 3%
Making patients pay 10% of all health care 
costs themselves to a maximum of 2% of 
their total annual income
WelfareState 29% 4%
Replacing the income-adjusted contribution 
for obligatory health insurance to a flat rate 
with tax measures to compensate low-
income groups
WelfareState 66% 31%
Abolishing a number of tax returns (for home 





Loosening regulations against the dismissal 




Forcing companies that fail to provide 
education placements to pay an education-




Treating people with children more 





Raising the tobacco tax to increase the price 




Lowering unemployment benefits to 
motivate receivers of the benefits to take 
lower paying jobs
WelfareState 64% 5% SPD
Not raising pensions for one year to solve 
financial problems in the pension system
Macroeconomy 53% 5%
Not raising pensions for one year to solve 
financial problems in the pension system 
(next year)
Macroeconomy 41% 4% Grüne





State involvement to address rising price 
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APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues (CONTINUED)












Temporarily increasing taxes to compensate 
flood-damages10
Macroeconomy 26% 4%
Should the tax reform for 2003 be postponed 
by one year to pay for the flood damages?10
Macroeconomy 73% 12%
Raising the retirement age to 67 Macroeconomy 7% 1%





Changing agricultural policy to put 
more emphasis on natural agricultural 










Abolishing military conscription and 
introducing a professional army instead
Militarism 51% 4%
The introduction of a limited work permit 
(“Green Card”) for foreign workers in the IT 
sector
Multiculturalism 43% 4% Grüne
Banning the extreme-right NPD party Justice and 
Freedom
76% 6%





Spending additional income from selling 
mobile phone frequencies (100 billion 
D-Mark) on reducing public debt
Macroeconomy 59% 6%
Making registered partnerships between 
same-sex partners legally equivalent to 
marriage
Traditional Morality 54% 5%
Treating same-sex couples with a registered 
partnership like married couples regarding 
income taxes
Traditional Morality 62% 6% CDU/CSU
Making it easier for foreign workers that are 
in demand to enter Germany
Multiculturalism 69% 4%
Abolishing the environmental tax 




The introduction of an energy tax on all 





Raising the inheritance tax Targetgroups 30% 9%
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APPenDIx 2.7: lIsT of PolICy Issues (CONTINUED)












Re-introduction of the wealth-tax Targetgroups 51% 7% CDU/CSU, FDP
Only increasing pensions to correct for 
inflation
Macroeconomy 39% 8% FDP, Grüne
Obliging all employees to pay into a private 
pension fund in addition to the existing 
pension insurance (“Rentenversicherung”)
Macroeconomy 0,53 5%
Allowing children of foreigners who have 
lived in Germany for an extended period of 
time to get the German nationality upon 
birth and choosing which nationality they 
want to keep at age 23
Multiculturalism 62% 3%
Allowing women to serve in the army 
(“Bundeswehr”)
Militarism 68% 3%
Financially contributing to post-war 
reconstruction in Kosovo
Internationalism 69% 3%





Allowing shops to open on Sundays Free Market 
Economy
48% 2% Grüne
To increase the price of gasoline to 5 D-mark 




Banning double citizenship (of two countries) Multiculturalism 38% 9% FDP, Grüne
Building a holocaust memorial in Berlin Internationalism 51% 7%
1. Hartz IV is a program offering unemployment benefits. The issue concerns the extent 
to which receivers of the benefits are required to do ‘voluntary’ work for society in 
return for receiving the benefits.
2. In 2010 the Bundestag had given a mandate for the deployment of German troops in 
Afghanistan until the end of February 2011. The issue is about whether the mandate 
should be extended until after 2011.
3. In response to the economic crisis the issue is about whether the government should 
limit the wages and the development of wages earned by managers.
4. Quelle, the mail order branch of Arcandor (a German company) found itself on the 
brink of bankruptcy in during the financial crisis. The issue is about whether the Ger-
man government should provide Quelle with loans to make it solvent again and avoid 
bankruptcy.
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5. Konsumgutscheine are coupons provided by the state that citizens can spend on con-
sumer goods, with the idea of increasing consumer spending to boost the economy. 
The issue is whether the German government should provide such coupons.
6. German commuters could deduct the costs of commuting to work, but only for part of 
the total distance. The issue is about reintroducing the tax-deduction of commuting 
costs from the first kilometre.
7. The Constitutional Court ruled that the fact that people without children were treated 
more favourably than people with children by the existing regulations about the 
obligatory care-insurance. The issue is about raising contributions by those without 
children by 9 euros a month to offset this.
8. The issue is about ensuring that there are enough places that enable students pursu-
ing practical education programs to gain work experience.
9. The issue is about hikes in the prices of goods that (allegedly) resulted from the in-
troduction of the Euro – and whether the government should intervene of offset the 
increased prices.
10. Parts of Southern Germany (especially Bavaria) suffered severe damages due to a large 
flood. The issue is about a temporary tax increase to pay for a compensation scheme.
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APPenDIx 4.1: lIsT of PolICy Issues
Table A4.1: Overview of policy-issues.








Building of a bridge for vehicles and trains across the 
Kattegat
distributive low 54
Reducing mortgage interest deduction from 33% to 25% redistributive high 31
Granting asylum to families with children among rejected 
Iraqi asylum seekers
regulatory high 46
Reducing the unemployment benefit period by half from 
four to two years
redistributive high 53
Strengthening the control of the Danish agriculture in 
order to take action against the misuse of antibiotics
regulatory low 90
Controlled delivery of heroin for particularly vulnerable 
drug addicts at special clinics as a pilot scheme
regulatory high 85
Introducing differentiated VAT redistributive low 8
Making schools’ average test results public regulatory low 45
Cutting the allowances paid to young people between 25 
and 29 years by half
redistributive low 27






Financial support of Arcandor through public money redistributive high 19
Guaranteeing a pension above the poverty line for 
pensioners who have paid contributions for many years
redistributive high 86
Supplying citizens with consumption vouchers to boost 
the economy
redistributive high 17
Establishing a wealth tax redistributive low 68
State control of electricity prices regulatory low 66
Banning of computer games that glorify violence regulatory high 72
Cutting the tax exemption for night, Sunday, and holiday 
supplements
redistributive low 34
Cutting coal subsidies distributive low 76
Making it illegal to carry out a paternity test without the 
consent of the mother
regulatory high 24
Cutting social benefits redistributive low 31
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Table A4.1: Overview of policy-issues. (continued)









Allowing all illegal immigrants who have lived in the 
Netherlands for a long time to stay
regulatory high 52
Raising the retirement age to 67 redistributive high 33
Abolishing the mortgage interest redistributive high 18
Spending more money on development aid redistributive high 48
Obligating stores to be closed on Sunday regulatory high 34
Ban of smoking in restaurants regulatory low 65
Banning embryonic stem cell research regulatory low 35
Allowing more asylum seekers regulatory high 25
Banning euthanasia regulatory low 8




Permanent introduction of a congestion charge in 
Stockholm
redistributive high 37
Reinstating the wealth tax, which was abolished in 2007 
and meant that anyone with a fortune of 1.5 million paid 
1.5% in taxes
redistributive low 45
Rescuing Saab through government funds redistributive high 40
Banning the construction of minarets in Sweden regulatory high 63
Reducing third-world aid distributive low 19
Introducing a language test for Swedish citizenship regulatory high 67
Restricting the right to free abortion regulatory low 14
Making household and domestic services tax deductible redistributive low 64
Allowing free download of all films and music from the 
Internet
regulatory low 62
Increasing the old age retirement age regulatory high 14
179
Table A4.1: Overview of policy-issues. (continued)





Giving amnesty to illegal immigrants who have spent 
ten years in Britain without getting into trouble with the 
police
regulatory high 32
Scrapping ID cards regulatory high 69
Requiring food manufacturers to reduce the fat/salt 
content in their products
regulatory low 73
Introducing a graduate tax, where graduates would pay an 
extra income tax on their income after graduating
redistributive high 55
Allowing a third runway to be built at Heathrow Airport distributive high 45
Reducing corporation tax redistributive low 41
Increasing Air Passenger Duty, to be paid by people taking 
both short-haul and long-haul flights
redistributive high 35
Subsidising the building of new nuclear power stations distributive low 57
Increasing the tax on large executive-style, estate, and 4x4 
vehicles
redistributive low 77
Downgrading ‘ecstasy’ from a class-A drug to a class-B 
drug
regulatory low 23
selection of policy issues
Collected as part of the GovLis project, policy issues were sampled from a set of issues 
that were included in public opinion polls and formulated as proposals to change the 
status quo. We started with an extensive mapping of all issues on which public opinion 
was polled in our five countries both by (academic) surveys like election studies and 
the German Politbarometer, and by companies providing high-quality opinion polls like 
Gallup. We then checked whether the response was measured on an agreement scale 
and checked whether each issue indeed fell under the competence of the national gov-
ernment (as opposed to the EU or regional governments). From this total population of 
issues we then drew a stratified sample ensuring that there was variation on a number of 
independent variables that previous studies have shown affect advocacy and/or prefer-
ence attainment: media saliency, policy type and public opinion.
Appendix  |  
180
APPenDIx 4.2: AnAlysIs of survey (non) resPonse
Table A4.2.1: Response rates per country.































Total 932 478 1,410
Total % 66% 34% 100%
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Table A4.2.2: Logistic regression including all invited advocates, with whether they responded to the sur-
vey as the dependent variable.
(1)
Actor type (ref: Business)
Hobby & identity groups 0.64*
(0.32)
Public interest groups 0.88***
(0.25)




Experts, think tanks & institutional associations 0.51*
(0.21)
Articles per day 0.04
(0.31)


















Number of advocates 1394
McFadden R-square 0.11
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Changing the baseline categories in the regression shows that firms are the least likely 
advocate type to respond, followed by business groups. All other advocates were more 
likely to respond, but response rates were not significant across these other advocate 
types. Similarly, advocates from Germany and the UK were significantly less likely to 
respond than those from other countries. Swedish respondents were in the middle 
and Dutch and Danish advocates were most likely to respond to the survey invitation. 
There are no significant differences between different types of policy issues, nor is the 
response rate related to the media salience of the issue.
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APPenDIx 4.3: DesCrIPTIve sTATIsTICs
Table 4.3.1: Descriptive statistics
variable minimum mean maximum st. dev.
Dep var: Preference attainment (binary) 0 .55 1 .50
Worked with any party (binary) 0 .72 1 .45
Power index 0 0.25 0.78 0.23
Worked with parties on same side 0 .45 1 .41
Share of parties on same side 0 .41 0 .34
Articles per day 0 .17 1.65 .30
Economic resources (binary) 0 .42 1 .49
Media attention (binary) 0 .88 1 .33
Public support .10 .51 .92 .23
Other actors’ support 0 .51 1 .19
Pro policy change (binary) 0 .55 1 .50
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APPenDIx 4.4: overvIeW of DIfferenT TyPes of 
orgAnIzeD InTeresTs
Public interest groups
































Other – undefined - identity group
Sports groups
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Other hobby/leisure groups
Groups associated with the protestant church
Roman/Catholic groups
Other religious group




Associations of local authorities
Associations of other public institutions
Associations of managers of public institutions
Other Institutional associations
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APPenDIx 4.5: ADDITIon of ConTrol vArIAbles
Table 4.5: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an actor on an issue. 
Models 1-3 from table 1 including control variables.
(1) (2) (3)
H1: Worked with any party 0.30
(0.40)
H2: Party power 1.31+
(0.76)
H3: Worked with parties on same side 1.82**
(0.66)
Controls










































Actor type (ref: Business)
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Table 4.5: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an actor on an issue. 




















Number of advocates 264 264 264
Number of issues 34 34 34
AIC 330 327 322
BIC 398 395 390
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPenDIx 4.6: robusTness
Table 4.6.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an 
issue. Replacing measures for working with any party with activity measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4)









































Actor type (ref: business)
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Table 4.6.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an 
issue. Replacing measures for working with any party with activity measures. (continued)

















Number of actors 259 259 261 261
Number of issues 34 34 34 34
AIC 348 323 352 325
BIC 377 390 381 393
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
The models in table 4.6.1 are based on the following survey question:
“Please indicate how important the following activities were to you (experts)/your organisa-
tion (associations)/ your company (firms) on the issue of xxx.”
With advocates answering whether “Direct contact with national cabinet members and 
their staff”, or “Direct contact with national members of Parliament or their offices”, respec-
tively, were “Not at all important” to “Very important”.
The original survey question used in the main analyses in the chapter then read:
“For each of these political parties, please indicate how important they were for your 
work(experts)/the work of your organisation(associations)/the work of your company(firms) 
concerning the issue of xxx.”
With respondents indicating for each party in parliament during the observation period 
whether it was “not at all important” to “very important”.
189
APPenDIx 4.7: AlTernATIve sPeCIfICATIons
Table 4.7.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an 
issue. Alternative operationalizations for model 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)






















Worked with parties on same side * 
Party power (20% of days)
9.37*
(4.22)


































































Actor type (ref: Business)
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Table 4.7.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting preference attainment of an advocate on an 
issue. Alternative operationalizations for model 4. (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)











































































Number of advocates 264 264 264 264
Number of issues 34 34 34 34
AIC 321 320 320 316
BIC 396 395 395 391
Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPenDIx 4.8
figure 4.8.1: Inverse marginal effects plot, showing the effect of working with powerful parties at different 
levels of lobbying parties on the same side. Based on Model 5 in table 1.
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APPenDIx 5. 1. CoDIng AnD meAsuremenT of 
PreferenCe ATTAInmenT
Coding process
Following extensive training a student assistant was first instructed to identify and code 
the requests in each of the letters. They then searched through the coalition agreement 
to determine whether the content of the request was mentioned in the coalition agree-
ment. Initially, preference attainment was coded on a five-point scale running from “not 
at all fulfilled” to “completely fulfilled”, with a Krippendorff’s alpha of .70 (two coders and 
50 coded units). However, an ordinal dependent variable requires ordinal logistic regres-
sion modelling. Even though results from such a model were similar to those presented 
in the chapter, a Brant test showed that the relationship between each of the outcome 
pairs is not the same. Despite the relatively high number of observations there is not 
enough data to reliably estimate generalized ordinal logistic regression models instead. 
Preference attainment was therefore dichotomized to compare advocates who attained 
their preferences at least somewhat (categories 2 through 5) to those who did not attain 
them at all (category 1). Moving the point of dichotomization does not substantively 
change the results.
Description of the original coding categories:
1- Not at all fulfilled: This code is applied when the request is not fulfilled at all. It is ap-
plied when the request seeks to change the status quo and is not at all mentioned 
in the coalition agreement. The category also applies if the coalition agreement does 
mention the requested policy, but does not deliver the policy, or proposes policy in the 
opposite direction (for example if the request was to lower the retirement age and it is 
not lowered, or kept at the same level).
2-  Fulfilled to a very limited degree: This code is applied to cases where the request 
is mentioned, but only a small part of it is fulfilled. An example is a request to raise 
spending on welfare benefits by 20 million euros and the coalition agreement raising 
the benefits by 1 million only. Another example would be a request to implement a 
full policy program, and the coalition agreement only promising a small part of that 
program.
3- Partial fulfilment: This code is applied to requests that are fulfilled to a substantial 
extent, but not hardly nor (almost) fully. It is therefore applied to instances where a 
substantial part of the request is fulfilled, but another substantial part is not. An ex-
ample is a request to ban the sale of cigarettes in supermarkets and gas stations, and 
the coalition agreement promising to ban the sale of cigarettes in supermarkets.
4- Almost completely fulfilled: This code is applied when the request is almost completely 
fulfilled, but some small part of the request is not. Examples are requests to spend a 
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given amount on a certain policy, and the coalition agreement promising almost that 
amount. Another example would be a request to spend 20 million on building houses 
that rent for 700 – 1000 euros a month, and the coalition agreement promising to 
spend 20 million on building houses that rent for 700 to 1100 euros a month instead.
5- Complete fulfilment: this category is applied to requests that are fulfilled completely. 
Apart from the obvious case where the coalition agreement mentions the exact policy 
and promises what was requested, this category also applies to those instances where 
the actor requests that the status quo is kept, and the coalition agreement does not 
mention the policy.
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APPenDIx 5.2. DATAseT DesCrIPTIon
Since lobbying during coalition negotiations is hardly studied in the literature this ap-
pendix provides additional information about the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the chapter (table A5.2.1) and also discusses some descriptive findings in more 
detail.
Table A5.2.1: Descriptive statistics.
variable range values mean st. Dev
Preference attainment 0 – 1 0,1 .35 .48
Party support 0 – 1 0,1 .34 .47
VVD support 0 – 1 0, 1 .11 .31
CDA support 0 – 1 0, 1 .13 .34
Business actor 0 – 1 0,1 .32 .47
Coalition size 0 – 1 1 – 29 6.01 6.83
Access 0 – 1 0, 1 .08 .27
Pro policy change 0 – 1 0, 1 .94 .25
Description of lobbying coalition negotiations
Over a third of all requests (35%) are in the end somewhat to fully implemented in the 
coalition agreement suggesting that advocates often make relevant requests that are 
discussed at the formation table. A request by the council for the judiciary (“Raad voor 
de Rechtspraak”) requesting room to experiment with new ways of punishment was 
even copied verbatim from the letter to the coalition agreement. Although almost all 
letters received a standardized response, a letter by VNO-NCW (the main employers’ 
organization) received a response asking for further elaboration. These two examples 
show at the very least some of the letters are read by the negotiators.
Turning to the nature of the requests, these underline the image that lobbying 
around elections focuses on policy change. 94% of all requests are requests to change 
the status quo, which is much higher than comparable figures in studies of general 
lobbying (Baumgartner et al, 2009), but comparable to the distribution of pledges in 
election manifestos (Thomson et al., 2017). Moreover, the vast majority of requests are 
indeed policy-centred with 82% covering substantive policies. 8% of all requests ask the 
new government to explicitly prioritize a certain issue and another 10% are procedural 
requests. Examples are requests to appoint a minister for Agriculture, or to let go of 
party discipline when voting on medical-ethical issues. The main farmer’s organization 
(LTO), asked farmers to send letters asking for the appointment of a separate minister for 
agriculture. This means that there are 70 identical letters asking for this request (which 
was supported by the CDA). The models in the chapter exclude these 70 letters, but 
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results do not change substantially when they are included. The results presented in 
the chapter do include the other requests about procedures and prioritization, but Ap-
pendix 4 shows that they do not affect the findings.
Table A5.2.2: Share of requests made by respective advocate types.
Advocate type share of requests
Trade unions and professional groups 15%
Public interest groups 16%
Hobby, religious and identity groups 13%
Firms and business groups 33%
Experts and think tanks 7%
Sub national governments and institutions 16%
As shown in table A5.2.2, the requests are made by a wide range of policy advocates. At 
the same time, individual firms and business groups are by far the most prevalent type 
of advocate as they account for 33% all requests.
referenCes
Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth L. Leech, and David C. Kimball. (2009) Lobby-
ing and policy change: Who wins, who loses, and why. Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press.
Thomson, R., Royed, T., Naurin, E., Artés, J., Costello, R., Ennser-Jedenastik, L., Ferguson, M., Kostadinova, 
P., Moury, C., Pétry, F. & Praprotnik, K. (2017) The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges: A Com-
parative Study on the Impact of Power Sharing. American Journal of Political Science, 61, 527-542.
Appendix  |  
196
APPenDIx 5.3. PolICy AreA AnD Issue oWnershIP
This appendix explores an alternative explanation for the results in table 5.1 in the chap-
ter that issue-ownership instead of requests by firms, business groups and employers’ 
organizations is driving the results. The argument is in line with issue-ownership theory 
(Petrocik et al., 2003, Klüver and Spoon, 2016) suggesting that political parties will want 
to ‘stand out’ on issues they own or are perceived as competent on. This may translate 
into political parties being less willing to compromise on such issues during coalition 
negotiations. If a certain category of policy advocate is predominantly making requests 
in a policy area and a party ‘owns’ the issue, a party’s issue-competition driven desire not 
to compromise on these promises may drive the higher rates of preference attainment 
for some policy advocates. For this chapter, it seems likely that firms and business groups 
would make relatively many requests on issues concerning the economy, regulations 
and taxation. At the same time, the VVD and the CDA are likely ‘issue owners’ of this 
policy field.
To ensure this alternative explanation does not drive the reported results, all re-
quests were coded into the 21 major categories outlined by the Dutch version of the 
Comparative Agendas Project (Breeman & Timmermans, 2017). 20 of these categories 
also overlap with the general codebook of the Comparative Agendas Project, but the 
Dutch version of the codebook adds a category about the management of spatial order-
ing and water. Figure A5.3.1 shows the distribution of all requests across policy areas.
The figure shows that most requests are made in the areas of healthcare and 
education and culture, with defence and foreign trade attracting the lowest number 
of requests. To create a binary variable identifying economic requests, requests in the 
categories “macro economy and taxes” and “companies, trade and commerce” were 
coded as a 1 and all requests in other policy areas as a 0.
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figure A5.3.1: Requests by policy area.
Model 1 in table A5.3.1 then interacts whether any request was shared by either of the 
right-wing parties in its election manifesto with whether the request was made in an 
economic policy area. The positive significant interaction shows that requests about 
economic issues benefit more from being present in the right-wing parties’ manifestos 
than requests in other policy areas. When adding the interaction between right-wing 
support and business advocates in model 2, the interaction reported in table 5.1 of the 
chapter remains significant, suggesting that this issue-ownership effect comes in addi-
tion to, rather than instead of, the expectation in Hypothesis 2.
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Table A5.3.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their 
policy preferences, controlling for policy area.
















































































































Letter random intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of requests 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281
Number of letters 346 346 346 346 346 346
AIC 2126 2116 2194 2162 2122 2124
BIC 2178 2174 2246 2219 2174 2181
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Models 3 and 4 then repeat the same process, but only for the VVD, with models 5 and 
6 doing the same for the CDA. In these models the main conclusions from the chapter 
remain unchanged. Similar to the results reported in the chapter, it is mainly the VVD 
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that seems to distinguish between requests in different policy areas: the interaction 
effect for the CDA is negative and not significant. Again this suggests that where the 
VVD was aiming to fulfil its promises on economic and business issues, the CDA was not. 
It should be noted that the variables ‘business’ and ‘economic policy’ are as expected 
correlated, but only moderately so. All VIF-values are <2.6, indicating that there is no 
problematic multicollinearity in the model.
referenCes
Breeman, Gerard. & Arco Timmermans (2017). Politiek van de aandacht: Het Nederlandse codebook 
voor onderzoek naar politieke en maatschappelijke agendavorming. Version: April 2017:https://
comparativeagendas.s3.amazonaws.com/codebookfiles/Comparative_agendas_-_codebook_
NL_Dutch__4.pdf.
Klüver, Heike. & Jay-Jay Spoon (2016). Who responds? Voters, parties and issue attention. British Journal 
of Political Science, 46, 633-654.
Petrocik, John. R. , William. L. Benoit & Glenn. J. Hansen (2003). Issue Ownership and Presidential Cam-
paigning, 1952–2000. Political Science Quarterly, 118, 599-626.
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APPenDIx 5.4: PArTy PosITIons AnD DIsAgreemenT
We know from existing studies that political parties are especially likely to pay attention 
to policy issue areas (like the environment) in coalition agreements when their positions 
in these areas diverge (Klüver & Bäck, 2019). One may therefore expect that advocates 
are most likely to attain their preferences on issues where (at least) two coalition parties 
disagree. To explore whether this is the case, model 1 in table A5.4.1 replicates model 
1 from table 1 in the main text, but replaces the variable ‘party support’ with a ‘party 
position index’ which ranges from -3 (three parties disagree with the advocate’s request) 
to +4 (all parties agree with the advocate), with the middle point meaning that either no 
party had a position, or the known party positions were balanced. The strong positive 
effect clearly suggests that the more (unanimously) the negotiating parties share posi-
tions outlined in the policy request, the more likely the request is fulfilled in the coalition 
agreement.
Table A5.4.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their 
policy preferences, using the party position index
(1) (2)

























Letter random intercepts Yes Yes
Number of requests 2281 924
Number of letters 346 202
AIC 2057 959
BIC 2097 993
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Model 2 in table A5.4.1 then shows the same model, but only including those 924 cases 
where at least one party has a known policy position on the request. This means that 
the ‘0’ value only includes cases where at least 2 parties disagreed with each other on 
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the request. Even if the effect size is smaller the effect remains positive and significant, 
suggesting that rather than disagreement among coalition partners, it is the number 
of negotiating parties that have a position in line with a request that matters. Finally, to 
preclude the possibility that this is an artifact of the modeling strategy chosen, figure 
A5.4.1 shows the share of policy advocates that attain their preferences at different levels 
of the party position index (descriptive data, not model based). Like in model 2 of table 
A5.4.1 this figure includes only those cases where at least one party position is known: 
meaning that the value 0 indicates issues over which the coalition partners disagreed.
figure A5.4.1: Unmodeled share of fulfilled requests at different levels of the party position index, only 
including the 924 instances where at least 1 party position was known.
The figure shows that levels of preferene attainment increase with each step on the 
party position index. The only exception is when 3 parties disagree with the advocate 
(-3). At this data point, there are only 15 requests, of which 13 are the same request 
by a large coalition of 13 local media organizations for more funding, with which 3 of 
the negotiating parties disagreed in their eelction manifestos. Against these odds the 
advocates did see their request partially fulfilled, which accounts for the very high level 
of preference attainment at -3 in the party position index. At every other step of the 
index, the number of requests is much higher.
referenCes
Klüver, H., & Bäck, H. (2019). Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance. Compara-
tive Political Studies, Online first.
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APPenDIx 5.5: TrADe unIons
It may be the case that the interaction between VVD positions and business groups on 
preference attainment is simply about the fact that these business groups credibly signal 
support from a large party of society, regardless of the shared ideological and interper-
sonal links between the party and business groups. This appendix therefore replaces 
the business advocates in table 1 in the main text with trade unions. While these groups 
were ideologically clearly not aligned with the major negotiating parties (especially the 
VVD), Dutch trade unions did still have more members than most interest groups in 2017 
(with the largest trade union Federation FNV representing around 1 million members, 
more than the negotiating parties’ membership combined). Representatives from the 
FNV also joined the coalition negotiations on some days.
In other words, if the mechanism is only about the size of membership, rather than 
either the ties between the party and a type of policy advocate (or the electoral impor-
tance of the group membership), we would expect requests by trade unions to also be 
fulfilled more readily when shared with one of the negotiation parties than requests 
by other advocates: a request by a trade union is likely shared by a substantial share of 
the public. Table A5.5.1 therefore replicates models 2 through 4, interacting right-wing 
support, CDA support and VVD support respectively with whether a request was by a 
labour group. The insignificant interaction effects show that there is no such interaction 
effect in the data: groups need to do more than ‘just’ represent a large constituency to 
increase their levels of preference attainment in coalition agreements.
203
Table A5.5.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their 













































Letter random intercepts Yes Yes Yes
Number of requests 2281 2281 2281
Number of letters 346 346 346
AIC 2169 2249 2151
BIC 2215 2295 2197
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPenDIx 5.6. PolICy reQuesT TyPes
The models presented in table 5.1 in the chapter also include both policy-related re-
quests, as well as more procedural requests. These are for example requests that the 
government explicitly has to mention an issue as a priority in the government agree-
ment. Given that mentioning something as a priority is arguably less costly than promis-
ing to implement a policy (change), table A5.6.1 replicates models 1 and 2 in Table 5.1, 
but only includes requests that imply a legislative change or a policy change that costs 
money to implement. The results remain substantively unchanged, included when they 
are split by party (not shown).
Table A5.6.1: Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their 






























Letter random intercepts Yes Yes
Number of requests 1981 1981
Number of letters 329 329
AIC 1724 1866
BIC 1763 1910
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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APPenDIx 5.7. ClusTerIng
To demonstrate that most results remain the same when robust standard errors are used 
at the letter level (rather than random intercepts) table A5.5.1 replicates models 1 – 4 
from table 5.1 in the main text. The models fit robust standard errors for letters instead 
of the multilevel modelling in table 5.1 in the chapter. The results remain unchanged.
Table A5.7.1: Replication of models 1 – 5 in tables 5.1 and 5.2. predicting whether a policy advocate at-
tained their policy preferences, replacing random intercepts with robust standard errors.

























































Number of letters 2281 2281 2281 2281
McFadden Pseudo R square .25 .17 .15 .16
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
In addition, advocates often made more than one request in a letter. To account for this 
possible clustering of the data at the level individual advocates, table A5.7.2 replicates 
models 1, 3 and 4 – 4 from table 1 in the main text. Models 1ri, 3ri and 4ri in table A5.7.2 
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fit random intercepts (ri) and models 1rse, 3rse and 4rse fit logistic models with robust 
standard errors (rse) at the level of the individual advocate (as opposed random errors 
for letters in table 1 in the main text). Results remain substantively unchanged.
Table A5.7.2: Replication of models 1, 3 and 4 in table 5.1, predicting whether a policy advocate attained 
their policy preferences, fitting random intercepts (ri) and robust standard errors (rse) at the level of indi-
vidual advocates.




















































































Yes Yes Yes No No No
Advocate robust SE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of requests 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281 2281
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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DuTCh summAry
Wat is de kwestie? het lobbyen en de vertegenwoordiging van politieke partijen 
op specifieke beleidskwesties.
Inleiding
In de meeste Westerse democratieën hebben politieke partijen de belangrijke taak 
om publieke voorkeuren te vertegenwoordigen en te implementeren in beleid. Er zijn 
daarom veel studies gedaan naar de mate waarin politieke partijen in staat zijn ook 
daadwerkelijk responsief beleid te maken dat in lijn is met publieke opinie. Dergelijke 
studies onderzoeken in de regel ideologische dimensies, zoals rechts-links, en laten 
zien dat de beleidsposities van kiezers en politieke partijen in veel landen in grote mate 
overeenkomen. De empirische conclusies over de mate waarin partijen in staat zijn 
hun vertegenwoordigende rol op zich te nemen zijn dus door de band genomen zeer 
positief.
Daar staat tegenover dat er maatschappelijk, maar ook in de wetenschappelijke lite-
ratuur (bijvoorbeeld door Peter Mair, 2010) steeds vaker gesteld wordt dat er problemen 
zijn als het gaat om de mate waarin politieke partijen in staat zijn de beleidsvoorkeuren 
van kiezers te vertalen naar beleid. Eén belangrijke reden daarvoor zou zijn dat politieke 
partijen er steeds vaker voor kiezen zich ‘verantwoordelijk’ in plaats van ‘vertegenwoor-
digend’ op te stellen, ook wanneer dit tegen publieke opinie ingaat (Mair, 2010). Denk 
hierbij bijvoorbeeld aan de beperkingen die de EU oplegt aan nationale beleidsmakers, 
het idee dat je niet alle veranderingen van een vorige regering ongedaan moet maken, 
de noodzaak om ook de overheidsfinanciën op orde te houden, of de belangen van 
toekomstige generaties of andere publieke belangen mee te wegen (bijvoorbeeld bij 
klimaatbeleid). Het is belangrijk om te benadrukken dat ‘verantwoordelijk’ beleid geen 
slechte zaak is, en verantwoordelijke beleidskeuzes (bijvoorbeeld waar het gaat om 
het beschermen van de rechten van minderheden) soms zelfs democratischer zijn dan 
keuzes die goed liggen bij grote delen van de bevolking.
Het eerste doel van dit proefschrift is om te onderzoeken of dit tegenstrijdige beeld 
(ten dele) te verklaren is door te kijken naar specifieke beleidskwesties in plaats van de 
ideologische dimensies die tot nu toe bestudeerd zijn in de wetenschappelijke litera-
tuur. Denk daarbij aan het beleidskwesties die daadwerkelijk de levens van burgers be-
invloeden, zoals de hoogte van de pensioenleeftijd. Naast de theoretische puzzel is dit 
ook een normatief belangrijk vraagstuk: als kiezers meer ‘links’ beleid willen, omdat ze 
meer economische gelijkheid wensen, maar het geleverde meer ‘linkse’ beleid bestaat 
uit een meer actief klimaatbeleid, is het natuurlijk de vraag of dat wel telt als goede 
vertegenwoordiging.
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Nadat twee hoofdstukken deze vraag bestudeerd hebben, is het tweede doel van dit 
proefschrift om kijken naar een ander groot voordeel van het bestuderen van activitei-
ten van politieke partijen rond specifieke beleidskwesties: het maakt het makkelijker om 
ze te vergelijken met belangengroepen en andere organisaties al lobbyend proberen 
beleid te beïnvloeden. Alhoewel minder formeel vastgelegd, hebben ook belangen-
groepen de rol om publieke voorkeuren te helpen vertalen naar beleid. Daarom wordt 
in de laatste twee empirische hoofdstukken de mate waarin het dergelijke organisaties 
lukt om beleid te beïnvloeden via politieke partijen onderzocht. Alhoewel er genoeg 
zorgen zijn over de eventueel onevenredige invloed van bepaalde typen belangenor-
ganisaties, is enige invloed wel een voorwaarde voor de mogelijkheid dat belangen-
groepen helpen om tekortkomingen in vertegenwoordiging door politieke partijen te 
helpen corrigeren. Natuurlijk zijn er ook andere kanalen die daaraan zouden kunnen 
bijdragen en die buiten de focus van dit onderzoek vallen, zoals (sociale) media en ook 
de ambtenarij.
methode
Dit proefschrift is geschreven als deel van het GovLis-project. Het richt zich op een vijftal 
welvarende Noord-West Europese landen (specifiek Nederland, Zweden, Denemarken, 
Duitsland en het VK), stuk voor stuk goed functionerende democratieën. Daarnaast 
lijken de politieke systemen van deze landen, met uitzondering van het VK, behoorlijk 
op elkaar: ze hebben proportionele kiesstelsels (wat tot gevolg heeft dat er meerdere 
partijen in het parlement zitten) en zogenaamde corporatistische relaties tussen de 
overheid en de samenleving. Dat laatste betekent dat de overheid er in ieder geval tra-
ditioneel gezien voorkeur aan gaf om een beperkt aantal maatschappelijke organisaties 
sterk te betrekken bij politieke besluitvorming (“de polder”). Het gevolg van deze me-
thodologische keuzes is dat de uitkomsten van het onderzoek vooral toepasbaar zijn op 
vergelijkbare Europese democratieën (waar bijvoorbeeld ook Noorwegen en Oostenrijk 
toe behoren). Sommige vondsten zullen ook in minder vergelijkbare landen opgaan, 
maar dat is minder vanzelfsprekend.
Alle empirische hoofdstukken richten zich daarbij zoals gezegd op specifieke 
beleidskwesties als de hoogte van de pensioenleeftijd, of er troepen moeten worden 
ingezet in Afghanistan en of de (Zweedse) staat noodleningen aan Saab moe(s)t ver-
strekken. Een groot voordeel van deze beleidsgerichte benadering is dat het helpt om 
te onderzoeken of en hoe politieke partijen en belangengroepen publieke voorkeuren 
vertegenwoordigen. In hoofdstukken 2 en 4 is daarbij een gestratificeerde steekproef 
van beleidsonderwerpen getrokken. Alhoewel het onduidelijk blijft hoe een populatie 
van alle mogelijke beleidskwesties er uit zou zien, is geprobeerd om een aantal kenmer-
ken van de verschillende issues te variëren. Zo zitten er zowel onderwerpen bij die zeer 
veel media-aandacht trokken, als kwesties die juist weinig aandacht kregen. Er zitten 
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onderwerpen bij waarin beleid veranderde, en onderwerpen waar er qua wetgeving 
niks gebeurde. Ook is er een grote variatie in de beleidsterreinen waarop de onderwer-
pen liggen, variërend van milieubeleid tot migratie, van ethische kwesties tot de wel-
vaartsstaat. De onderzochte onderwerpen, bestudeerde landen en gebruikte methoden 
verschillen verder enigszins tussen de verschillende artikelen die samen de empirische 
hoofdstukken van dit onderzoek vormen: deze keuzes worden hieronder daarom (kort) 
besproken in de samenvatting van de verschillende hoofdstukken, die op hun beurt 
gevolgd worden door een samenvatting van de bredere conclusies van het proefschrift.
hoofdstuk 2
Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de relatie tussen publieke opinie en de beleidsposities van 
politieke partijen. Het maakt daarbij gebruik van surveyonderzoeken die in de periode 
tussen 1998 en 2010 een steekproef van de Duitse bevolking hebben bevraagd over 
precies het soort specifieke beleidsonderwerpen als hierboven beschreven. Deze kiezers 
is ook gevraagd naar hun partijvoorkeuren, waardoor we in kaart kunnen brengen wat 
zowel de gemiddelde kiezer als aanhangers van de 5 grote Duitse partijen in deze pe-
riode van de 102 onderzochte beleidsvoorstellen vonden. Van sommige partijen zaten 
maar weinig aanhangers in de steekproef. Bestaande onderzoeken lossen dit meestal op 
door een vrij arbitraire grens aan te houden, en sluiten partijen uit waarvan bijvoorbeeld 
minder dan 20 kiezers in de steekproef zitten (een erg klein aantal).
In dit hoofdstuk is daarom gebruik gemaakt van Multipele Regressie met Poststra-
tificatie (MRP). MRP draait een multilevel-model om voor elke demografische categorie 
(bijvoorbeeld een vrouw tussen en 50-60 jaar, die hoogopgeleid is en FDP stemt) te 
voorspellen in welke mate ze voor of tegen een voorstel is. Vervolgens is andere data 
gebruikt om in kaart te brengen wat de demografische compositie van de FDP-aanhan-
gers is, om te schatten hoe groot de steun voor een voorstel onder deze groep is. Het 
voordeel van deze methode is dat die ook informatie over gerelateerde kiezersgroepen 
meeneemt (bijvoorbeeld hoogopgeleide vrouwen tussen de 50-60 jaar die CDUCSU 
stemmen) om de steun voor een voorstel binnen een groep kiezers te schatten.
Vervolgens is aan de hand van uitlatingen in de media in kaart gebracht wat de 
posities van de politieke partijen op deze 102 beleidskwesties zijn. Uit het onderzoek 
blijkt dat de beleidsposities van zogenaamde niche-partijen (die zich op een beperkt 
aantal onderwerpen richten) en mainstream-partijen (partijen die aan een breder aantal 
onderwerpen aandacht besteden) ongeveer even sterk samenhangen met publieke 
opinie.
Er is echter wel een groot verschil tussen partijen in de regering en de oppositie. 
De beleidsposities van oppositiepartijen hangen sterk samen met de voorkeuren van 
kiezers én die van de aanhangers van de eigen partij. Daarentegen hangen de beleids-
posities van regeringspartijen in het onderzoek niet samen met de beleidsvoorkeuren 
Appendix  |  
210
van de gemiddelde kiezer. Wel is er nog enige, maar afgezwakte, samenhang met de 
beleidsvoorkeuren van de aanhangers van de partij. Het lijkt er dus op dat als partijen in 
de regering komen, en rekening moeten gaan houden met o.a. coalitiepartners, interna-
tionale wetgeving en de overheidsuitgaven, ervoor kiezen om vooral beleidsposities te 
vertegenwoordigen van de eigen kiezers. Dit is begrijpelijk, maar kan ook problematisch 
zijn als kiezers veel populaire beleidsposities horen van oppositiepartijen, die vervol-
gens niet leverbaar blijken als partijen in de regering zitten.
hoofdstuk 3
Hoofdstuk 3, geschreven met Anne Rasmussen en Dimiter Toshkov, onderzoekt hoe 
publieke opinie en belangenbehartigers (experts, belangengroepen en denktanks) 
beleid beïnvloeden. Het hoofdstuk zoomt daarbij in op 4 beleidskwesties in Zweden 
waarvoor over langere periodes data beschikbaar is over publieke opinie. Vervolgens 
zijn ook alle uitspraken van niet statelijke actoren over deze onderwerpen in 2 grote 
Zweedse kranten in kaart gebracht, zodat we per jaar een beeld hebben van de toon van 
de media-activiteiten van belangenorganisaties en van publieke opinie.
Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt daarbij twee afhankelijke variabelen. Allereerst biedt 
het een kwantitatieve analyse van de mate van politieke aandacht (gemeten als het 
percentage van de politieke debatten en documenten in het Zweedse parlement dat 
over elk van de vier onderwerpen gaat) voor een onderwerp. Het idee hierbij is dat als 
een groot of toenemend deel van de Zweedse bevolking wil dat er beleidsverandering 
plaatsvindt, we ook verwachten dat er meer politieke aandacht voor het onderwerp 
komt. De tweede, kwalitatieve, analyse ging daarbij een stap verder en onderzocht ook 
de mate waarin beleid dan ook daadwerkelijk veranderde.
De analyses laten zien dat noch de media-activiteiten van belangenbehartigers, 
noch publieke opinie alleen een sterk effect hebben op politieke aandacht of be-
leidsveranderingen. Er is wel enig bewijs voor een positief effect van publieke opinie: 
als meer burgers de status quo willen veranderen, besteden Zweedse politici meer 
aandacht aan een onderwerp in het jaar erna. Tevens zien we dat een sterk negatieve 
houding van belangenbehartigers over een onderwerp de kans verlaagt dat politici 
over een onderwerp praten in het volgende jaar: ze lijken dus in staat onderwerpen van 
de politieke agenda te houden. Wel vinden we, zeker als het gaat om het onderwerp van 
het sluiten van kerncentrales, dat er achter de schermen veel meer subtiele lobbyacti-
viteiten plaatsvinden. Zo werd ondanks officieel beleid om kerncentrales uit te faseren 
en de sluiting van 2 grote kerncentrales, toch een vergunning verleend om twee andere 
centrales zo uit te breiden dat van uitfasering absoluut geen sprake was.
Al met al is de conclusie dus dat (media-)lobbyactiviteiten en publieke opinie een 
verre van deterministische relatie hebben met beleid, zeker ook als we over lange 
tijdsperiodes naar specifieke beleidsonderwerpen kijken. Daarbij is er veel lobbyacti-
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viteit die gericht is op een detailniveau dat in de meeste studies (inclusief de andere 
hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift) over het hoofd gezien wordt – in ieder geval op het 
beperkte aantal Zweedse beleidskwesties dat hier bestudeerd is.
hoodstuk 4
Hoofstuk 4, geschreven met Anne Rasmussen, richt zich vervolgens op de vraag of 
belangengroepen en andere belangenbehartigers vaker hun zich krijgen als ze samen-
werken met politieke partijen op specifieke beleidskwesties. Er zijn steeds meer be-
staande studies die onderzoeken in welke mate er allianties en samenwerking is tussen 
belangengroepen en politieke partijen. Vaak doen dit soort onderzoeken de aanname 
dat dit soort samenwerking belangrijk is voor democratische vertegenwoordiging en 
beleid, maar daar is tegelijk nog geen bewijs voor in de literatuur.
Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt daarbij allereerst of belangenorganisaties die samen-
werken met politieke partijen vaker hun zin krijgen dan andere belangengroepen. 
Vervolgens zoekt het uit of het uitmaakt met welke politieke partijen met samenwerkt: 
bijvoorbeeld met partijen die dezelfde mening hebben over een beleidsonderwerp, of 
partijen met veel macht (grote partijen en partijen die in de regering zitten).
Hiertoe onderzoeken we 50 beleidsvoorstellen in alle vijf de landen beschreven in 
de introductie. Voor elk van deze voorstellen bracht het GovLis project in kaart welke 
belangenbehartigers er allemaal actief op waren. Deze 1400 organisaties en experts is 
vervolgens een survey gestuurd (met een respons van ongeveer 30%), dat vroeg naar 
het belang van samenwerking met verschillende politieke partijen voor het (lobby)
werk van de respondent. We kijken vervolgens over een periode van vier jaar of het 
beleid op deze voorstellen gewijzigd is. Door de mate waarin verschillende groepen 
belangenbehartigers hun zin kregen te vergelijken, kunnen we conclusies trekken over 
de effectiviteit van de strategie van het lobbyen van (machtige en) bevriende partijen – 
zelfs al kunnen we er geen daadwerkelijke invloed mee aantonen.
De analyses laten zien dat het werken met politieke partijen alleen effectief is wan-
neer deze partijen machtig zijn én dezelfde beleidsopvatting hebben als de belangen-
organisatie. Dit is een belangrijke uitkomst, omdat dit het beeld nuanceert dat dit soort 
samenwerking tussen belangenorganisaties en politieke partijen al te veel invloed heeft 
op beleid.
hoofdstuk 5
Naast het werken met een partij zouden ook de meer langdurige banden tussen poli-
tieke partijen en (groepen) belangenbehartigers gevolgen kunnen hebben voor beleid. 
Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt dit in een meer bijzondere setting: de onderhandelingen 
over het coalitieakkoord na de Nederlandse Tweede Kamerverkiezingen in 2017. Met de 
dividendbelasting in het achterhoofd is het belangrijk om dit soort lobby-invloed beter 
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te begrijpen: het zou er namelijk toe kunnen leiden dat politieke partijen afwijken van 
de verkiezingsbeloftes waarop ze net verkozen zijn.
Politieke partijen hebben tijdens de onderhandelingen echter weinig reden om al 
te erg in te gaan op verzoeken van lobbyorganisaties: ze staan onder grote tijdsdruk, 
hebben de zeer uitdagende taak om hun eigen verkiezingsbeloften het coalitieakkoord 
in te krijgen en compromissen te sluiten, en zijn er daarbij vooral ook op gericht om 
te voorkomen dat de nieuwe coalitiepartners later in de regeringsperiode ongewenste 
plannen lanceren. Daarom is de eerste verwachting van hoofdstuk 5 dat lobbygroepen 
die verzoeken doen, die ook al in de verkiezingsprogramma’s van de onderhandelende 
partijen staan, hun ook vaker verzoeken vervuld zullen zien in het regeerakkoord.
Onderhandelende partijen streven naast alle bovenstaande zaken echter nog een 
tweede doel na: ze moeten een inschatting maken hoe goed de compromissen die ze 
sluiten vallen bij hun achterban. Daarvoor kunnen ze natuurlijk deels directe contacten 
onderhouden met de achterban, maar een andere manier is om te kijken welke ver-
kiezingsbeloftes gesteund worden door belangengroepen waar de partij al lang goede 
relaties mee onderhoudt, en die bovendien vaak ook groepen vertegenwoordigen die 
de partij van belang vindt. Daarom is de tweede verwachting in het onderzoek dat 
belangengroepen die traditioneel goede banden hebben met de onderhandelende 
politieke partijen, vaker hun verzoeken vervuld zien in het regeerakkoord dan belan-
gengroepen die dergelijke banden niet hebben.
Om dit te onderzoeken zijn alle lobbybrieven die tijdens de Nederlandse kabinets-
formatie van 2017 verzonden zijn aan de informateur onderzocht: uit elk van deze brief 
zijn de specifieke beleidsverzoeken gedestilleerd. Vervolgens is voor elk van deze ruim 
2000 verzoeken nagegaan of ze ook in het partprogramma van de nieuwe regeringspar-
tijen voorkwamen.
Uit de analyse blijkt allereerst dat in het regeerakkoord bijna geen lobbyverzoeken 
vervuld worden, die niet eerst voorkwamen in de partijprogramma’s van de nieuwe coa-
litiepartijen. Van 1200 unieke verzoeken werden er slechts 30 vervuld die niet eerst in de 
partijprogramma’s stonden van de formerende partijen: rond de 2,5%. Verder blijkt dat 
verzoeken van bedrijven en werkgeversorganisaties die gesteund werden door de VVD 
eerder vervuld werden van die van andere belangenbehartigers die verzoeken deden 
die ook gesteund werden door de VVD. Met andere woorden: de VVD lijkt verzoeken 
van bedrijven en werkgeversorganisaties serieuzer te nemen dan de verzoeken van 
andere organisaties, zelfs als die iets vragen waar de VVD wel positief tegenover staat. 
In tegenstelling tot de verwachtingen ging dit niet op voor het CDA, dat historisch ook 
veel contacten en banden onderhoudt met werkgeversorganisaties. Een extra analyse 
van de verkiezingsprogramma’s van deze partijen suggereert een iets andere verklaring 
dan hierboven beschreven: het zou er vooral om kunnen gaan welke (maatschappelijke) 
groepen belangrijk zijn voor de campagne van een politieke partij. Als een lobbyorgani-
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satie een dergelijke groep vertegenwoordigt, heeft deze wellicht ook meer invloed op 
een politieke partij.
Samengevat maakt het hoofdstuk dus duidelijk dat partijen tijdens de formatie veel 
sterker zijn dan lobbyorganisaties. Hier moeten wel twee kanttekeningen bij geplaatst 
worden. De eerste is dat het natuurlijk mogelijk is dat de partijprogramma’s van de po-
litieke partijen ook al beïnvloed zijn door lobbyisten. De tweede is dat partijen (zoals de 
VVD in deze analyse) soms dus wel de opvattingen en voorkeuren van bepaalde lobby-
groepen meewegen. Beide onderwerpen vragen om extra onderzoek om de oorzaken 
achter de gevonden patronen te onderzoeken.
Conclusie
Behalve de resultaten per hoofdstuk, zijn er natuurlijk ook bredere conclusies aan het 
onderzoek in deze dissertatie te ontlenen. De eerste en belangrijkste is dat de disser-
tatie duidelijk maakt dat het bestuderen van de activiteiten aan de hand van specifieke 
beleidskwesties een waardevolle toevoeging is aan de bestaande politicologische li-
teratuur. Dit proefschrift presenteert twee belangrijke voorbeelden van dergelijke 
voordelen. Allereerst helpt het ons beter te begrijpen waarom veel onderzoeken een 
zeer hoge ideologische congruentie tussen publieke opinie en politieke partijen vinden, 
terwijl er tegelijk veel zorgen bestaan over de mate waarin partijen nog geworteld zijn 
in de samenleving. De analyse van specifieke beleidskwesties maakt duidelijk dat de 
beleidsposities van Duitse regeringspartijen niet correleren met publieke opinie, al blijft 
er wel een correlatie met de voorkeuren van de aanhangers van deze partijen.
Het tweede grote voordeel is dat het bestuderen van specifieke beleidskwesties het 
mogelijk maakt de activiteiten van lobbyorganisaties en politieke partijen tegelijk te 
onderzoeken. De conclusies van hoofdstuk 4 en 5 maken laten daarbij zien dat de gevol-
gen van de samenwerking en allianties tussen deze twee belangrijke organisatietypes 
minder vanzelfsprekend zijn dan soms aangenomen. In hoofdstuk vier zagen we dat 
alleen samenwerking met machtige en partijen die het eens zijn met de belangenbehar-
tiger ervoor zorgt dat deze ook vaker haar/zijn zin krijgt. Hoofdstuk 5 liet bovendien ook 
zien dat zelfs de traditionele banden tussen een politieke partij en een bepaalde groep 
maatschappelijke organisaties er niet per definitie toe leidt dat deze laatste vaker een 
verzoek vervuld ziet in het regeerakkoord: andere factoren lijken deze beleidsinvloed te 
mediëren.
Al met al is het beeld dat deze dissertatie schept van representatieve democratie 
in West-Europa niet louter positief. De correlatie tussen de beleidsvoorkeuren van de 
gemiddelde kiezer en regeringspartijen is beperkt, en hetzelfde lijkt – in ieder geval op 
de onderwerpen die hier onderzocht zijn op te gaan voor Zweeds beleid. Daarnaast is er 
weinig direct bewijs dat belangenorganisaties deze tekortkomingen compenseren. Al-
hoewel de studies niet direct de effecten van lobbyen op beleidsresponsiviteit toetsen, 
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suggereert de beperkte invloed van deze organisaties op beleid wel dat ze niet zomaar 
de vertegenwoordigende functie van partijen zullen/kunnen overnemen.
Daar staat echter tegenover dat het niet enkel slecht nieuws is. Zo blijven de beleids-
posities van Duitse regeringspartijen samenhangen met de voorkeuren van aanhangers 
van de partij, en reageren Zweedse politici op veranderingen in publieke opinie door de 
aandacht die ze aan onderwerpen besteden. Bovendien zullen veel mensen de beperkte 
invloed van lobbyorganisaties niet alleen negatief vinden: zeker in hoofdstuk 5, zou 
veel lobby-invloed kunnen betekenen dat politieke partijen afwijken van de plannen 
waarmee ze net verkozen zijn.
Samenvattend biedt deze dissertatie dus een gemengd beeld van de mate waarin 
politieke partijen en belangengroepen helpen om publieke voorkeuren te vertalen naar 
beleid. Het blijft belangrijk om ook in de toekomst meer van dergelijke analyses uit te 
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Political parties take positions and make decisions on many policies 
that directly influence important parts of the lives of their voters. 
These policies include issues like raising the retirement age, lending 
money to large companies that face bankruptcy, or deploying soldiers 
to Afghanistan.
But do political parties take into account the policy preferences of 
the general public and their own voters when making such decisions? 
And to what extent do interest groups influence political parties’ 
positions and decisions on these policy issues? 
This dissertation studies these important questions across a 
range of wealthy, Northwestern European democracies with strong 
democratic credentials, covering dozens of political parties, policy 
issues and even more interest groups and other policy advocates.
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